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Abstract 
This study of early modern governing practices analyzes the rule of Philip V of Spain (1700-
1724, 1724-1746) in relation to his predecessor, the Habsburg Charles II (1665-1700) and his 
grandfather, Louis XIV of France (1643-1715). Philip creatively engaged the legacy of both 
monarchs to create a unique set of governing practices that centralized his authority while also 
maintaining a significant degree of variation in how he related to his subjects based on their 
social and political standing. Philip followed a particularist model that allowed him to give 
specific concessions and privileges only to the subjects who requested them. This approach to 
governing resulted in an ad-hoc administrative and legal patchwork rife with irregularities, but it 
circumvented the unavoidable problems of replacing multiple complex systems throughout his 
kingdoms with a uniform legal system. While Philip’s reforms left some subjects dissatisfied 
with his reign, it enabled him to cultivate support among elite groups in his towns and kingdoms, 
securing his rule in the aftermath of the War of Spanish Succession (1705-1714). The advantages 
of particularism can be seen in comparison with eighteenth century France, where greater 
centralization and administrative uniformity created long-term problems that eventually resulted 
in the French Revolution. The Spanish model, while usually deemed less successful than that of 
the French, avoided some of the problems that led to the revolution while simultaneously 
minimizing royal debt. These findings challenge dominant interpretations of state formation in 
early modern Europe, suggesting that rulers could rationally choose policies that increased 
administrative and legal fragmentation.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
“...my royal intention is that all of the continent of Spain be governed by the same laws, in 
which the Aragonese and Valencians are very interested, for the communication of my kindness 
that will allow them, along with the Castilians, access to the posts, honors, and other 
conveniences that are available in the kingdoms of Castile....” – Philip V of Spain (July 29, 
1707)
1
 
 
The War of Spanish Succession ended with the fall of Barcelona on September 11, 1714, but 
the process of establishing the new Bourbon rule in the Crown of Aragon had only just begun. 
While Philip V, the first Bourbon king of Spain, was safe from foreign invasion, the popular 
support in the eastern kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon for his rival, the Archduke Charles of 
Austria, lent the conflict within Iberia the appearance of a civil war. Philip’s subjects in Aragon 
were confused as to how they should communicate with the victorious king. Communication 
mattered because the king had levied new taxes and many in war-torn Aragon doubted their 
ability to pay. On May 7, 1715, the enterprising municipal officials of the town of Alquézar 
wrote a letter to the city council of the nearby town of Berbegal, asking them to summon a 
meeting of delegates (diputados) from the various towns of the region (el Partido de Barbastro) 
to prepare a joint petition to the king. The petition would be sent by a delegation from the towns 
with instructions “and the blessing of the region (Partido) in common, as well as that of each one 
of its villages (pueblos),” so that they could represent the “miserable state” of the region with 
accuracy and brevity to secure the “paternal clemency and love of His Majesty.”
2
  
                                                 
1
 Published in Novísima recopilación de los Leyes de España (Madrid: 1805), Book III, Title 
III, Law II. 
 
2
 Letter from the Alcaldes y Legidores y Auntamiento de Alquézar to Antonio Ayerbe, 
Secretario, Señores Alcalde y Regidores de la Villa de Berbeyal, 7 May 1715, in the Archivo 
Histórico Nacional (A.H.N.), Consejos, Leg. 6811A, No. 80. 
2 
 
The meeting, with delegates from at least twenty-seven villages, began three weeks later in a 
hermitage near Berbegal.
3
 Early optimism must have faded quickly, however, as a few of the 
delegates began to warn the others that no one had petitioned the local corregidor, a key royal 
official, for permission to hold the meeting. The assembled delegates chose to notify the 
corregidor and reconvene the next day when they expected representatives from 120 villages to 
attend. The corregidor immediately notified the regent of the royal tribunal (Real Audiencia) in 
Zaragoza, the capital of the kingdom of Aragon. The regent told the commandante general, the 
Marqués de Casafuerte, who sent the constable (Alcalde de Crimen), Don Andrés Montañez, 
with an escort of fifty dragoons to investigate the true motive of the convocation, apprehend its 
main instigators, and “mortify” those who might want to copy its example by demonstrating the 
“pernicious and evil consequences” of organizing similar unauthorized assemblies.
4
 
While Montañez was en route to Berbegal, the Marqués de Casafuerte received a letter from 
the corregidor of Barbastro relating the account he had received from two city councilmen 
(regidores) from Barbastro who had attended the meeting in Berbegal. They explained that the 
assembly’s only goal was to tell the king about the difficulty these towns would have paying the 
new taxes. The councilmen then asked for permission to continue the meeting, which was denied 
by the corregidor. Even though the delegates of the towns had committed a crime by meeting, the 
corregidor forgave those involved because they acted out of ignorance. He then wrote to 
Casafuerte for further orders.
5
  
                                                 
3
 The Ermita de Santa Águeda or the Ermita de San Gregorio are likely candidates, although 
none of these records name which hermitage they met in.  
 
4
 Letter from the Marques de Casafuerte, Commandante General of the Kingdom of Aragon, 
to Don Miguel Fernandez Duran, 28 May 1715, A.H.N., consejos, Leg. 6811A, No. 80. 
 
5
 Ibid. 
3 
 
When the king met with the Council of Castile to discuss the matter, they concluded that 
while this meeting, which they called an “arbitrary committee” (junta arbitraria), violated the 
laws of the kingdom, it was done in “total ignorance” and for the purpose of facilitating the 
timely collection of the new tax with the least harm to the king’s subjects—a goal that the king 
would no doubt affirm. The council concluded that the crime was “only worthy of a severe 
warning” to discourage its repetition. Despite the apparent failure of the now-dispersed 
assembly, however, its message had been received. The council took the Aragonese concerns 
seriously and suggested that various officials in Aragon collect reports on the villages and their 
inhabitants’ ability to pay the new tax, but to do so secretly in order to avoid anything that might 
disturb the public peace. The king agreed with this advice and ordered his ministers to enact all 
of the council’s recommendations.
6
  
The official response to these towns’ attempt at collective negotiation with Philip V reveals 
his key concerns and strategies for ruling his kingdoms. When the king’s subjects had concerns 
about royal policy, the king and his advisors were willing to listen, but they insisted on 
approaching each community separately rather than collectively. The primary reason for 
opposing the meeting in Berbegal was the fear that the assembly of frustrated subjects could 
spiral out of control and lead to public disturbances. Direct negotiation with the separate towns 
had additional benefits, however. It allowed the king to concede only as much as each particular 
community required, reducing the cost of royal tax concessions on the whole. This form of 
“particularist” negotiation also focused his subjects’ attention on their relationship with Philip 
rather than highlighting the shared concerns of his subjects that might distance them from him. 
The result was that the Aragonese looked to the king for help with local and personal concerns, 
                                                 
6
 Consulta of the Consejo de Castilla, 6 June 1715, A.H.N., Consejos, Leg. 6811A, No. 80. 
4 
 
linking their interests with the monarch who solved their problems. It also dramatically increased 
the amount of time and paperwork involved in these negotiations and ultimately led to 
fragmentation in the privileges granted to the towns and kingdoms of Spain. 
This system of government, referred to by historians as particularism, marked a natural, 
although significant, evolution in the negotiation between king and subject in early modern 
Spain. Until 1700, there was no “Spain,” but rather an Iberian “composite monarchy” made up of 
several separate kingdoms united in the person of the monarch but divergent in their 
administration and law.
7
 The War of Spanish Succession marked a turning point in the Spanish 
monarchy’s relationship with its subjects and is commonly identified as the beginning of the 
modern Spanish state, but as this example shows, the reality was complicated. While Philip V 
claimed to want to rule all of his subjects under the same law so that he could treat them equally, 
his approach to negotiating with his subjects undercut his steps towards legal and administrative 
unity and produced a patchwork of divergent privileges instead. While the standard narrative of 
growing centralization and uniformity under the Bourbons has some virtues to recommend it—
most notably the language of centralization in the infamous initial decree of the Nueva Planta 
and the abolition of fueros and privileges in the Crown of Aragon—royal practices in eighteenth 
century Spain reveal surprising continuities in the approaches to ruling employed by the new 
Bourbon king and his Habsburg predecessors. 
Philip V's transformation of the Spanish government through the adoption and reinvention of 
Habsburg models of governance did not create a centralized and uniform government. By 
                                                 
7
 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Cities and the State in Spain,” in Cities and the Rise of States 
in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800, Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans, eds. (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994), 168. On composite monarchies, see J.H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite 
Monarchies,” in Spain, Europe & the Wider World, 1500-1800 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009), 3-24. 
5 
 
adopting particularism and abolishing many of the intermediate institutions (such as the cortes) 
that had facilitated the corporate negotiation with the king, Philip V both centralized power and 
increased the ability of individual subjects and towns to negotiate directly with the king. These 
reforms allowed him to be much more responsive to their interests and requests, as a town did 
not need to persuade neighboring communities to support its preferred privileges before it could 
present them to the king. At the same time, this increase in royal flexibility also multiplied the 
number of requests, and therefore the volume of paperwork, that the more streamlined royal 
bureaucracy had to process. Particularism, as implemented by the Bourbons, both increased 
centralization and decentralization, pushing the loci of those negotiating royal policy into the 
royal court and simultaneously into each town council and individual household. 
Most theories of state formation in the early modern period emphasize the importance of 
centralization, so suggesting continued fragmentation in Bourbon Spain raises the specter of 
once again “proving” Iberian backwardness. To repeat the old “Black Legend” of a failed state 
that was either in decline or had never managed to succeed, however, would require ignoring the 
true significance of the Bourbon governing strategy and its long-term consequences.
8
 The 
continued legal fragmentation of eighteenth century Spain is an example of the alternative paths 
of state development open to absolute rulers in early modern Europe. The Bourbons chose to 
reform their administration in a way that enhanced local authority and the influence of 
municipalities while at the same time increasing the security of their own rule. Instead of failing 
to become a successful nation-state—a telos imposed by historians looking backward rather than 
a goal in the mind of any early modern ruler—the Bourbon kings of Spain reformed their 
                                                 
8
 For an engaging account of how the narrative of decline was introduced and perpetuated 
among American scholars of Spain, see Richard L. Kagan, “Prescott’s Paradigm: American 
Historical Scholarship and the Decline of Spain,” American Historical Review, 101, 2 (April 
1996): 423-446.  
6 
 
administration in response to immediate challenges with an institutional character all its own. It 
is a reflection of the unexpected possibilities open to early modern rulers that can be so hard to 
see from the perspective of the present, which has been colored by nationalist myths and theories 
emphasizing the importance of state centralization. It also suggests that the desire to claim 1700 
as the year of the advent of the Spanish state should be tempered with the recognition that the 
new Bourbon government was built upon the skeleton of the old composite monarchy. 
The last twenty years have reminded the world that each nation-state has its own history, 
which in turn has shaped its present. Current challenges raise important questions about the 
origins of states that we believe we know and the inevitability of any particular institutional 
arrangement. In the midst of the rise of the European Union in 1992, the historian Sir J. H. Elliott 
suggested that the establishment of such supra-national political institutions had roots in early 
modern multi-kingdom monarchies, such as the Habsburg empires in Spain and Austria.
9
 Twenty 
years later, the European Union now appears increasingly unstable as its member states 
emphasize their autonomy, a position which recent elections have encouraged. Nowhere is this 
opposition to centralization greater than in Catalonia, where the Catalans are expressing a 
growing interest in independence from Spain. While these developments could be read as the 
resurgence of the nation-state as the “imagined community” seeking political self-determination, 
each of these states contains significant diversity—Catalonia, for example, is itself a multi-ethnic 
and multi-lingual political unit composed of large immigrant populations from other parts of 
Spain and the rest of the world—indicating that more is at work than this would suggest.
10
 
Recent research has further complicated our conception of nationalism at its height in the early 
                                                 
9
 Elliott, “Composite Monarchies,” 3-24. 
 
10
 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).  
7 
 
twentieth century by demonstrating how a preference for local concerns and “indifference to 
nation” could persist and even co-opt nationalist rhetoric in fascist Germany and Italy.
11
 These 
complex political developments demonstrate the need for renewed reflection on the origin of 
modern state institutions. By focusing on the moment traditionally identified as Spain’s 
transformation from a multi-kingdom monarchy to a modern nation state, this study reveals how 
early modern monarchs could co-opt competing local interests through particularist negotiation 
in a process that simultaneously promoted fragmentation and yet reinforced the monarchy. 
The early modern period has often been identified as a crucial period for state formation in 
Western Europe.
12
 Charles Tilly provided an influential framework for analyzing the creation of 
states in his contributions to The Formation of National States in Western Europe. He 
emphasized the importance of recognizing that the process was open and contingent. For 
example, in 1600 it was not clear how political institutions would develop nor which would be 
successful, as evidenced by the many governments that failed to survive into the nineteenth 
century.
13
 Tilly identified the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a period of proliferating 
                                                 
11
 Roberta Pergher, “Staging the Nation in Fascist Italy’s ‘New Provinces,’” Austrian history 
Yearbook 43 (2012): 98-115. 
 
12
 For some prominent studies that adopt this framework, see Charles Tilly, ed., The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 
Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), Kenneth H. F. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study 
of an Idea and Institution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), Charles Tilly and Wim P. 
Blockmans, eds., Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1994), Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems 
Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), Thomas Ertmann, The Birth of Leviathan: 
Building States and Regimes in Early Modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), Paul Kléber Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999),  and James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern 
France, 2
nd
 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), among many others.  
 
13
 Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” in The Formation of 
National States in Western Europe, 7. 
8 
 
institutional variety, followed by a period of increasing convergence among the states that 
survived the increasingly competitive environment of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
14
 
He concluded that the “European state-making process minimized the cultural variation within 
states and maximized the variation among states.”
15
 This tendency helps to explain the power of 
the nationalist narratives in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—the sense of living in an 
“imagined community” described by Benedict Anderson reflected the growing cultural 
similarities actively promoted by these states. The states in turn employed these narratives 
toward defending their various claims to national self-determination. Tilly went on to suggest 
that administrative and cultural homogeneity increased the likelihood of a population remaining 
loyal to its government, and that it facilitated efficient “centralized policies of extraction and 
control,” based on the society’s “relatively uniform” way of life.
16
 This emphasis on the state’s 
extraction and repression led Tilly to interpret sixteenth century Spain as a promising example of 
state development, presumably because of the centralization associated with the defeat of the 
revolt of the comuneros against Charles V in 1520-1521 and the cultural unification driven by 
the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 and the Moriscos (whose predecessors had converted from 
Islam to Christianity a century earlier) in the early 1600s. According to Tilly, these early 
successes were followed by a period of decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the 
monarchy failed to continue to centralize power in Madrid and homogenize its population. This 
“decline” led to Spain entering “the age of industry and empire with one of the least stately 
                                                 
14
 Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 62. 
 
15
 Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 79. 
 
16
 Ibid. 
 
9 
 
governmental structures of the continent,” according to Tilly.
17
 This discouraging narrative is 
unable to explain how Spain survived the great winnowing of European states in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, however, which suggests that something must have held the Iberian state 
together despite its apparent backwardness.
18
 Given Tilly’s emphasis on the importance of 
stately governmental structures to state survival in modern Europe, it appears that there is more 
to be discovered concerning the development of the Spanish government in the early modern 
period if this question is to be adequately answered.
19
 
One way to approach this challenge is to consider the relationship between the basis of 
governmental authority and its institutional forms. Max Weber did this in his discussion of the 
kinds of authority employed by rulers in various ages. His description of the kinds of authority 
that could legitimize the exercise of power and the ways that these cultural foundations manifest 
in different institutional forms provides a more flexible framework for considering the variations 
among early modern states. Weber proposed three general kinds of authority. The first he termed 
“charismatic authority,” which claims legitimacy based “on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, 
heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person,” which grant the charismatic leader 
broad authority to define normative patterns to govern collective life. Charismatic authority is the 
most personal form and the least-relevant for understanding early modern Europe. The second is 
“traditional authority,” which bases its legitimacy “on an established belief in the sanctity of 
                                                 
17
 Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State-Making,” 35. See page 44 as well.  
 
18
 Christopher Storrs has argued against precisely this kind of narrative in his book on late-
seventeenth century Spain, The Resilience of the Spanish Monarchy, 1665-1700 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
19
 Tilly has noted the weakness of his emphasis on state formation as a process of 
“extraction” and “repression” more recently and addressed it in his book, Coercion, Capital ,and 
European States, AD 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1990). See also Tilly, 
“Entanglements of European Cities and States,” in Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 
100 to 1800, 4-6. 
10 
 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them.” This form of 
authority is still personal, but it is based on traditions and institutions to legitimize the personal 
exercise of power within those traditional bounds. Traditional authority is more helpful when 
considering early modern states, because the claims to legitimize legal action nearly always 
invoke some kind of precedent, even when they were employed to justify innovation. Weber’s 
third form of authority is “rational authority,” which he describes as relying “on a belief in the 
legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands.” Rational authority is the most modern and least personal form of authority. It is the 
source of modern bureaucratic states based on arbitrary and abstract rules established by consent 
(of the elite, at least) rather than any personal or traditional claims to authority. Weber believed 
that rational authority was the most precise, stable, and reliable form of authority and an essential 
arrangement for managing the large populations of the modern world.
 20
 
This final form of authority, especially when wielded by a modern bureaucracy, has a 
number of things in common with Tilly’s description of the attributes of successful states, yet 
Weber’s description of rational authority rules out most early modern states. Weber’s model of 
traditional authority is more helpful when considering early modern Europe in general and Spain 
in particular.
21
 Rather than following any of the institutional models for the exercise of 
traditional authority described by Weber, however, early modern Spain exhibited a peculiar 
                                                 
20
 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed. Guenther 
Roth and Claus Wittich, (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), vol. I, 215-241; quotations from 
215.   
 
21
 Other historians of early modern Spain have come to the same conclusion, although they 
tend to focus on the Habsburg monarchy. For a helpful summary in English, see James S. 
Amelang, “The Peculiarities of the Spaniards: Historical Approaches to the Early Modern State,”  
in Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations, James S. Amelang and 
Siegfried Bier, eds. (Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2006), 43-44. Among the works that he draws 
on here, the most important is Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía: trabajos 
de historia política (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992).  
11 
 
blending of the qualities of several of these forms of authority along with a few that are entirely 
novel. This is especially true following the ascension of Philip V in 1700. Under Philip, the 
Spanish monarchy became increasingly personal as the king worked to emphasize his own 
authority to make law and dispense privileges, which is one of the signs of Weber’s model of 
traditional authority when exercised within a patrimonial system that links patronage to the 
personal rule of the monarchs drawn from the royal family.
22
 At the same time, Philip granted 
numerous privileges to individuals and municipalities that he deemed loyal. These concessions 
constrained the king’s political power, forcing him to compromise with those holding seigniorial 
authority and municipal political power. While Weber described this kind of development as a 
variation of the patrimonial system, he emphasized the role of corporate bodies such as the 
French estates and Spanish cortes as the instruments of negotiation between the king and his 
subjects.
23
 Spain under the Habsburgs had already begun to replace the cortes with direct 
negotiation with towns, and this process accelerated under Philip. Direct negotiation enabled the 
king to grant each town or individual’s most important demands without making the concession 
generally applicable throughout the king’s realm. The increased variation in privileges, while 
emphasizing the personal link between those privileges and the person of the monarch, led the 
king’s subjects increasingly to identify their interests with those of the monarchy. It also 
dramatically increased the time and paperwork involved in running the royal bureaucracy.
24
 This 
particularist negotiation was the key governing strategy of the Bourbons and stands in dramatic 
contrast to the centralization and homogenization that figure so significantly in Weber and 
Tilly’s theories of state development.  
                                                 
22
 Fernández Albaladejo, Fragmentos, 226-227, 231-232.  
 
23
 Ibid., 232, 237, 239.  
 
12 
 
The tensions between these models of state formation and the institutional reality of early 
modern Spain have not been adequately addressed in the historical narrative.
25
 Part of the 
problem is the tendency for most descriptions of this process to focus on France or England.
26
 
Theorists’ concentration on these two cases has had detrimental consequences for scholars’ 
understanding of the development of the Spanish state, as can be seen in a recently published 
collection of essays by some of the most prominent Spanish historians and legal scholars 
investigating the formation of the Spanish nation state.
27
 In his introduction to the volume, José 
Manuel de Bernardo Ares argues that “the Nation-State” of Spain was created in 1700-1716 and 
served as the underlying “political organization of the Spanish society” until 1978, when Spain 
became a “State of Autonomous Regions.” By this account, the Habsburg composite monarchy 
ended with the Nueva Planta reforms in Catalonia on January 16, 1716. These reforms initiated 
the “‘National’ monarchy of the Bourbons,” which was defined by “a unitary power, 
administrative centralization, and legal uniformity.”
28
 The entire volume is organized around 
these themes and this chronology. Similar claims often have been made by other historians, 
                                                 
25
 Regina Grafe has done some helpful work toward this end, but her focus on the economic 
development of Spain leaves many questions concerning the development of the Spanish 
monarchy and its practices of governance unanswered; see Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, 
and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
 
26
 Paul Monod, The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589-1715 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 8. Ironically, as with Tilly, Monod seems to over-
generalize and suggest too much continuity between European monarchies in this work despite 
his caution against making this error. 
 
27
 José Manuel de Bernardo Ares and Santiago Muñoz Machado, eds. El Estado-Nación en 
dos encruciajadas Históricas (Madrid: Fundación Ricardo delgado Vizcaíno, 2006).  
 
28
 Bernardo Ares, “Nota preliminary (la perspectiva histórica),” ibid, 15. He echoes this 
argument in his essay in the same volumen, “La España francesa y la Europa británica a 
comienzos del siglo XVIII. De la monarquía «paccionada» de los austrios a la monarquía 
«nacional» de los borbones,” ibid, 154-155. 
13 
 
placing Bernardo Ares clearly among the mainstream interpretation of eighteenth-century 
Spanish history.
29
  
Such characterizations are commonplace and yet highly problematic on a number of levels. 
First of all, it is not particularly helpful to claim that the nation state of Spain was created by one 
decree when that document does not state anything of the sort. The assertion becomes even more 
doubtful when the decree reaffirms legal irregularity, as the Nueva Planta of Catalonia did by 
leaving Catalan civil law in place.
30
 Second, claiming the persistence of the nation state despite 
significant political upheaval and reconfiguration over two and a half centuries is forced and 
avoids many of the historical problems that could increase our understanding of the formation of 
the Spanish nation state. The consistent re-emergence of regional and local loyalties suggests that 
many of the king’s subjects held alternative conceptions of the state during this period. The joint 
memorial of the procuradores of the four capitals of the Crown of Aragon in the Cortes of 1760 
asking Charles III for the restoration of their privileges, the emergence of modern Catalan 
                                                 
29
 James Amelang’s review of the historical literature on the early modern Spanish 
government reflects this understanding; see Amelang, “The Peculiarities of the Spaniards,” 
especially page 41. For additional examples, see, Ricardo García Cárcel, “Introducción. La 
significación histórica de los Borbones,” in the volume he edited, Historia de España Siglo 
XVIII: La España de los Borbones (Madrid: Cátedra, 2002), 10, 13; Francisco Cánovas Sánchez, 
“Los decretos de nueva planta y la nueva organización política y administrativa de los países de 
la Corona de Aragón,” in La época de los primeros Borbones: La Nueva Monarquía y su 
posición en Europa (1700-1759), eds. Francisco Cánovas Sánchez, et al., 2nd Ed. (Madrid: 
Espasa-Calpe, 1987), 3-4; W. N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, Eighteenth-Century Spain, 1700-1788: 
a political, diplomatic, and institutional history, (London: Macmillan, 1979), 9; John Lynch, 
Bourbon Spain, 1700-1808 (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), passim, and I. A. A. Thompson, 
“Castile, Spain, and the monarchy: the political community from patria natural to patria 
nacional,” in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic world: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott, Richard 
Kagan and Geoffrey Parker, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 159. 
 
30
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nationalism in the nineteenth century, and the growing autonomy of Catalonia under the Second 
Republic in the early 1930s, among other examples, demonstrate that the tensions between the 
old Crown of Aragon and the old Crown of Castile remained throughout this period of supposed 
unity.
31
 Finally, it is perplexing to insist that Spain became a modern nation state while 
remaining a society based on privilege and composed of unequal kingdoms, municipalities, and 
subjects—the equality of citizens before the state is one of the hallmarks of the modern nation-
state that eighteenth-century Bourbon Spain failed to achieve.
32
 While Bernardo Ares and others 
correctly identify the early-eighteenth century as a period of significant political change, it is 
essential to find more accurate language to describe it if we are to make sense of these dynamics. 
One term that is often used to describe both the Habsburg and Bourbon monarchies in Spain 
is absolutism. The Bourbon monarchy in Spain is especially identified as an absolutist regime, 
either because it was following the French model of Louis XIV, or because it was expanding 
Castilian practices to the rest of the Iberian kingdoms.
33
 Absolutism conjures many images and 
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associations and yet has proved a slippery category when employed by historians. Its invocation 
tends to elide meaningful differences between the governments of various European monarchs 
by emphasizing the French Bourbon’s efforts to centralize royal authority and increase cultural 
and administrative unity as the pan-European model. Part of the allure of this error is that this 
narrative has been linked to “absolutism” since the word was coined by Châteaubriand in his 
Essay on Revolutions in 1797.
34
 The term acquired new baggage in the nineteenth century as it 
came to be associated with “militarism, mercantilism, despotism, inquisition, the Jesuits, [and] 
ultramontanism,” while serving as the opposite of constitutional government and liberty.
35
 
Reflecting this history, our modern conception of absolutism suggests that the monarch was 
entirely unrestricted. 
This understanding misrepresents historical reality. Even in France, absolute monarchs 
remained meaningfully restricted in their authority by natural law and a duty to act for the 
“common good” of their subjects even while the king remained technically absolved from 
complying with the law.
36
  Modern historical research now tends to reflect this distinction. While 
twenty-five years ago Richard Bonney concluded his review of the literature on French 
absolutism by noting the “little agreement among historians on the nature of absolutism,” there is 
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Century Europe, edited by John Miller (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). 
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much greater consensus now.
37
 Recently, William Beik has observed that the questions about 
absolutism in France primarily concern its practice. While no one disputes that these kings 
claimed absolute authority, current research must investigate how much these monarchs could 
actually do and what real limits existed on their power to enforce their will. The current 
consensus holds that Bourbon France in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries was 
the product of social collaboration between the king and the regional and local elite. Royal power 
was constrained by numerous institutions and could not be arbitrarily exercised without the 
support of many of the king’s subjects.
38
 Ruth MacKay has noted a similar emphasis on 
negotiation in the practice of absolutism in Habsburg Spain. She argues that the Castilian 
monarchy was not an oppressive centralized state, but rather a state composed of reciprocal 
personal obligations that enabled subjects, individually and corporately, to appeal to their king 
and negotiate their compliance with his orders. The Habsburg monarchs ruled Castile in an 
increasingly personal manner through these connections and responded to particular concerns in 
creative and inconsistent ways.
39
 In both Spain and France, historians have converged on 
understandings of absolutism that emphasize the role of negotiation and compromise in the daily 
operation of the government. 
Given the many negative and doubtful implications of the word “absolutism” which persist, 
James Collins has cautioned against its use. He argues that the technical use of a word in a way 
that differs so dramatically from common usage is profoundly misguided. Collins insists that 
using the word “absolutism” as if it did not have this baggage is nothing short of “linguistic 
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chicanery.”
40
 Whether or not historians abandon the language of “absolutism,” some new 
vocabulary is necessary to characterize the royal policies and practices of the Bourbon monarchy 
in Spain if we are to differentiate them from those of Habsburg Spain and Bourbon France.  
Toward that end, this study will employ the term “particularism” to describe the form of 
social collaboration pursued by Philip V in most of his dealings with the Crown of Aragon.  The 
term has often been used as a synonym for localism or sometimes devolution, especially in the 
work of Spanish historians where it is generally (and disparagingly) contrasted with 
“universalism.”
41
 Luis Corteguera has refined the use of this term by noting that particularism 
“underscores not only the indifference of one location or region in the affairs of another—what 
may be referred to as localism or provincialism—but also of one social group toward another.” 
In this context, particularism can be employed to describe subjects’ preference to negotiate 
directly with the monarch for specific concessions and privileges instead of first negotiating a 
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common position with their fellow subjects in the same city or region.
42
 While the terms 
devolution or localism can also be employed to describe decentralized decision making or the 
preference for local concerns over the more general interests of a kingdom, particularism allows 
us to describe the preference of a group within a specific community to look out for its interests 
through direct negotiation with the king. By focusing on the narrow interests of a particular 
group, the word particularism allows one to describe the form of social collaboration that is 
increasingly recognized as the hallmark of early modern monarchical government.  
It is worth noting that particularist interests among communities and towns need not always 
support the monarch. Xavier Gil has noted how recent studies indicate that particularism in 
England during the Civil War led to indifference to the Charles I’s cause. As towns eschewed 
participation in a war which they did not care about, Charles was unable to raise troops to 
challenge the professional army that opposed him.
43
 A similar form of pacifism based upon the 
local indifference of cities in Holland to “national” or “royal” concerns played an important role 
in the Dutch revolts of the sixteenth century. The Duchy of Milan provides the counter example, 
as the Spanish Habsburgs successful use of particularism allowed the monarchy to link the 
interests of the Milanese ruling elite to their own, which was essential to the Habsburg’s 
continued hold on the Duchy until the eighteenth century. Indifference could be a strong 
motivation for pacifism, which gave early modern monarchs good reason to pursue policies that 
linked particularist concerns to royal interests through networks of patronage.
44
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This perspective complicates traditional narratives, such as those proposed by Tilly and 
Weber, which emphasize the centralization of power as the key feature of successful early 
modern states. “Success” in these narratives is almost always defined by military triumphs. 
Centralization, however, was not the only way for a government to administer justice and pay for 
an army. I.A.A. Thompson has shown how the devolution of the responsibility to raise and 
maintain an army could be a very effective strategy in defensive wars, such as those between 
Habsburg Spain and Bourbon France in the seventeenth century. By invoking the traditional 
feudal duty of vassals to provide and supply soldiers, Philip IV and Charles I acquired the 
military they needed at the cost of devolving significant royal authority to various municipalities. 
The administration of raising troops and paying for them remained entirely outside of royal 
control, and in the hands of municipal officials instead. This process naturally increased the 
significance of the negotiation between the monarchy and the local and regional elite providing 
the military for the king.
45
 Even when the central government appears strong, MacKay has 
properly cautioned against assuming the impotence of regional and local centers of power, as “a 
strong center may simply indicate effective management of peripheral jurisdictions, not their 
elimination.”
46
 Given the complexity of these relationships and the problematic characterizations 
of eighteenth century Spain that persist, a comparative look at the kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon under the Bourbons is long overdue. 
This dissertation will examine state formation in early modern Spain by focusing on the way 
in which the Spanish monarchy governed the Crown of Aragon under both the Habsburgs and 
the Bourbons. To understand how Philip V changed the Spanish monarchy through the 
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institutional reforms of the Nueva Planta, one must also grasp the way in which the seventeenth-
century Habsburgs exercised their power when facing similar challenges. This is the focus of 
chapter two, “The Habsburg Practice of Governance,” which argues that the Habsburgs governed 
their kingdoms in a flexible manner that facilitated negotiation between royal subjects and the 
monarch. The institutional complexity of Habsburg governance involved multiple authorities in 
competition with one another for jurisdiction, which created space for these negotiations and 
provided the king’s subjects with a number of opportunities to appeal or delay decisions that they 
opposed. The Habsburgs were not lackadaisical monarchs with no desire to increase their power, 
however, as this chapter will argue based on the increase in royal authority following the revolts 
in Catalonia in 1640 and in Messina in 1672. Despite these changes, local privileges that 
reflected traditional custom and preference but did not oppose royal authority were permitted to 
remain. This peculiar combination of respect for legal forms and customs, along with a very 
pragmatic and flexible approach to their implementation permitted the Habsburgs to maintain 
much of their European empire through a century of significant demographic, military, and 
financial set-backs. This resilience demonstrates the success of particularism as a royal model of 
governance and challenges the emphasis on uniformity and centralization in Tilly and Weber’s 
theories of political development. 
Chapter three, “Bourbon Reforms of the Crown of Aragon, 1706-1716,” analyzes how Philip 
V changed this system in the Crown of Aragon and highlights some of the surprising continuities 
between his approach to governing and Habsburg particularism. This is especially significant as 
he chose this course of action after the War of Spanish Succession essentially removed the legal 
restraints that had traditionally defined the king’s relationship with his subjects in the Crown of 
Aragon. The initial reforms in June 1707 abolished Valencian and Aragonese privileges based on 
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Philip’s right of conquest following their “rebellion” with the explicit intention to govern all of 
his territories “by the same laws.”
47
 He backed away from this policy one month later, however, 
admitting that not all of his subjects had rebelled and that the communal and individual 
privileges of those who had been faithful remained. Nevertheless, Philip continued his 
institutional reforms on the basis of his absolute royal authority despite conceding the right of 
conquest. This decree immediately created a flood of petitions from towns and individuals 
throughout Aragon and Valencia for the restoration of their privileges. In 1711, having lost and 
subsequently regained control of Aragon, and following a significant decline in the French 
influence on Philip’s court,
48
 a new set of reforms were implemented that restored Aragonese 
civil law and increased the influence of Aragonese officials within their kingdom. This new 
Aragonese system served as the model for the new governments of Catalonia and Mallorca 
following the War of Succession and was more-or-less extended to Valencia in 1716.
49
 By 
emphasizing his authority over his subjects’ privileges, Philip gained a powerful tool in his 
negotiations with his subjects in the Crown of Aragon that he employed to reward those who had 
demonstrated their fidelity during the war. In this way he created an increasingly fragmented and 
idiosyncratic web of corporate and individual privileges that were dependent on his personal 
authority. These privileges cemented the king’s support among those who had been faithful to 
him during the war. Those who had supported Philip’s rival, the Habsburg Archduke Charles, 
served as an example of the cost of challenging the king, as they lost their property, their income, 
and their eligibility for public office, among other punishments. The effect of these policies was 
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not to create a uniform nation-state, as Bernardo Ares and others have contended, but rather a 
reconfiguration of royal networks of patronage within the Crown of Aragon. The Spanish 
monarchy remained dependent on social collaboration, and the king’s pursuit of particularist 
policies reflected this reality. 
Chapter four, “The Reality of Bourbon Rule, 1717-1746,” explores the Bourbon practice of 
governing the Crown of Aragon after the implementation of these reforms, highlighting the way 
that Philip and his ministers addressed the particularist concerns of his subjects and preserved 
significant institutional variety among the kingdoms and towns of the Crown of Aragon. Philip V 
and his ministers continued to prefer to leave well-enough alone by granting specific exemptions 
to the general rule when necessary rather than reform the legal system to promote legal 
uniformity. When difficulties arose, Philip consistently opposed “innovations” in governing 
practice and pursued policies which had proven successful despite the complexity and 
incoherence that such approaches to governing promoted. This chapter traces these governing 
practices through analysis of three issues that arose during Philip’s reign: the problems in the 
financial system created by reforming the censo, the complication of administering justice due to 
the preservation of Aragonese and Catalan civil law, and the jurisdictional disputes that arose 
when implementing the Nueva Planta in Catalonia. As these examples demonstrate, the Bourbon 
monarchy created a novel patch-work system that was flexible, pragmatic, and ultimately 
fragmentary. Philip V’s primary concern was the creation of a functional government, not some 
desire for bureaucratic or legal uniformity. When he attempted to impose sweeping reforms, his 
officials often found that the apparently simple and universal royal decrees raised more questions 
than they answered when one attempted to apply them to the complex practical and legal 
situations that they faced in the Crown of Aragon. Particularism allowed Philip to make choices 
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that affirmed royal authority as the ultimate source of resolution to these difficulties while also 
freeing him to make decisions that added to the legal and administrative complexity of his 
government. 
The fifth and final chapter, “The Myth of Bourbon Absolutism,” compares the Bourbon 
monarchy in Spain with that in France to develop the larger implications of Bourbon rule in the 
Crown of Aragon for an understanding of absolutism and state formation in early modern 
Europe. Bourbon France, especially under Louis XIV, is traditionally interpreted as the most 
successful absolutist state in Europe. Because Philip was Louis’ grandson and brought a retinue 
of French ministers with him to France, many have assumed that the reforms early in his reign 
were an effort to transplant the French model of governing to Spain. This chapter challenges that 
narrative based on a comparison of Spanish and French governing practices on matters regarding 
taxation, the sale of offices, and the role of representative assemblies in the negotiation between 
king and subject. Over all, the policies adopted by Philip V and the subsequent Bourbon kings of 
Spain seem to reflect a recognition of the importance of cultivating support from the local and 
regional elite through granting and protecting their privileges. Louis XIV and his successors, on 
the other hand, threatened these privileges by introducing new forms of taxation and changing 
the rules regarding the sale of offices that attempted to shift the fiscal burden of the state to those 
who had traditionally been exempt from funding it. This shift was a response to dire financial 
need and reflected Louis’ belief that he had adequate social support to make it work. While this 
divergence had some long-term consequences, in the short run both Philip V and Louis XIV 
were able to secure their rule by emphasizing their subjects’ dependence on them while 
simultaneously improving the financial resources of the Crown. In fact, the absence of the fiscal 
and bureaucratic problems that led to the French Revolution demonstrate that the Spanish 
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governing strategy offered some advantages over those employed in Bourbon France. 
Divergence in the use of taxation and venality reveal the open and contingent nature of state 
development in early modern Europe. Among the important factors that shaped rulers’ decisions 
were the customs and expectations of royal subjects, which determined which reforms could 
plausibly be pursued. The enduring legacy of the Habsburg composite monarchy continued to 
structure Bourbon Spain as its kings worked to reform its institutional arrangement. 
Together, these chapters reveal the weakness of theories that emphasize the inevitability of 
the formation of the modern nation-state and the necessity of policies promoting centralization 
and increasing legal and administrative uniformity to that process. In 1700, it was not clear that 
centralization was the most effective strategy for increasing the stability of a monarchy, and 
policies that might be described as devolutionary could prove conducive to the preservation of 
the state. Not only was the Spanish monarchy willing to grant significant privileges to gain 
support, such actions were mutually beneficial to the king and the local elite that he depended 
upon—theories that describe early modern government solely in terms of extraction and 
repression inaccurately suggest that early modern governance was a zero-sum game. 
Particularism functioned because it benefited both the monarchy and the local elite. It was an 
implicit recognition by the king that he needed the support of local leaders and that these leaders 
were more motivated by their local concerns than by any invocation of the needs of the crown or 
nation.  
Finally, the Spanish Bourbons use of particularism in the government of the Crown of 
Aragon suggests that early modern Spain followed a different path of state development than its 
neighbor across the Pyrenees. Given the significance of these differences, the teleology of state 
development should be reevaluated and the importance of municipalities and local interests 
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should play a larger role in the narratives of state development in early modern Europe. The 
peculiar relationship between the Bourbons and their various kingdoms and towns shaped the 
institutional transformation of Spain with significant results, but imposing a particular goal on 
the development of this relationship would only obfuscate its true significance: that early modern 
rulers focused on solving immediate problems rather than trying to create the modern world. 
More consideration must be given to the accidental nature of state formation and the significance 
of the diverse paths taken by different states if the history of European states is to be accurately 
understood. By emphasizing the importance of local institutions and the relationship between 
localities and the state, it may be possible to make more sense of our world in a way that affirms 
the many communities that exist without insisting that they develop along a particular path 
towards “modernity” or risk “backwardness” and irrelevance.  
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Chapter Two: The Habsburg Practice of Governance, 1665-1700 
 
“Many think it a miracle that the monarchy is still in existence.” – Venetian Ambassador, 1681-
1682
1
 
 
“Not without cause was Charles II beloved and revered by the Catalan nation… he was, in the 
end, the best king that Spain ever had… because he was the only king of Spain who gave his life 
for his subjects.” – Narciso Feliu de la Peña, 1709
2
 
 
 
Contemporary accounts of the last Habsburg monarch present a variety of conflicting reports 
concerning the virtues of the king. Usually these are interpreted as signs of decay and 
weakness—Charles II, “the bewitched,” had limited mental and physical capacity and the praise 
of the Catalan reformer Narciso Feliu de la Peña suggests that his incompetence provided the 
Catalans with a period of salutary neglect following their return to the Spanish monarchy after 
the Catalan revolt of 1640. Yet at the same time, under Charles II, the Cortes throughout the 
kingdoms of Spain were all-but abolished in an apparent absolutist triumph achieved by the 
weakest of the Habsburgs in Iberia. How did Charles’ practice of governing create such 
seemingly contradictory developments?  
The negotiation surrounding a disputed municipal succession in the capital of the Kingdom 
of Aragon provides some insight into this question. It highlights the way in which the legal 
process of confirming a royally appointed official provided opportunities to protest the king’s 
choice while insisting that this opposition was merely the legal exercise of privileges guaranteed 
by the king. On the morning of July 8, 1699, the Archdeacon of Sobrábe in the Santa Iglesia de 
Huesca, the Doctor Don Diego Joseph Dormer, prepared to take his oath of office and receive his 
title as the new deputy of the Court of the Judges (Tribunal de los Judicantes) in Zaragoza. 
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Already well-known for his chronicle of the kingdom,
3
 he was about to replace Don Joseph 
Rodrigo and begin his career of royal service. Unfortunately for Dormer, his appointment 
became the focus of a power struggle between the newly-appointed Viceroy Baltasar Gómez 
Manrique de Mendoza de los Cobos y Luna, the Marqués de Camarasa, and the members of the 
Diputación of Zaragoza, who considered themselves the principal defenders of the kingdom´s 
liberties. The period for filing objections to Dormer’s appointment had passed the preceding day, 
but unknown to Dormer, late on the night of the seventh the diputados filed their objections at 
the last moment. This sneaky maneuver apparently prevented Dormer from preparing a proper 
defense for his claim to the office. The public prosecutor (abogado fiscal), along with the current 
officeholder, Rodrigo, argued before the judges that the objection followed the Aragonese 
fueros, the customary laws defining official procedure in this case, and petitioned the judges not 
to admit Dormer to his office. Over the opposition of the Prelate Don Jacinto Julue, the one 
diputado who found these proceedings “repugnant,” the tribunal ruled against Dormer and 
denied him the title to his office. 
The viceroy of Aragon was furious and encouraged the king to take action against the 
meddlesome Diputación. The viceroy explained how the Márques de San Martin, in collusion 
with the diputados Joseph de Villanueva and Manuel de Las Joyas, had met together and plotted 
to interfere with the appointment. He considered the last-minute filing of the objection against 
Dormer an offense to the king. That these officials should betray him in this manner worried the 
viceroy, who encouraged the king to defend his royal name by suspending the diputados’ wages 
and the exercise of their offices. 
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In Madrid, the Council of Aragon supported the viceroy’s advice, noting that these events 
were a disgrace to the king. The council hoped that the loss of privileges and income would 
“mortify them, as they justly deserve” and serve as a “lesson” for all of the other members of the 
Diputación. The majority of the council found no justification for the suspension of Dormer’s 
appointment, although four of them dissented, coming to the opposite conclusion and believing 
that the fueros had been properly followed by the Diputación.
4
 Finally, the regent of the council, 
Don Juan Luis Lopez, supported the plan of the viceroy, but believed that it would cause too 
many problems if it was implemented immediately. He suggested that the king wait until the 
diputados had completed their terms in office and then punish them appropriately. Charles II 
decided that “it is not convenient now to execute the Council’s proposal for the Deputies,” an 
ambiguous ruling that appears to leave the option of delayed punishment on the table.
5
 
Two aspects of this story reflect common trends in Charles II’s practice of governing. First, 
the process of implementing the law and royal appointments included opportunities for royal 
subjects to express their interests to the king. In Dormer’s case, the review period provided 
opportunities for his opponents to challenge his appointment, and they cleverly used the letter of 
the law to their advantage. Second, the review process for this case involved a lot of people both 
in Zaragoza and in Madrid. These officials were split between their concern for the affront to the 
king’s honor caused by the failure of Dormer’s appointment, and those who defended the 
Aragonese privileges that enabled this failure. It is noteworthy that the Diputación was 
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composed exclusively of subjects from the Kingdom of Aragon, and the council of Aragon was 
similarly composed of members of the Crown of Aragon. In the end, the defenders of the 
Aragonese privileges carried the day, but this whole process reinforced an essential source of 
royal authority—Charles was the defender of the Aragonese privileges and the diputados who 
opposed the royal appointment of Dormer ultimately succeeded because of the king’s affirmation 
of their privileges. Rather than an absent monarch, this incident demonstrates the king’s central 
role in resolving a local dispute over a regional office.
6
 
The apparent strength of local officials in the Crown of Aragon has led many to emphasize 
the royal support for local privileges during Charles II’s rule. Half a century ago, J. H. Elliott 
described Charles II’s reign as “federalism by default,” as the local elite exercised considerable 
influence because of the weakness of the government in Madrid.
7
 In part, this federalism 
reflected the views of his father, Philip IV, who sought to avoid a repeat of the Catalan and 
Portuguese revolts of 1640 by including members of the various regions of Spain in the Junta 
that governed during Charles’ minority.
8
 The apparently increased influence and autonomy of 
the peripheral kingdoms of Spain led the Catalan historian Joan Reglá to argue in the 1950s that 
the reign of Charles II was a period of “neoforalism” during which the traditional privileges of 
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the Crown of Aragon were widely respected.
9
 Reglá’s thesis continues to be the focus of 
considerable historical research and defined the analysis of the period decades later.
10
  
While this “neoforalism” thesis accurately reflects the flexibility with which the government 
of Charles II approached the peripheral kingdoms of his realm, it has too often been interpreted 
as a consequence of royal incompetence. Recent research has demonstrated that Charles’ 
government successfully preserved royal authority and its territorial holdings despite significant 
fiscal and military pressures. By reinforcing and supporting the particularist agendas of the local 
elite in towns throughout their realm, the Habsburgs increased the security of their kingdoms and 
survived decades of warfare with Bourbon France. This approach could only succeed because the 
monarchy responded to local concerns satisfactorily while at the same time maintaining order 
and raising enough funds to avoid bankruptcy. Surprisingly, the Cortes’ absence in these 
negotiations proved beneficial for the monarchy and for its subjects. The “neoforalism” thesis 
also fails to account for the moments when the Habsburg government aggressively increased 
royal control at the municipal level, as happened following the defeat of the rebels in Barcelona 
in 1652 and in Messina in 1678. At other times, the most prudent course of action was to devolve 
authority to particular cities and kingdoms, allowing them to assume the responsibility for (and 
cost of) defending the king’s realm. Habsburg pragmatism permitted both centralization and 
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devolution depending on which strategy appeared most likely to accomplish their larger goals of 
preserving the monarchy.  
 
I: Negotiation and the shift toward particularism 
Prior to Philip V’s ascension, the kingdoms of Habsburg Spain typified the complex and 
idiosyncratic administration of “composite monarchies”: multiple kingdoms, each with their own 
unique institutions and laws, united only in the person of the monarch.
11
 The marriage of Isabella 
and Ferdinand in 1469 created this composite monarchy by bringing together the kingdoms of 
Castile and León and the Mediterranean kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, which included 
Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia. This was a union of equals, yet equals with very different 
traditions, institutions, demographic weight, and economic power.
12
 These differences created 
significant tensions between the kingdoms of Spain and difficult challenges for their monarchs. 
As the king resided in Madrid, the seat of the royal court since 1561, tensions between the center 
of monarchical authority and the periphery of the eastern Aragonese kingdoms were negotiated 
through a variety of institutional mechanisms. In a tradition with roots in the writings of Isidore 
of Seville (c.560-636 AD), the Aragonese believed that their monarch was bound by traditional 
oaths that granted him authority within narrow limits that were constrained by several duties to 
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his subjects.
13
 This republican tradition denied the absolute power of the monarch, emphasized 
the role of the territories’ Cortes, and advocated the preservation of local laws and institutions.
 14
  
Several institutions, both in Madrid and throughout the Spanish kingdoms, guaranteed these 
privileges by mediating the negotiation between the king and his subjects.
15
 Nearest to the king 
were the royal councils that advised the king on affairs of state and provided an essential space 
for debate concerning royal policy. The members of these councils often served in several of 
them simultaneously and they were drawn from the highest circles of the nobility, since they 
were considered the most qualified individuals to advise the king.
16
 Each council had its own 
jurisdiction and met regularly with the king to discuss the many decisions that he had to make. 
The Council of State and the Council of War governed all of the kingdoms of Spain and focused 
on foreign and military affairs, respectively, while the Council of Castile, the Council of the 
Crown of Aragon, and the Council of Italy each had jurisdiction over domestic affairs within 
their respective territories. Other important councils included the Council of the Chamber of 
Castile, which made recommendations on official appointments in Castile, the Council of the 
Indies, which considered the administration of the empire, and the Council of Finance, which 
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oversaw revenue collection throughout the kingdoms. Each of these councils served an essential 
role in the monarchy by making sense of the many issues that came before the king and 
managing the bulk of the paper work produced by governing his realm.  
These councils would present the king with consultas, formal documents that summarized 
the history of a particular case and offered the council’s advice on the matter. Generating these 
consultas could be quite time consuming. Usually the process began when a subject or royal 
official petitioned the king, who would then give the petition to the council and ask for their 
advice. The council would generally solicit reports from officials in Madrid and in the relevant 
region. These reports would confirm the facts from the original petition and often provide 
specific recommendations to the council and king about how to respond to the petition. Once the 
council received these reports, they would draft the consulta, which would summarize the initial 
petition and other reports before offering councilors’ advice. This advice might be unanimous or 
might include several different positions. The king would resolve the issue and the council would 
then put his decision into effect. This whole process was slow, often taking several months. 
Despite the many calls for reform to increase the efficiency of the system, the councils and their 
consultas provided a space for the monarchy to consider his subjects’ concerns and to respond 
carefully and thoroughly to them.
17
 The historian Bernardo Ares has even suggested that these 
councils were “real ‘parliamentary’ assemblies,” because of their important role in shaping royal 
policy.
18
 By facilitating the careful consideration of requests from royal subjects, the counciliar 
system promoted the monarchy’s responsiveness to local concerns and thereby helped to 
maintain the composite monarchy. 
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The kingdoms of Spain had several other institutions to facilitate this negotiation that were 
located away from the royal court in Madrid. Focusing on the Crown of Aragon, each of its 
kingdoms had a viceroy who acted on the king’s behalf as his alter nos, embodying his sovereign 
authority while he was away. While the Council of the Chamber of Castile recommended 
viceregal appointments to the king, the Council of State and the Council of the Crown of Aragon 
both oversaw the viceroy, the former in relation to the defense of the kingdom and the latter 
concerning domestic affairs.
19
 The viceroys usually served three-year terms in office and they 
were often “foreigners” from Castile, or one of the Italian or German states under Habsburg 
rule.
20
  
The viceroys under Charles II usually had military experience, which was important for the 
defense of the kingdom against the constant threat of French invasion. As captain generals, the 
viceroys were in charge of the military in the kingdom during their tenure. While nominally the 
viceroy had significant autonomy, his proximity to Madrid, which was only four days distant, 
meant that he rarely acted without consulting the king and the Council of Aragon. In addition to 
military affairs, the viceroy was also in charge of administering the king’s justice.
 21
  He presided 
over the criminal chamber of the chief judicial tribunal, the Real Audiencia, and voted on matters 
when there was no majority among the judges. In addition to these responsibilities, viceroys also 
facilitated the councils’ work by providing information on petitions originating from their 
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kingdoms. In this way, they served as a crucial bridge between the king and his court and his 
subjects in the peripheral kingdoms. 
The Real Audiencias in the Crown of Aragon were the highest judicial body in their 
kingdoms and also served an important role as the intermediary between king and the kingdom 
in legal matters. The Audiencia of Catalonia, which was typical of those in Aragon and Valencia, 
had three halls, the two higher halls for civil proceedings, each with a president and five judges, 
while the third (and newest) for criminal cases had four regular judges and three special judges. 
This third hall heard the appeals from the civil halls in addition to criminal cases.
22
 These judges 
usually had doctorates in canon or civil law, and with the sale of titles under Philip IV, they 
increasingly were drawn from the newly ennobled families with legal backgrounds.
23
  
In addition to these legal responsibilities, the Audiencia also functioned as a council to advise 
the foreign viceroy on local law and custom. This role increased both the responsibilities and the 
power of its judges, and often the viceroys found it difficult to decide against the advice of the 
Audiencia.
24
 When the viceroy and the Audiencia disagreed, their dispute would go to the king 
and his councils in Madrid. In general, the Council of Aragon supported the jurisdiction and 
privileges of the Audiencias against encroachment by the viceroy or other officials—for 
example, the council prevented the viceroy of Valencia from commenting on any judge who was 
up for promotion, “since all of them are worthy men” because of their position as judges in the 
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Audiencia.
25
 The council’s support is unsurprising as its members were usually recruited from 
the Audiencias of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, which naturally aligned their interests.
26
 The 
development of royal policy in the Crown of Aragon—through recommendations and reports 
sent to the king through the council—and the subsequent implementation of these policies 
generally depended upon both the viceroy and the Audiencia, and each was wary of the other 
encroaching on its jurisdiction. 
The final crucial institutions in the royal administration of the kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon were the Cortes (or the Corts in Catalonia and Valencia), the representational bodies that 
had to authorize all taxes. They also could renegotiate the relationship between the king and their 
kingdom, as the Catalan Corts did in 1599 when it restricted the viceroy’s use of proclamations 
to those that complied with the Catalan constitution. This enabled the Diputació, composed of 
members of the Corts when it was not in session, to strike down the viceroy’s proclamations 
whenever they were deemed unconstitutional, as they frequently did.
27
 The Diputació—whose 
principal duty was to oversee tax collection—was composed of diputats who considered 
themselves the guardians of Catalonia’s privileges and used their power to curtail encroachment 
from the viceroy and other officials.
28
 The Aragonese Cortes, along with its standing council 
called the Diputación, functioned in similar ways to prevent the implementation of new taxes 
and defend its kingdom’s traditional privileges.
29
 Valencia also had a Cortes and a Diputación, 
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but as the latter could only collect taxes and had neither the authority nor the military support 
with which to defend Valencian privileges, it was considered the “softest” of the three peninsular 
kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon.
30
 The Cortes and Diputaciónes in the Crown of Aragon 
provided an important institutional space where the king’s subjects could communicate their 
interests and shape royal policy.  
The overlapping jurisdictions of these institutions created additional opportunities for 
negotiation. By playing the Audiencia and the Council of Aragon against the viceroy and the 
Council of State, the king’s subjects could find powerful allies for their causes and buy time for 
their cases. This dynamic parallels the one noted by Ruth MacKay in seventeenth-century 
Castile, where jurisdictional disputes permitted resistance to royal decrees and enabled subjects 
to exercise their privileges.
31
 When problems arose and popular revolts took place, they were 
almost always directed toward the replacement of one of these officials rather than against the 
king or the ruling elite as a whole.
32
 J. H. Elliott has similarly argued that the absence of revolt in 
1640s Castile—despite bearing a heavier tax and recruitment burden than Portugal or Catalonia, 
which did revolt—reflects the Habsburg success in responding to local concerns.
33
 The 
institutionalization of a space for negotiation and resistance that could be justified with the 
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rhetoric of obedience will have much in common with the institutional arrangement in the Crown 
of Aragon after the Bourbon reforms of the eighteenth century.   
While the institutions described above usually facilitated negotiation in these ways, 
characterizing the government of Charles II as static and passive would be a serious error. His 
reign marked some major shifts in channels of negotiation between the king and his subjects in 
Castile and Aragon as the Cortes became marginalized and were circumvented through direct 
negotiation between the king and the municipal councils of his kingdoms. The history of the 
Cortes and the justification of this transition reveal the value of particularism as a model for 
early modern governments and will have much in common with the governing strategies adopted 
by Philip V in the eighteenth century. 
The Cortes in Castile differed in significant ways from its nominally similar counterparts in 
the Crown of Aragon, primarily because it only represented twenty-one cities in Castile by the 
late seventeenth-century. Traditionally, Charles V’s suppression of the comunero revolt in 1520-
1521 is interpreted as a key moment in the centralization of royal authority in Castile, but this 
interpretation neglects the fact that only two years later the Castilian Cortes forced Charles V to 
respond to their concerns before they would renew the tax grants required to fund his perpetual 
wars. This concession established Castile as a “commonwealth of self-ruling republics,” and 
demonstrates how far Charles V was willing to go to address the concerns of the towns in Castile 
after the suppression of the comunero revolt.
34
 The preeminence of the cities in Castile defined 
the operation of the Castilian Cortes—rather than representing the various estates of Castile, it 
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embodied the kingdom as a collection of towns.
35
 Unlike other representative institutions, such 
as the English Parliament or the Estates-General of France,
36
 the Cortes of Castile was only an 
intermediary for representatives of the cities that never developed its own interests or character.
37
 
The voting cities of Castile reserved the final decision-making power to themselves (voto 
decisive), limiting the Cortes to an advisory role with only the power to make recommendations 
(voto consultivo) through 1632.
38
 This meant that the king could consult the “kingdom” of 
Castile with or without the Cortes. If he was not interested in summoning it, then he could 
consult each town’s city council directly.
39
  
During the tumultuous period from 1601-1665, the Cortes of Castile served an important 
function as the point of contact between the king and the local oligarchs of the Castilian towns. 
The power of Castilian towns to curtail the collection and to direct the disbursement of royal 
funds drew significant attention from the Count-Duke of Olivares, but the ultimate failure of his 
reforms has been interpreted as a sign of the Cortes strength.
40
 This victory was short-lived, 
however, and the end of the Cortes as a meaningful political institution—it was no longer 
summoned after Philip IV’s death in 1665, when it was replaced by direct negotiation between 
the king and the towns—is often interpreted as a sign of the “political atrophy” of Castile in the 
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late seventeenth century.
41
 This perspective has been complicated by more recent interpretations, 
however.
42
 Pablo Fernández Albaladejo has persuasively argued that the Council of Castile and 
the towns themselves were more important than the Cortes in opposing Olivares’ reforms.
43
 The 
end of the Cortes of Castile as a meaningful institution reflected both the towns’ and the king’s 
preference for direct negotiation rather than the royal suppression of a popular representative 
institution. Charles’ mother and regent, Mariana of Austria, took the decisive step in the 
transformation from corporate to particularist negotiations when she did not call the Cortes to 
renew the grant of the millones in 1667.
44
 The Camara de Castilla—the royal privy council—
advised Mariana against calling the Cortes for three reasons. First, the Camara estimated that it 
would cost the royal treasury more than 500,000 ducats to pay for the residence of the cities’ 
representatives (procuradores) at the Cortes even if it lasted less than a year, which would be 
short in comparison to many previous meetings. This estimate does not include the costs of any 
concessions, pensions, offices, and the like, so the final cost would likely have been much 
higher. Avoiding a meeting of the Cortes thus provided significant savings to the Crown, as the 
expense would have increased the monarchy’s total non-military spending by about twenty 
percent.
45
 Second, the previous Cortes had been difficult to manage, granting relatively little 
with the concession of the millones, the key source of royal revenue negotiated by the Cortes, 
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after forty-nine months in session. The benefits of negotiating with the Cortes evidently no 
longer outweighed its cost and there was no reason to expect this to change during the regency of 
Charles II. Third, the Camara feared that the Cortes would claim a role in the government and 
insist that representatives from the cities rotate through the Junta de Gobierno, which had been 
created to oversee the Charles during his minority following a precedent from 1391.
46
 Mariana 
was already in a weak position because Charles II’s illegitimate half-brother, Don Juan José de 
Austria, as his popularity and ambition provided a focus for opposition to her regency. To 
persuade the cities to renew the millones without a Cortes, the royal letter to the cities explained 
the pressing military concerns and emphasized that this was a request for a renewal of the 
millones rather than a new grant that would have required a meeting of the Cortes.
47
 While the 
cities lost the lucrative opportunities to send representatives (procuradores) to the Cortes, the 
monarchy rewarded the members of the town councils who brought the letters of assent to the 
court. More importantly, during a Cortes there were only two representatives from the cities, 
while the cities often sent several city councilors with the letters, spreading the benefits of the 
negotiation to a larger set of the civic elite.
48
 This accommodation rewarded the city councils, 
saved the crown from a large financial expense, and decreased the potential for opposition to 
Mariana’s authority as regent. 
The transition to particularist direct negotiation of the millones did not mean that any town 
could opt-out of a renewal of the tax grants through voting against them. When the city of 
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Palencia opposed the tax, the royal government responded that “other cities have given their 
agreement and since they are a majority your efforts are not now necessary.” These bilateral 
negotiations obligated all of the towns, including those in the minority, as the cédula of 
November 1, 1667 reaffirmed when it claimed that most of the Cortes had renewed the taxes 
despite the fact that the Cortes had not been called.
49
 So despite the Castilian Cortes’ absence, 
Charles II continued to depend on the support of the Castilian towns. In fact, he even petitioned 
the towns with votes in the Cortes for their views on the Junta de Alivios, which was convened 
in 1669 to propose reforms for the improvement of royal revenue in Castile.
50
 The absence of the 
Cortes did not end communication between the monarchy and the towns represented in the 
Cortes, but rather it was a significant shift in the channels through which this communication 
flowed. Under Charles II, these negotiations took place between the king, or the regent, and each 
town in isolation while still binding all of the towns by the vote of the majority, rather than the 
corporate negotiation between the king and the towns assembled together in the Cortes. 
Significantly, there is no indication that the towns of Castile objected to the shift to particularist 
negotiation or requested a meeting of the Cortes.
51
  
The adoption of particularism and direct negotiation further strengthened the relationship 
between the towns of Castile and their monarch by making it more personal. As with the creation 
and multiplication of Castilian towns in the sixteenth century, the Habsburg monarchs 
“fragmented local administration, creating hundreds of newly autonomous towns,” which were 
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now “intensely loyal” to the monarch who had granted them their liberty.
52
 A similar dynamic 
operated in the seventeenth century under Charles II. The direct negotiation between the local 
elite in the Castilian towns demonstrated their dependence upon royal patronage for their 
preeminence. For example, the regidores and corregidores of Murcia recognized that their 
opportunities for social advancement, particularly through ennoblement, came from the king. 
This led them to increasingly identify their own interests with those of the king.
53
  
The ownership of towns in the seventeenth century is further complicated by their sale. In 
order to raise cash, the king sold towns (villas) at a rate of roughly 14,000 silver maravedis for 
each subject (vecino) within its jurisdiction. Between 1626 and 1639, nearly 300 towns in Castile 
were sold, removing nearly a quarter of a million subjects from the king’s jurisdiction. Such 
purchases allowed the purchaser to enforce the king’s law themselves, or appoint other officials 
to do so on their behalf. Some of these towns were purchased by nobility, but around thirty-eight 
percent of these towns purchased their own jurisdiction. The sale of towns decreased under 
Charles II so that by 1710 about 500 of the 700 largest towns in Castile were outside of royal 
authority. In the Crown of Aragon the situation was similar: in Valencia the king had jurisdiction 
over 73 towns while 300 were under various nobles’ jurisdiction and in the Kingdom of Aragon 
the king controlled about a fifth of the towns. It is important to qualify these numbers by noting 
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that the largest cities, such as Madrid, Toledo, Barcelona, Zaragoza, and Valencia (all of which 
were officially villas, or towns), remained under the royal jurisdiction.
54
  
Given the high degree of municipal and noble autonomy, it was incredibly important for the 
king to maintain a personal link with his subjects. This relationship drew upon old forms of 
reciprocal duties between feudal lords and their vassals, which enabled Charles II to respond to 
the aggressive campaigns of Louis XIV despite the increasingly dire fiscal straights of the royal 
treasury.
 
Throughout the seventeenth century, the gap between the expected royal revenue and 
the funds that actually arrived grew as towns accrued tremendous debt to the Crown in lieu of 
paying their taxes. The king could not enforce payment, so these debts grew without ever being 
paid to the detriment of royal finances.
55
 The solution employed by Charles II and his ministers 
was to call upon the towns to provide a certain number of men of their choice, instead of 
imposing a troop levy directly, and to insist that the towns perform their duty as loyal vassals to 
the king by providing for these troops through direct payments in kind. The towns responded 
well to this arrangement, which enabled Charles II to field an army adequate for the defense of 
Spain against Louis XIV despite falling real royal revenue. Such success came at the cost of the 
central administration of the state, however, as the raising of troops and maintenance of the army 
completely circumvented the royal treasury and central bureaucracy.
56
 The particular 
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relationships between the various towns of the Spanish kingdoms, drawing on feudal language, 
simultaneously strengthened the monarchy while reducing its ability to act independently from 
the towns. In recognition of this reality, the government of Charles II worked to satisfy the 
interests of the local elite and acquired their support.
57
 This had the effect of increasing royal 
authority, while simultaneously decreasing its power to operate independently.
58
  
The transition from corporate negotiation with the king through the Cortes in Castile toward 
direct negotiation by towns and individuals reflects a significant reorientation in the Habsburg 
administration of Spain. While it became more difficult for the towns to work together to oppose 
the king, direct negotiation also limited the king’s ability to standardize his administration and 
channel the resources of his kingdoms through the royal treasury. Charles II’s adoption of 
particularism to govern his fragmented monarchy facilitated its survival, however, and while the 
Castilian Cortes was no longer summoned after 1665, the Cortes of the Crown of Aragon also 
declined in relevance under Charles II—neither the Catalan nor the Valencian Corts were called 
during his reign—indicating that this was a pan-peninsular trend.
59
 The neglect of the many 
Cortes continued into the eighteenth century, when Philip V demonstrated a noticeable 
preference for particularistic negotiation with the towns over negotiation in the Cortes. The shift 
to particularism was not a radical innovation by the Bourbons, as should now be clear, but rather 
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a natural evolution of governing practices pioneered by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth 
century.
60
 
 
II. Royal prerogative: the revolts in Catalonia and Messina 
As revealed by the preceding discussion, the reign of Charles II was quite dynamic. In 
addition to the shift toward particularism in Castile and elsewhere, the reintegration of Catalonia 
under Philip IV after the Catalan revolt in 1652 and the reforms in Sicily after the War of 
Messina in 1678 during Charles II’s reign increased royal authority to reduce the threat of future 
opposition to the Crown. In both cases, the king’s authority over the selection of local officials 
increased, and in Messina significant changes to the city government and the privileges of the 
local nobility reduced their ability to threaten the monarch’s rule. Despite these changes, 
however, local privileges that reflected local custom and preference—and that did not oppose 
royal authority—were permitted to remain. The Habsburgs demonstrated significant respect for 
legal traditions in all of their dealings with their subjects, including those that had rebelled 
against them. Together these targeted reforms increased the loyalty of the urban elite in 
Barcelona and Messina, reducing the risk of future revolts.  
The focus on increasing royal control and local loyalty among the municipal elite is apparent 
following the revolt of Catalans. As Habsburg victories in Catalonia in 1652 marked the end of 
the Catalan Revolt, Philip IV sent his illegitimate son Don Juan José de Austria to negotiate the 
peace on his behalf. The negotiations began with a proposal by the Consell de Cent, which called 
for a general pardon and the restoration of all of their privileges, along with an orderthat the king 
recognize that they had remained faithful subjects despite everything that had taken place since 
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1640. Additionally, they wanted a guarantee of all personal privileges and the restoration of 
estates and goods seized by the king during the war, in addition to a promise that Philip IV’s 
troops would not enter the city of Barcelona. These ambitious demands were probably posturing 
to establish a good position for negotiation with the king, and it is unlikely that they expected to 
gain all of these requests, given the circumstances of their surrender.
61
 Still, the Catalan’s 
conditions of surrender reflect the interests of the urban elite in preserving their privileges and 
property despite the rebellion.  
When the negotiations came before the Council of the Crown of Aragon, its members 
advised the king to use this opportunity to affirm his authority over Catalonia. They encouraged 
the king to occupy the city with troops in case publication of the king’s terms led to renewed 
protests. Their proposals restored stability by reinforcing the noble and burger dominance within 
the city, reflecting the Council’s belief that the revolt reflected peasant intransigence in 1640. 
Finally, the Council sought to reduce the city of Barcelona to the rank of the other major cities of 
Spain by granting it only privileges held by other cities and repealing all of its unique 
privileges.
62
  
Philip IV took a more moderate path that preserved more of Barcelona’s privileges and yet 
still increased his authority over the city. Philip explained his desire to “establish his government 
in the form that was most convenient for the good administration of justice, and the public good” 
was not “opposed to all of the privileges and honors (preeminences)” of Barcelona. Among his 
guiding principles were the desires for “quietude” and “security” in his newly reclaimed city.
63
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He confirmed most of Barcelona’s traditional privileges, with a few important exceptions. First, 
he reserved the control of the military in Barcelona, which would be administered by the royally 
appointed viceroy and not the Catalan Diputació. This increased the power and authority of the 
king’s local representative. Second, he acquired the royal veto on the old system of choosing 
ministers for the Consell de Cent, the Diputació, and the Audiencia.
64
 The king could then 
prevent these institutions from filling with individuals opposed to the royal administration. 
Finally, Philip maintained control of the old baronies of Barcelona in compensation for the 
expenses he had incurred during the war. Private estates, however, were restored to their 
previous owners and a general pardon was granted, in addition the restoration of Catalonia and 
Barcelona’s other privileges.
65
 
The generosity of these terms has led historians largely to ignore the privileges reserved by 
Philip IV. Elliott, for example, did not note the exceptions and went so far as to assert that 
“Catalonia was thus reinstated as part of the Spanish monarchy, enjoying the same laws and 
privileges as it had enjoyed at the time of the accession of Philip IV in 1621.”
66
 Most other 
historians who discuss this period characterize the reintegration of Catalonia in similar terms, 
and the few exemptions have not been translated into English. Even the recent and valuable work 
of Christopher Storrs reflects this oversight.
67
 Their interpretations are problematic, however, as 
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the modification to the method of selecting city officials significantly augmented the king’s 
ability to assure their support and fidelity in any future crisis.
68
 Additionally, it is worth noting 
that royal authority over the defense of the city meant that the viceroy of Catalonia had 
significantly more military personnel at his disposal and was much less likely to suffer the 
violent end of the Count of Santa Coloma, the viceroy who died in the revolt of 1640.
69
 
While Catalonia’s reintegration into the Spanish monarchy appears remarkably untraumatic, 
especially in comparison to what happened in 1714, it still marked a significant increase in royal 
authority in Catalonia. The willingness of Philip IV to leave so many of the Catalan privileges 
intact after the revolt of 1640 and his leniency toward the city’s elite were justified by blaming 
peasants exclusively for the revolt. In reality, members of the elite participated in the revolt and 
Philip’s actions reflected his need to galvanize the support of the leading Catalans against the 
threat of future French invasion. His reforms reflect a supremely pragmatic form of governance, 
as they were targeted to reinforce royal rule without upsetting the Catalans, especially the 
municipal elite whose privileges he had just preserved.  
The suppression of the Catalan revolt is clearly of interest to those attempting to understand 
the later repeal of Catalan privileges under Philip V and the differences between them are 
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striking. Immediately following the initial decrees of the Nueva Planta, the royal officials 
implementing the new policy turned to another instance of the Habsburg’s suppression of revolt 
for guidance—the revolt of Messina. In 1707, the new Regent of the Audiencia of Valencia, Don 
Pedro de Larreategui y Colón, presented a series of “doubts” to the king, asking for clarification 
on a number of details concerning the operation of the new government.
70
 His request elicited a 
response from the Council of the Crown of Aragon addressing his specific questions.
71
 The 
Council believed that Larreategui y Colón had raised three more general issues which required 
greater reflection, and provided a separate response on these matters to the king. In this 
document, they suggested that he might look to the example of Charles II’s handling of the 
Revolt in Messina as a model for the new government of Valencia.
72
 So what took place in 
Messina and how does this relate to the Nueva Planta of the Bourbons?  
The revolt in Messina resulted from the tensions between the two very different sides of 
Sicilian society: that of Palermo, which was feudal and dominated by barons, and that of 
Messina, which was commercial and run by the new burgers exploiting their monopoly of the 
silk trade. The Spanish monarchy recognized this but failed to address the growing tension 
between both factions adequately. In fact, Spanish officials had an important role in the 
increasing antipathy between the citizens of Messina and the monarchy. In the end, however, the 
citizens of Messina were not simply revolting against “the state,” as some historians have 
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suggested, because city could not maintain its economic and social preeminence in Sicily without 
external support. The Messinans recognized their need for external support, so they invited the 
French monarchy in as the new guardian of their privileges. Instead, the revolt was an effort to 
assert their dominance on the island.
73
 Despite initial difficulties in responding to the crisis, 
Charles II was eventually able to get enough soldiers to Sicily to suppress the revolt, which came 
to a definitive end in 1678.
74
   
In the aftermath of the revolt, Charles II implemented significant reforms that redefined the 
relationship between Messina and the Spanish king. The attitude at court quickly turned against 
Messina, perhaps at the prodding of the loyal citizens of Palermo. In any case, both the Council 
of State and the Council of Italy encouraged the king to make an example of Messina so that the 
king’s subjects everywhere would not risk revolt. The Council especially desired to send a strong 
warning because of the weakness of Spain’s military position in the 1670s.
75
  
The repression of Messina began with the arrival of the Conde de Santisteban in January of 
1679. At the king’s order, he replaced the Senate of Messina with a Castilian-style city council 
(ayuntamiento), whose members would be chosen by the viceroy from all over the Spanish 
territories. The honorific privileges of the old senate disappeared with it. As an indication of the 
finality of this change, the Palace of the Senate was razed to the ground. An equestrian statue of 
Charles II slaying the hydra of rebellion—made of the melted-down bell from the old palace—
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was erected in its place with an inscription commemorating the suppression of the revolt.
76
 The 
new city council met in the presence of the royal governor in the Royal Palace. Other local and 
regional officials were replaced by Castilian ones, such as the Corregidor. Messina’s exemption 
from the taxes of the gabelas and the donativos also disappeared, along with its secondary 
schools and its university.
77
 To prevent any future revolt and to demonstrate their reduced 
prestige, the citizens of Messina, including nobles, had to surrender their firearms. The 
Messinans were also banned from corresponding with the fugitives who had supported the 
French on penalty of death. In case these precautions proved inadequate, the monarchy built a 
fortress between 1680-1683 to secure the city against threats from within or without.
78
 In 
addition to abolishing Messina’s privileges, the city’s records were confiscated, erasing the local 
records that had guaranteed their old relationship with the king. Charles II and his officials were 
systematically removing the institutions that had protected Messina’s privileges, the buildings 
where its government had met, and the documents that had preserved their traditions and 
privileges.  
These reforms parallel the most severe institutional, physical, and symbolic changes imposed 
by the Philip V on the cities of Valencia and Barcelona, while Zaragoza received much gentler 
treatment. So did Philip V follow his council’s advice and Charles II’s model when crafting the 
Nueva Planta? Perhaps, but not initially. In its advice to the king, the council emphasized the 
limits of the reforms in Messina. It explained that in Messina, Charles II had “removed the city’s 
                                                 
76
 The statue was made by Giacomo Serpotta, and no longer exists, although it may have 
been there as recently as 1907; see Ribot Garía, Monarquía, 626, footnote 26, 
 
77
 Specifically, the academia de caballeros de la Stella, the Funcia, and the Abbarbicati were 
shut down; Ribot García, Monarquía, 625. 
 
78
 Ribot García, Monarquía, 624-626. 
53 
 
privileges, fueros, and exemptions that they had enjoyed in punishment for its rebellion, but in 
the matters touching on the pragmáticas, ordinances, and civil laws of the kingdom, he made an 
edict ordering the viceroy... to observe them inviolably.”
79
 Following this example, the council 
encouraged Philip V to recognize the difference between the privileges, which had been forfeited 
because of rebellion, and those:  
…royal orders [cedulas y real pragmáticas] that touch on the commutative justice, and 
assure its good administration, which in no form could be understood as lost because of 
this rebellion, because they are not fueros, nor privileges, but rather laws and rules given 
by the lord kings to hold them [his subjects] to his [Your Majesty’s] disposition and to 
assure by means of them his good government, and proper justice; as they are just and 
holy and approved by the customs of some years, it would be very dissonant to abolish 
them because of rebellion.
80
  
 
Here the council makes a significant distinction between privileges that benefit only those 
possessing them and are enjoyed at the king’s good will, and other legal structures that promote 
justice and good administration. The council advised Philip V to preserve the latter, as there is 
“no stronger bond for the maintenance and good government of republics than the punctual 
observation of their laws.”
81
 The council’s appeal to the example of Messina indicates that they 
believed that Philip V was interested in following the legal practices of the Habsburgs. The 
distinction between legal privileges, which could be lost through rebellion, and the laws and 
rules essential for good government, which could not, provides a helpful framework for 
comparing Charles’ policies toward Messina and Philip’s towards Valencia. While this advice 
was not followed by Philip V in the initial decrees of the Nueva Planta, subsequent edicts 
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restored many of the local laws in Aragon, Catalonia, and Mallorca, and Philip publicly indicated 
his willingness to restore them to Valencia.
82
 Evidently the legal distinction that guided Charles’ 
handling of the revolt of Messina reflected a meaningful distinction in the kinds of privileges and 
laws and how they shaped the royal administration that transcended both the Habsburg and the 
Bourbon dynasties—a distinction that Philip V learned through experience rather than his 
council’s advice.   
At the same time, there were important difference between the reforms in Messina and those 
in the Crown of Aragon under Philip V. Both cities were punished for their revolts and both 
cities’ governments were filled with a new elite drawn from other kingdoms. It seems that Philip 
made more concessions to the Catalans that he positively identified as loyal than were made for 
the elite in Messina. Perhaps the lack of a homegrown elite did not seem necessary because the 
defeat of Messina had reinforced the bonds between Charles and the near-by city of Palermo. It 
is remarkable that the Council of Aragon, in one of their final acts, advised the king to use 
Messina as a model that demonstrated the value of preserving certain kinds of local privileges. 
These variations demonstrate how the kings of Spain, Habsburg and Bourbon, did not have a 
standard operating procedure, but instead made practical decisions based on the specific 
situations that they encountered.  
The same theme can be seen when comparing the cases of Messina and Barcelona in the 
seventeenth century. In Messina under Charles II and Barcelona under Philip IV, the Habsburgs 
demonstrated their willingness to redefine the relationship between the Crown and its subjects. 
The example of Messina is more dramatic than that of Barcelona in 1652, yet the justification for 
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these reforms was based on the language of security. In Barcelona, Philip IV seemed content to 
solidify his support with the city’s oligarchy; in Messina the city officials were implicated in the 
revolt, which led Charles to curtail further the autonomy of the city’s elite. What is difficult to 
argue, however, is that the government of Charles II was content to ignore its peripheral 
kingdoms in Europe, as suggested by the “neoforalist” thesis advanced by Joan Reglá. The 
reforms in Messina demonstrate that Charles’ government could be quite active in the defense of 
royal authority. 
More importantly, the royal responses to revolts under the Habsburgs depended upon the 
specific circumstances surrounding each revolt and its suppression. There was no standard policy 
that could be applied following a revolt. Indeed, the Habsburgs responded to each of these 
revolts in a unique way that reflected practical considerations, just as Philip V would follow the 
apparent revolt of the Crown of Aragon with a contradictory series of royal decrees collectively 
known as the Nueva Planta. This name, which implies that the acts were part of a coherent “new 
plan,” hides the complexity and development of Philip’s reform efforts that subsquent chapters 
will reveal. 
 
III. Conclusions 
The Habsburg system of governing the Crown of Aragon under Philip IV and Charles II was 
flexible and reflected long-standing local traditions. Despite this, however, it would be a mistake 
to characterize the period as one of “federalism by default”
83
 or “neoforalism.”
84
 Instead, it was a 
pragmatic balance between royal efforts to maintain stability and security in the Crown of 
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Aragon coupled with respect for the privileges that subjects expected from their monarchs.
85
 In 
other words, the monarchy increasingly implemented particularism because it proved to be the 
most effective way for the king to maintain control of his territories. The renegotiation of the 
relationships between the center and the periphery following the fall of Barcelona in 1652 and 
the fall of Messina in 1678 indicates that the monarchy was capable of, and willing to, assert its 
authority while simultaneously maintaining the contractual balance between privileges and duties 
that characterized the composite monarchy of Spain. The Habsburgs creatively engaged the 
issues that arose and selected their policies based upon practical considerations, which resulted in 
unique responses to the various challenges that they faced.  
At the same time, the way in which the Habsburg monarchs interacted with their subjects 
shifted away from negotiation with the Cortes to direct negotiations with the towns. While this 
limited the towns’ ability to present a united front against royal intrusions, it also meant that each 
had the ability to push for the privileges that mattered most to them without having to 
compromise with the interests of other towns, creating a less homogenous legal landscape. When 
coupled with Charles II’s devolution of the responsibility for military recruitment and provision, 
these policies marked a significant shift away from the centralized royal control of military 
affairs.  
The complexity of the way in which Charles II governed Spain has led to a split between the 
scholars of the history of ideas and law, who portray increasingly absolutist tendencies, and those 
studying government and practice, who describe growing fragmentation in seventeenth century 
Spain.
86
 These different characterizations reflect the complicated balance that typified the 
flexible and pragmatic administration of the Spanish Habsburgs. The struggle to balance the 
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security of the state by alternately asserting royal authority and respecting local privileges helps 
to explain the ability of local officials to interfere with Don Diego Dormer, discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter. These local officials recognized the importance of their role in the 
royal administration and knew how far they could push against the king’s decisions when they 
disagreed with them. Just as importantly, they knew how to do so while invoking the rhetoric of 
obedience that bound king and subject in the reciprocal bonds of duty and privilege. The 
resilience of Habsburg government depended upon such compromises between royal interests 
and those of the local elite in the Crown of Aragon. Finding a similar balance would prove 
essential for the first Bourbon king of Spain. 
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Chapter Three: The Bourbon Reforms of the Crown of Aragon, 1706-1716 
 
The ascension of the first Bourbon king of Spain, Philip V, raised the possibility of general 
reform to the flexible Habsburg administration described in the previous chapter. The subsequent 
War of Spanish Succession and the rebellion of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon provided 
Philip with the opportunity to redefine the reciprocal duties that had bound his predecessors to 
respect these kingdoms’ traditional privileges. Philip’s reforms have been identified as a 
significant moment in the formation of the modern nation state of Spain. Careful analysis of 
these reforms and the shifting language employed to justify and challenge them suggests that 
despite the substantial institutional changes that took place, Philip V continued to respect his 
duty toward his loyal subjects. Ultimately this duty, in conjunction with myriad practical 
difficulties, led him to back off from establishing the uniform system of government proposed in 
the initial decrees of the Nueva Planta reforms.  
Philip V and his ministers developed an ambitious set of reforms during his first two decades 
as king, and no kingdoms felt this more than those of the Crown of Aragon. The Nueva Planta 
reforms are particularly revealing of royal aspirations because the War of Succession freed Philip 
from the traditional rights and privileges of these kingdoms, enabling him to redefine the 
relationship between the king and his subjects. This chapter reveals the royal decision-making 
process through analysis of the debates among the king’s ministers, the language of the royal 
decrees enacting the Nueva Planta, and the immediate consequences of the reforms. Philip and 
his ministers’ decisions in these matters were free of the many institutional constraints that had 
limited the Habsburgs and demonstrate that the Bourbons were not attempting to create anything 
that could be described as a modern nation state. Instead, their focus on much more immediate 
practical matters led the Bourbons to reshape society to maintain the centrality of privilege even 
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as they reconfigured the political institutions to emphasize the personal rule of the reigning 
monarch.  
This chapter will explore these issues in five sections. The first will consider the various 
interpretations of the Bourbon reforms, which can be loosely organized into two groups—those 
which emphasize Philip and his ministers’ effort to create a uniform system of government over 
his kingdoms, and those which focus on the dynamic and ad-hoc nature of the reforming process 
that eventually produced a decidedly multiform system. The second section will look at the 
challenge of reestablishing Philip’s rule in Valencia in the early years of the war, paying 
particular attention to his advisor’s respect for Habsburg models and avoidance of jeopardizing 
the war effort through threatening the traditional relationship between the Valencians and their 
monarch. The third section will analyze the initial decree of the Nueva Planta, exploring how it 
responded to the challenges posed by the earlier form of government and Philip’s intentional 
break from the traditional limitations on royal authority in the Crown of Aragon. The fourth 
section will consider the new difficulties created by Philip’s position and the way in which he 
shifted the justification for and nature of his reforms in response to the loyalty of many of his 
subjects in the Crown of Aragon. This renegotiation of the Bourbon reforms eventually led to a 
new model of government that blended Castilian and Aragonese institutions. The process that 
created this blended model is the focus of section five, which will examine the arguments for and 
against it, and its eventual affirmation in the reforms of the Catalan government in 1714. Taken 
together, this process of reform created a complicated and idiosyncratic government in the 
Crown of Aragon that embodied respect for personal loyalty to the king while also reducing the 
institutional limitations on royal authority. The new government reflected royal compromises in 
addressing a variety of competing concerns. Philip’s many concessions to local interests indicate 
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that a willingness to negotiate continued to typify the royal administration of the Crown of 
Aragon.  
 
I. The problem of the Nueva Planta  
Charles II, the last king of the Spanish Habsburgs, died without having produced an heir on 
November 1, 1700, setting the stage for the War of Spanish Succession. European international 
politics had revolved around the fate of the kingdoms of Spain for years. In his final will, Charles 
left the crown to the Bourbon grandson of Louis XIV, who became Philip V of Spain.
1
 His 
claim, however, was contentious, as it came through Maria Theresa, Charles II’s half-sister, who 
had renounced all claims to the Spanish throne when she married Louis XIV of France. Based on 
her renunciation, the next in line, the Habsburg Archduke Charles of Austria, claimed the throne 
for himself. Although Charles II’s will affirmed the ascension of Philip V, an alliance supporting 
the Archduke Charles began its war with France and Spain two years later. The fall of the Crown 
of Aragon in early 1705 forced its subjects to choose between Philip and Charles, giving the 
conflict the characteristics of a civil war.
2
  
The war increased the tensions between the two Crowns of the king of Spain—that of Castile 
and Leon, and that of Aragon, composed of the kingdoms of Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and 
Mallorca. The kingdoms of Habsburg Spain formed a composite monarchy: multiple kingdoms, 
                                                 
1
 Henry Kamen, Philip V of Spain: The King who Reigned Twice (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2001), 1-5.  
 
2
 There is some debate over whether or not any rebellion actually took place as the defenses 
in these kingdoms were inadequate to defend them with or without local support. In either case, 
there were some supporters of the Archdukes invasion and this ultimately shaped Philip’s policy 
decisions in the Crown of Aragon. 
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each with their own unique institutions and laws, united only in the person of the monarch.
3
 
Following the principle of aeque principaliter, the kingdoms of a composite monarchy were 
treated as dynastic inheritances rather than conquered territories, which bound the monarch by 
each kingdom’s laws. The kingdoms retained their own laws and traditional liberties and 
privileges—often collectively referred to as their fueros. In some cases this resulted in a monarch 
with widely varying degrees of authority in the different kingdoms under his rule.
4
 The 
differences between these two crowns had caused serious tensions for centuries and erupted most 
famously in the revolt of the Catalans in 1640. The War of Spanish Succession became another 
moment of significant tension and the apparent revolts against Philip’s rule gave him ample legal 
ground to transform his relationship with his subjects in the Crown of Aragon. 
When Philip regained control of Valencia with the Bourbon victory at the Battle of Almansa 
on April 25, 1707, he began to reform the political institutions of the Crown of Aragon with the 
Nueva Planta. Philip’s reforms involved the revocation of the many fueros, or traditional 
privileges, of the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, and the significant reorganization of their 
royal administration. These changes have been a matter of significant interest since its 
implementation. During the war, interpretations of Philip’s reforms by supporters of the 
Archduke described them as ending the nations and national identities of the Valencians, 
Aragonese, Catalans, and Mallorcans.
5
 This interpretation identifies the Nueva Planta as the 
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 The most famous of these early works is Narciso Feliu de la Peña, Anales de Cataluña, 
(Barcelona: Editorial Base, 1999, 1709). Similarly, the Valencian abogado Francisco Javier 
Borrull argued at the Constitution of the Cádiz that Philip V had centralized Spain and that they 
should return the Valencia’s Fueros and liberties; see Enrique Giménez López, Gobernar con 
una misma Ley: Sobre la Nueva Planta borbónica en Valencia (Alicante: Universidad de 
Alicante, 1999), 7.  Another famous and characteristic work in this tradition is Salvador Sanpere 
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defining reform initiating the creation of the modern state of Spain at the expense of the Crown 
of Aragon. A recently published collection of essays on the formation of the Spanish state was 
organized around this narrative and includes several essays by historians of early modern Spain 
exploring the creation of the modern nation state during the War of Succession.
6
 In the 
introduction from a historical perspective, José Manuel de Bernardo Ares argues that “the 
Nation-State” of Spain was born between 1700-1716 and served as the underlying “political 
organization of the Spanish society” until 1978 when Spain became a “State of Autonomous 
Regions.” By this account, the Habsburg composite monarchy ended with the Nueva Planta 
reforms in Catalonia on January 16, 1716. These initiated the “‘National’ monarchy of the 
Bourbons,” which was defined by “a unitary power, administrative centralization, and legal 
uniformity.”
7
 Similar claims have often been made by other historians, placing Bernardo Ares 
clearly within the mainstream interpretation of eighteenth century Spain. For example, W. N. 
Hargreaves-Mawdsley has argued that Bourbon rule “led to efficiency, to the destruction of 
regionalism, and so of feudalism, and to the concentration of wealth and power in the crown.”
8
 
More recently, Ricardo García Cárcel has noted that the need for change in Spain was palpable 
                                                                                                                                                             
y Miquel, Fin de la nación catalana (Barcelona: L’Avenç, 1905). For a description of this 
tradition through the 1950s, see María Teresa Pérez Picazo, La Publicística Española en la 
Guerra de Sucesión, vol. 1 (Madrid: CSIC, 1966), 5-14.  
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in 1700 and that the Nueva Planta “ended the federal model” of the Habsburgs.
9
 These 
characterizations of the Nueva Planta as a complete break with the past describe it in positive 
terms as a necessary step in the creation of the modern Spanish state, in contrast to the many 
earlier works lamenting the end of the traditional government of the Aragonese kingdoms. 
Many historians with this progressive view characterize the Nueva Planta as an effort to 
replace the civilian government of the Crown of Aragon with an efficient bureaucracy of military 
officials beholden to the king so that he could exercise greater control over his subjects.
10
 They 
emphasize the power of the new Captain Generals that replaced the viceroys of the Habsburgs 
and Philip’s Council of the Cabinet (Consejo del Despacho) that oversaw international 
diplomacy and the military. These historians contrast these institutions with the regional judicial 
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recent dissertation by Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso, “Politics, Political Culture and Policy Making: 
the reform of viceregal rule in the Spanish World under Philip V (1700-1746),” Doctoral thesis, 
University of Warwick, 2010. 
64 
 
tribunals (the Audiencias) filled with civilians (togados) and the older council system, which was 
traditionally dominated by the grandees of Spain. The Cabinet functioned as the key executive 
body for the king and its creation was certainly one of the most significant early reforms under 
Philip’s reign.
11
 Historians praising Philip’s reforms emphasize how they centralized of royal 
power by streamlining the royal bureaucracy and the simultaneous appointment of ministers 
dependent on royal favor to maintain their social positions and wealth. 
There is another set of historians who, while describing the new government as significantly 
different from the Habsburgs, note that the new government in Spain created a rebalanced 
equilibrium between the civilian nobility and the military officials rather than replacing the 
civilian institutions wholesale. Pedro Molas Ribalta has described the new government in 
Valencia as a “diarchy” with power shared between the military officials, particularly the 
Captain General, and the civilian nobility of the robe, concentrated particularly in the Audiencia. 
According to Molas Ribalta, the joint rule of these two groups created an “unstable equilibrium” 
that characterized Valencian government in the eighteenth century.
12
 This balance also existed at 
the highest levels of the Spanish government as demonstrated by Juan Luis Castellano. He has 
argued that both the councils and the Secretaries of the Cabinet (Secretarias del Despacho) ruled 
Spain together.
13
 The latter functioned as chief ministers and they served as the key officials in 
Philip V’s Cabinet. Castellano has convincingly argued, however, that the Cabinet was just as 
vital to the royal administration as the council—it was in fact dependent upon the councils to 
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register their orders, and, notably, most of the members of the Cabinet also served on the 
councils.
14
 The continued influence of the councils and Audiencias, along with that of the new 
military officials, suggests that Philip’s reforms created multiple channels of royal authority with 
competing jurisdictions. Although the bureaucratic “map” under Philip was certainly different 
than it was under the Habsburgs, there continued to be several ways for royal subjects to petition 
their king after the Nueva Planta.
15
  
In addition to this split between historians concerning the degree to which Philip’s reforms 
militarized the government of the Crown of Aragon, there is another dimension dividing the 
historians of eighteenth century Spain into two separate camps. On one side are those who 
consider the Nueva Planta reforms as part of an intentional effort to homogenize the royal 
administration of the kingdoms of Spain, while those on the other describe it as an inconsistent 
and ultimately incoherent effort towards administrative centralization. For example, José 
Antonio Moreno Nieves identified the theoretical goal of the Nueva Planta decrees as 
“uniformity and centralization,” which he has located in a long-standing Spanish tradition. He 
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has explained that its final form reflected both the Castilian model that it “copied” with some 
minor modifications, reflecting local Aragonese traditions.
16
 Jean-Pierre Dedieu has noted both 
French and Spanish precedents in Philip’s reforms and similarly considered them an effort 
towards centralizing and homogenizing the bureaucratic apparatuses of state, even though 
internal resistance, most notably from the Council of Castile, limited it.
17
 While contesting the 
origin of this model, Marta Ruiz Jímenez has agreed with this characterization of Philip’s 
reforms. She compared his reign to that of his grandfather, arguing that “the arrival of the new 
dynasty signified the implantation, in Spain, of the model of absolutist monarchy imposed by the 
roi soleil... which entailed centralization, rationalization, and uniformity in all of the spheres of 
the administration.”
18
 These historians consider the Nueva Planta an effort to rationalize and 
standardize the administration of Spain and place considerable significance on the newly created 
similarities between the governments of Castile and the Crown of Aragon following the reforms. 
The alternative position recognizes that there were central goals held by Philip and his 
ministers, but they emphasize the inconsistencies and reversals in royal policy as these were 
pursued. Giménez López has described how  
the regime of the Nueva Planta in 1707 must be understood as an open process that 
expressed its dynamism over the century, not trying to introduce a Castilian model 
entirely without procuring conformity to some regimes, now provincial, which provided 
their own organization, with a distinct tax system, and, over all, endowed with a new and 
distinctive element: its military character.
19
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This new military-centered state was a hybrid that developed through the reform process and not 
the product of an original plan designed to transplant either a French or a Castilian model of 
government in Valencia or the other kingdoms of Aragon. Jesús Morales Arrizabalaga has made 
a similar case for the kingdom of Aragon, arguing that “the reform of Aragon undertaken by the 
Bourbons was not carried out by developing a ‘single model,’ but on the contrary, there were 
various models of reform that correspond with the different moments of the war, and which gave 
expression to distinctive regulations.”
20
 More recently, he has noted the challenges of making 
sense of the Nueva Planta reforms because of the loaded language of the debate, and has 
suggested that his own work on the Royal Acuerdo of the Audiencia in Zaragoza (the capital of 
the Kingdom of Aragon) reveals that “the government of the kingdom was generally decided in 
the kingdom.”
21
 In this, he has challenged the degree to which the Nueva Planta centralized the 
state, in addition to his critique of the standard Bourbon model of uniformity and centralization 
borrowed either from Louis XIV or the Conde-Duque de Olivares. Finally, Henry Kamen has 
split the difference between these two camps, if that is possible, by arguing that Philip was 
drawing on both French and Spanish models while trying to centralize the administration and the 
finances of state. Philip’s goal in this account was to increase “crown control, military security 
and, in the words of Louis XIV, ‘the expenses of the state.’”
22
 Kamen has portrayed Philip as 
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rather eccentric and, on the whole, not very focused on the affairs of state. This description has 
more in common with that of Giménez López and Morales Arrizabalaga than the other camp of 
historians, because he has not indicated that Philip strove for uniformity and centralization of his 
administration, but rather on the more modest goals of increasing the power and resources under 
his command.  
In light of these debates, it is important to establish the method with which Philip approached 
the choices involved in reforming the government of the Crown of Aragon. Toward that end, this 
chapter will ascertain whether Philip V and his ministers pursued a consistent policy to establish 
a pre-determined model of administration, or if they instead had specific policy goals that they 
pursued through a pragmatic and dynamic process.  
The development of Philip’s reform policy between 1706 and 1716 answers this question. 
Philip and his ministers initially established a new government in Valencia with limited changes 
similar to those made following the revolt of the Catalans of 1640 that left largely intact the 
traditional reciprocal duties between the king and his subjects. This arrangement, however, 
changed dramatically when Philip revoked all of Valencia and Aragon’s traditional privileges on 
June 29, 1707, in an effort to quickly establish a functioning government. Philip’s assertion of 
royal authority over the Crown of Aragon also provided him with a strong bargaining position 
while understandably reducing the Catalans’ interest in a negotiated peace. His focus was not to 
create a uniform government, however, as subsequent reforms moderating the initial decree 
demonstrate. The process began on July 29, 1707, when Philip granted individual and corporate 
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exemptions to his loyal subjects and reconfirmed their privileges. This reflected a major shift in 
royal policy away from uniform legal and administrative standards toward negotiation between 
the king and his subjects, towns, and other corporations separately. By responding to the 
particular interests of these groups and individuals separately, Philip was able to provide what 
they most wanted in exchange for their support of the monarchy without having to create a 
universal policy that would have to balance their competing desires. The new administrative 
approach increased the idiosyncrasies of Philip’s administration while also increasing his 
subjects’ dependence upon his personal favor for their privileges. The shift towards 
accommodating particularist interests continued with the new “mixed” model of government 
created in Aragon in 1711. There Philip reestablished the kingdom’s traditional civil laws and 
rebalanced the relationship between the judicial and military officials, while maintaining 
Castilian civil law and a mixture of local and foreign officials throughout the kingdom. The new 
Aragonese model of government provided the framework for the assimilation and reform of 
Catalonia after the fall of Barcelona in 1714. Philip then reformed Valencia’s government in a 
similar fashion. The Valencians did not reacquire their civil law in the end, but this result had 
more to do with opposition from the Castilians on the Audiencia of Valencia than the royal will. 
Royal flexibility on the many questions that arose concerning which local and regional 
institutions would be abolished, which retained but reformed, and which allowed to continue 
with all of their old privileges intact, indicates a willingness by the king and his ministers to 
tolerate many idiosyncrasies in the government of the Crown of Aragon. The various 
reconsiderations and reversals of Philip’s initial policy reveal his pragmatic approach, which 
enabled him to shift his policies to better accomplish his goal of firmly establishing royal rule in 
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the Crown of Aragon. By responding to local concerns and reaffirming his willingness to reward 
service to the crown, Philip created a new and more personal relationship with his subjects.  
 
II. The new government of Valencia (November 1706-May 1707) 
Philip V’s policy towards the Crown of Aragon was developed in consultation with the royal 
councils in a system that had existed for centuries. The records of these consultations reveal the 
concerns of Philip and his various ministers as they tried to work through the challenges of 
reforming the royal government of the Crown of Aragon in the middle of the War of Spanish 
Succession.  
Philip initially asked the Council of Aragon for advice concerning the new government of 
Valencia on November 27, 1706, and they met with him to give their recommendations on 
December 22. The war was going well and he hoped to take Valencia in the next year when he 
would need to replace the royal ministers serving in the kingdom’s highest judicial body, the 
Royal Audiencia. Philip ordered the council to propose officials for the Audiencia—he wanted 
three Valencian ministers, and two Castilians along with an explanation of why they made these 
particular recommendations. The council responded by citing Philip IV’s order that the council 
“always treat the truth plainly, even when it seems to you that it will be contrary to my will.” 
With this introduction, the council explained the “inconveniences” that would result from the 
king’s plan.
23
 
 First of all, the ministers of the council explained that such a small Audiencia, with only 3 
places for Valencians, would be a great source of despair to the Valencians who had previously 
                                                 
23
 “Dicelo que se le ofrece en execución de la Real orden de VM a Consulta de 27 del 
pasado, tocante a la Audiencia que se ha de formar en el Reyno de Valencia, y sueldo, que han 
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served in the Audiencia. These ministers had fled Valencia when it capitulated to the Archduke 
Charles. Not only would they not be rewarded, now they would suffer by being deprived of 
office, which the common people would take as a sign of the ministers having offended the king. 
The council cautioned that this treatment of these officials would “set the worst possible 
example, and greatly discourage the good vassals of Your Majesty.”
24
 
Instead, the council advised the king to return the eight Valencian ministers who had 
previously served in the Audiencia as there would be many prosecutions and other government 
business for the court to pursue, and they were the best qualified to do it. By uniting these 
ministers in the Audiencia, rather than giving it a new form, the king would have a tribunal of 
proven competence in the royal service, which would increase the support for the king and 
intimidate the “evildoers” in Valencia. Failing to do this, however, and appointing incompetent 
ministers would upset the fickle Valencians and cause them to once again shake off the yoke of 
his royal rule. In particular, the council cautioned that the appointment of Castilian ministers now 
would become: 
...the fruitless cause of pernicious consequences to the disservice of Your Majesty, 
because the Valencian citizens (naturales) would know that Your Majesty desires to 
remove their Fueros, and Privileges, and govern them with the same Law with which you 
govern your other kingdoms, which would put them in a state of desperation and make 
them obstinate, and reduce them to giving their lives for the conservation of their Fueros 
and Liberties which would touch the strongest alarm to irritate them against Your 
Majesty and close the doors to every form of negotiation, and the hope of being able to 
reduce them to secure this part for Your Majesty, making the conquest of this kingdom 
and of the rest of the Crown of Aragon most difficult, as everyone would be warned by 
the example and have the same suspicions.
25
  
 
By violating Valencia’s traditional privilege to be governed only by Valencians, the king’s 
proposal would turn the war from a battle between two claimants to the throne into a war over 
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the continued existence of the Crown of Aragon’s privileges, which were closely united to the 
identity of its subjects. The council feared that this would greatly impede the war effort, because 
it would raise the stakes of surrender so much that Valencia, Aragon, Catalonia, and Mallorca 
would fight as long as they possibly could. 
The council did not defend these privileges, instead offering practical advice for the king to 
accomplish his goals. The council explicitly stated that they were telling the king not to remove 
the privileges, fueros, and liberties of these kingdoms “which opposed the Royal sovereignty of 
Your Majesty,” but instead recommending their revocation only after he recovered his 
kingdoms. Then he could annul and revoke “everything that had given spirit to the insolence of 
these natural citizens for opposing Your Majesty and had been the cause of the ease with which 
they rebelled.” With the ongoing war, however, they cautioned that “Now is not the time to 
execute this, nor to give indications that you desire to do so, because one should not waste the 
hopes for conciliating the souls of these people and to attract them to the party of Your Majesty 
to facilitation the reduction of these kingdoms.”
26
 By eschewing all threats to the Valencian 
fueros, the council believed that the king could win the support of the kingdom and hasten 
victory in the war. Despite their reservations with the whole project, the council did fulfill the 
king’s request that they name five officials to serve in the Audiencia while noting that the 
Audiencia would have too much work for so few people.  
The king agreed with many of their suggestions and ordered the eight Valencians that they 
named to join the viceroy in Alicante. He did not appoint any Castilians to the Audiencia for the 
time being. This only delayed the establishment of a government in Valencia, however. 
Following his decisive victory in the Battle of Almansa on April 25, 1707, Philip quickly 
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recovered control of the kingdom of Valencia. It was now imperative to establish a new 
government, which generated a flurry of paperwork between the council and the king as they 
decided how to proceed.  
Once again, the council discouraged the king from abolishing the privileges of Valencia 
while the other kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon remained under the Archduke Charles’ 
control. Instead, they advised Philip, that “without speaking of the abolition of privileges, the 
ministers that Your Majesty puts in the conquered kingdoms should work sanely [cuerdemente], 
and with the least horror [espanto] that is possible, being as agreeable to the service of Your 
Majesty without creating obstacles with the fueros [sin embarazarse con fuero] that impede 
them.”
27
 By reducing the apparent risk of surrender, the council intended to promote the war 
effort with a smooth transition back to Philip’s rule in Valencia. Furthermore, this course of 
action would permit the king time to consider whether he wanted to repeal all fueros, or to 
“sweeten the resolution by not touching those that do not create obstacles [no traygan embarazo] 
to the absolute order of Your Majesty or his use of Justice.”
28
  
The king, however, had not solicited this advice. His central concern was how many tribunals 
should exist in Valencia. The council recommended that he maintain the status quo as much as 
possible, although they advised the king to create a Committee of Confiscations (Junta de 
Confiscaciones), to oversee the investigation of goods that the king could seize. They concluded 
with an appeal for slow action on the part of the king only after his rule had been fully secured, 
as his predecessor, Philip IV had done in 1652 following the previous revolt of the Catalans.  
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Spurred on by José de Grimaldo, Secretary of War and Exchequer (Secretaría del Despacho 
de Guerra y Hacienda) since 1705, the king pushed forward with several requests to the council 
concerning the establishment of his new government in Valencia. Grimaldo replied to the 
Council’s consulta the very next day, presenting counter-arguments and practical questions on 
the implementation of the new government. The Council produced five consultas in response to 
Grimaldo that they presented to the king on May 20, 1707. These addressed various questions 
related to the establishment of the new government in Valencia, including considerable detail 
related to its form and the appointment of new officials. These were the most pressing matters, as 
the current officials running the kingdom had been appointed under the Archduke Charles and 
had to be replaced immediately because of the tremendous amount of work associated with the 
transition in government. The issues raised and the council’s advice reveal their primary 
concerns and provide fascinating insights into the decision-making process that led to the 
administrative reforms in the Crown of Aragon.  
The Council continued to discourage royal action that was overtly contrary to the fueros and 
privileges of Valencia. They feared that such action might destabilize the recently acquired 
kingdom in addition to unnecessarily threatening the war effort in the rest of the Crown of 
Aragon. When asked to recommend Castilian officials to serve in the Royal Audiencia, the 
highest judicial tribunal in the kingdom, the council warned that this “could cause the most 
pernicious consequences... because with this they [everyone in the kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon] would believe that Your Majesty wants to abrogate the ancient laws touching justice 
and to govern them with those of Castile.”
29
 Here the council warned Philip that an aggressive 
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reform of the fueros of the Crown of Aragon would create too many practical problems for the 
government of the region. They reminded him of their similar cautions from December 1706, 
noting that the conquest of the rest of the Crown of Aragon seemed so close that there was little 
to gain and much to lose by raising the stakes of their surrender.  
This matter was complicated, however, by the office of viceroy. The Council anticipated the 
king’s desire to appoint a new viceroy, but advised him against it because the oaths of office 
required that the viceroy uphold the fueros of Valencia. Failing to take those oaths would 
naturally cause suspicions among the Valencians and others that their fueros were in danger, so 
the council recommended returning the previous viceroys of Valencia and Aragon to these 
kingdoms that they could plausibly avoid making any new oaths that might reaffirm the fueros 
that Philip intended to revoke.
30
 This path would allow the king the greatest degree of flexibility 
as he determined how to reform the administration of the Crown of Aragon without revealing his 
intentions to everyone just yet. 
For similar reasons, the council continued to encourage as much continuity as possible 
between the old government of Valencia and the new one. It consistently advised Philip to 
appoint Valencians in his government. Not only would this avoid arousing suspicions that he 
intended to repeal the fueros, it would also provide several practical benefits. First of all, this 
course of action would reward the royal ministers who had fled Valencia following the 
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Archduke’s invasion.
31
 These ministers already knew the kingdom and how to fulfill their old 
offices, so reappointing them would be the most efficient way to establish Philip’s rule. 
Additionally, they had demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown through their willingness to 
suffer on his behalf. The council summarized the stories of some of these officials so that the 
king would realize his duty to appoint them to office. For example, the council told Philip about 
Doctor Damian Cerdá, the former Fiscal of the Audiencia of Valencia. After leaving Valencia, 
his great poverty prevented him from going to the Court in Madrid. Instead, he had lived in a 
convent in a village in Castile with the support of Don Luys Salvador, Assessor of the 
Department of the Government of Valencia (Assesor de la Governación de Valencia), who 
helped him because of Cerdá’s prior connections with the University. Cerdá had spent the last 
few months in Vallecas where, because of his great poverty, he had become very ill.
32
 Stories 
like Cerdá’s were persuasive and often successful in securing an office for the exiled ministers—
in this case, the king reappointed Cerdá to his old position as Abogado Fiscal of the Audiencia 
when he established the new government of Valencia.
33
 By appointing these exiled Valencians, 
Philip was able to publicly reward those who had proven their fidelity and establish a 
government with competent ministers prepared to address the specific needs of Valencia.  
The council’s concern for practical matters continued in their recommendations for the 
preservation of local offices. These included local royal officials, such as the Bailes, as well as 
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city officials that represented the localities, like the jurados of the City of Valencia. The 
preservation of these local officials, however, sometimes included bringing the institutions more 
directly under the king’s control.  For example, the jurados were usually selected through a 
complex local custom that required the assembly of the Committee of the General Council (Junta 
del Consejo General). This was composed of 120 members from the four different estates of 
Valencian society that chose jurados by drawing their names out of a hat. The Council of Aragon 
strongly discouraged assembling this committee because the council always found it “pernicious 
to the public quiet, since such plebian congregations have always caused suspicious tumults.” In 
fact, sometimes the jurados convoked the Committee with the intention of inspiring fear in the 
viceroy and the Audiencia. Since the jurados were essential to the operation of the city 
government, their offices could not simply be left vacant. The council advised the king to avoid 
the convocation of the Committee and directly appoint the jurados. This would enable the 
government to function while avoiding the dangers of the Committee and the overt rejection of 
local custom.
34
 The council recommended officials for these positions, and the king followed 
their recommendation by appointing them directly.
35
 It is worthwhile to note that this focus on 
increasing royal influence over the particular officials chosen while maintaining the local 
institutional forms reflects royal policy during the assimilation of Catalonia in 1652.
36
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Three points are worth noting from the negotiations between the council, the king, and 
Grimaldo concerning the new government of Valencia. First, while Philip clearly dismissed the 
council’s advice to respect Valencia’s fueros until he had secured his rule over the Crown of 
Aragon, they exerted significant influence on the form that government took and the ministers 
who served in it. Among the more significant changes that they encouraged was the expansion of 
the Audiencia from five members in the original proposal of December 1706 to twelve when it 
was actually established.
37
 The majority of the practical details of the new government were left 
to the council, reflecting the king’s trust in their judgment and perhaps his lack of interest in the 
details of the plan. 
Second, Philip found positions for the Valencian ministers who were loyal to him. The 
council’s consistent appeals to justice for the Valencian ministers who had fled the Archduke 
Charles’ rule also met with great success. Loyalty to the king was highly valued, whatever the 
nationality of his subject, and Philip rewarded it. The ultimate consequences of the new 
government were not, in fact, a Castilian take-over of the Valencian government, but instead the 
creation of a royal administration that integrated Valencian and Castilian ministers.
38
 In the 
Audiencia, there was equal representation of Valencians and foreigners. As its practices had not 
been changed, the Valencian ministers would presumably need to explain Valencian practices to 
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 Even Philip V’s infamous minister Melchor de Macanaz called for this kind of integration 
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their foreign colleagues. In general, local officials seem to have remained predominantly of 
Valencian extraction. 
Finally, the new government in Valencia was a provisional government. The council made 
this point clear. It strove to meet the immediate need for institutions to organize the reacquired 
kingdom while maintaining as much long-term flexibility as possible for Philip. After all, the 
king had not yet officially decided to abolish all of the fueros and privileges of Valencia, so there 
was considerable uncertainty in the council about what the government would ultimately look 
like. For example, throughout the consultas the council referred to the viceroy of Valencia as an 
office that would be abolished in a few months.
39
 This uncertainty led to caution and a light-
handed approach as the council strove to retain local institutions more or less intact while also 
increasing these institutions’ dependence on the king as much as possible. 
 
III. Revocation of the fueros (June 1707) 
The inadequacies of the Bourbon government in Valencia raised continual questions about 
how it would function, who would administer it, and which officials would have which specific 
duties. Rather than working through them slowly, however, Philip V attempted to resolve all of 
these debates and tensions by transplanting the government of Castile, which required much less 
of his attention, to the more problematic kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon.  
Various challenges and opportunities faced the new officials in the recently re-formed 
government of Valencia. To resolve these matters definitively, the regent of the new Audiencia 
in Valencia, Don Pedro Larreatigui y Colón asked the king a series of questions concerning how 
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he should fulfill his official duties.
40
 He raised a variety of issues relevant to his role as regent, 
and suggested solutions reflecting his own aspirations. The king gave this letter to the Council of 
Castile, which responded in a consulta on June 14, 1707.
41
 It advised the king concerning 
Larreatigui y Colón’s suggestions, often agreeing with him, but occasionally proposing 
alternative solutions that they thought would better serve the king. The list of concerns is 
instructive, as it indicates the challenges of implementing the proposed new government of 
Valencia.  
For example, the first question concerned the role of the Audiencia. It was, by all accounts, to 
have the same authority as the Chancillerías in Castile, despite its designation as an Audiencia.
42
 
Thus Larreatigui y Colón would enjoy the same honor as a President of a Chancillería. 
Additionally, until the king appointed a viceroy, the regent would sign everything without 
distinction that was dispatched from the Audiencia.
43
 Along with these honors, the regent should 
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not be expected to visit anyone except for “certain and very important person,” so that he would 
not have to waste time on them instead of serving the public cause. He held this prerogative in 
common with the Presidents of the Chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada.
44
 The council 
indicated that he intended to preserve his authority by not making way for anyone in his carriage, 
and only giving way in his house when entering a room or surrendering his seat to Archbishops, 
Grandees of Castile, or other persons of equal stature. The council considered this taking things 
too far and a disservice to the king. They encouraged him to check Larreatigui y Colón’s 
pretension, as he had already begun claiming such precedence, much to the dissatisfaction of the 
other members of the Audiencia of Valencia.
45
 Larreatigui y Colón’s desire for power and 
prestige was also apparent in his request to have all of the authority of the vacant office of 
viceroy devolve to the regent of the Audiencia.
46
 The Council pointed out that doing this would 
diminish the authority of the Duke of Berwick, then Commandant General of the three kingdoms 
of Aragon and the highest military official in the Kingdom of Valencia. The Council offered to 
solicit Berwick’s opinion and assured the king that there would be no inconvenience because of 
the delay in resolving this matter.
47
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As there was no viceroy in Valencia, Larreatigui asked that he be permitted to make use of 
the military to execute the orders of the Audiencia. While he promised to try and maintain order 
through gentleness, Larreatigui y Colón believed that force would be necessary from time to 
time.
48
 The council noted that even though this might be convenient, the bodyguard of the 
viceroys was reserved for the command of the Alter Nos of His Majesty, and the king would 
have to make special arrangements for the regent and the Audiencia to exercise this power.
49
  
The Regent Larreatigui y Colón also suggested the standardization of legal proceedings in 
Castilian, instead of having cases tried in Catalan and all decrees published in Latin.
50
 The 
council opposed both innovations, noting that it would be unnecessarily costly and tedious to 
translate all of the cases currently being heard. Further, as royal decrees had always been made in 
Latin and they could not be more clearly articulated in Castilian, the council saw no benefit to 
the proposed change.  They noted that the use of Catalan caused no problems, just as the use of 
Italian in Naples functioned well. The council worried that change might prove “inconvenient” 
as the switch from Catalan to French in Roussillon had proven following the Treaty of the 
Pyrenees.
51
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There were several other proposals for changes in the operation of the Audiencia, which 
included: a requirement that all notarized documents be issued in Castilian instead of Latin; that 
Valencian courts follow the sentencing guidelines used in Castilian courts; that lawsuits brought 
in Valencian courts be required to have full citations, instead of expecting the judges to find the 
relevant precedents; that Castilians be sent to Valencia to serve as scribes; some changes to the 
oath of the regent and the way in which his title was sent to him; and, finally, the introduction in 
the Audiencia of Valencia of the practices of the Chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada.
52
 
These proposals, according to the council, should be denied since they either made things worse 
or unnecessarily complicated the administration of justice. Concerning the final point on the 
introduction of new practices in the Audiencia of Valencia, the council saw nothing defective in 
how the Audiencia had operated. Instead, the Council believed that this request reflected “a 
desire for change in the present state” that could not serve the king and would only create “a 
general tumult in the administration of justice.”
53
 As before, the Council attempted to preserve as 
much of the old system as possible.  
The new regent also asked for the king to specify which law the Audiencia should enforce. 
Recognizing that it was not convenient for the king to speak of revoking the fueros, he asked the 
king to tell the Audiencia which of the “fueros are useful for the public cause, royal prerogatives 
of His Majesty, and the business of the parts, both in the civil causes as in the criminal ones, that 
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are observed, and guarded, not because they are fueros, nor laws, but because of the reason on 
which they were founded.” Larreatigui y Colón wanted the king to identify these useful and 
reasonable fueros and to contrast them with those fueros that were “contrary to the royal 
prerogatives and impediments to the administration of Justice,” which should be ignored.
54
 The 
council agreed that the king’s instructions to the Audiencia would need to be specific on these 
matters. The Council repeated its advice from May 15, 1707, which encouraged the king not to 
discuss the revocation of the fueros and instead advise the Audiencia to ignore the fueros that 
were impediments to the administration of justice and detrimental to the king’s sovereignty.
55
  
The council proposed that the fueros which were “useful for the public cause, royal prerogatives 
of Your Majesty, and the business of the parts, both civil and criminal,” be followed “not as 
fueros,” but rather because of the reason upon which they are based. When the Audiencia 
encountered fueros that were “noxious or not conducive to the good administration of justice,” 
they should have recourse to common law or the laws of Castile—the king would need to specify 
which. This ambiguity would avoid the creation of a legal vacuum while maintaining the 
Valencian laws that were beneficial to the king and improving upon the ones that interfered with 
the exercise of royal authority.
 56
  
Larreatigui y Colón brought up one other issue with profound consequences for the fate of 
Valencia. He asked to know the king’s will concerning the crime of the past rebellion, whether 
he desired to proceed against the rebels by laws and by “other methods,” or if he wanted to 
forget the past and only prosecute current and future crimes. Larreatigui y Colón noted that 
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trying the crimes of rebellion would present “infinite impediments,” and would produce “so 
many tumults that would disturb and delay that which we principally agreed to establish [dilaten 
lo que principalmente convenga establecer].”
57
 The council agreed that this was important and 
suggested that the king decide quickly, hinting at the guidelines that existed for issuing a general 
pardon in Valencia, while also noting that they could continue to seize the incomes of particular 
rebels through the newly established Committee of Confiscations even with a general pardon in 
effect.
 58
 Such a pragmatic solution would decrease the risk of revolt while allowing the king to 
increase his revenue and punish the important Valencians who had openly betrayed Philip.  
Larreatigui y Colón’s questions reflected the complexity of completely overhauling the 
governing institutions of the Crown of Aragon. It seems that the king wanted most of all to avoid 
working through all of these challenging details and to establish a functioning government in 
Valencia as quickly as possible, so he dispensed with all of these difficulties in the simplest way 
possible and gave himself a strong bargaining position for future negotiations with the 
Valencians and Aragonese. On June 29, 1707, Philip V issued a Royal Order, traditionally 
identified as the first act of the Nueva Planta, that repealed all of Valencia and Aragon’s fueros, 
privileges, and laws, and replaced them with those of Castile. Additionally, he specified that the 
Audiencia that he had created in Valencia and the one he was creating in Aragon should govern 
in the same way as the Chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada, “observing literally the same 
rules, laws, practices, orders, and customs which they keep in these [Chancillerías], without the 
least distinction nor difference in anything except in those controversies, and points of 
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ecclesiastical jurisdiction.”
59
 This was the king’s initial answer to the various questions posed by 
Larreatigui y Colón—his resolution to the council’s consulta stated as much, emphasizing that 
the solution to all of these problems was to follow the Castilian model.
60
 While these decrees 
might be considered radical from an Aragonese or Valencian perspective, from the king’s point 
of view, they resolved the many uncertainties raised by the Valencian Regent by following a 
proven model. The decrees definitively affirmed the king’s authority over his kingdoms
61
 and 
clearly explained that Valencia and Aragon lost their fueros and institutions because of their 
rebellion against him. The Royal Order of June 29 left no doubt concerning Philip’s belief in his 
authority to rule and his unlimited legislative power. The assertion of royal authority over the 
Crown of Aragon placed his subjects in a position where they could at best hope for a partial 
restoration of their fueros and knew that whatever they regained would be dependent on Philip’s 
good will instead of an ancient tradition that bound the current monarch. Rhetorically, the decree 
of June 29 transformed the terms of the negotiation between Philip and his subjects in the Crown 
of Aragon by forcefully demonstrating that the king was no longer bound by the fueros. 
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IV. Reactions and renegotiation (July 1707-1709) 
The council of Aragon responded to the royal decree of June 29 a few days later. They 
presented a message from the diputados and jurados of Valencia to the king thanking him for 
extending to the “distinguished natural citizens” of both Valencia and Aragon “his grand 
clemency the most special honor of making them capable for the employment in the kingdoms of 
Castile.”
62
 The Council of Aragon also asked who should respond to the delegation of both 
Valencia and Zaragoza. The king responded that it should work in the same way as it does “for 
the Kingdoms, Cities, and Chancelleries of Castile.”
63
 Whenever doubts arose, the king told 
them to follow Castilian customs, usually without specifying what those were.  
The Jurados of the City of Zaragoza also wrote to the king on July 4, 1707. They explained 
that they were glad to be in the king’s domain once again and presented a memorial asking for 
the king’s mercy. It represented the suffering of Zaragoza’s “past disgrace” when it was “burning 
with the fire of sedition” which had prevented them from appealing to Philip for justice. They 
had failed their duty by submitting to “another lord” because of the Habsburg’s violent 
occupation of the city. Despite these problems, however, they described the citizens who had 
“maintained intact the treasure of loyalty to Your Majesty” from all orders of society: the 
ecclesiastical estate, religious orders, nobles, hidalgos, and even the popular estate. Together 
they asked the king to “act on the munificent clemency and generous tribute with which Your 
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Majesty is adorned,” by restoring “the grace of Your Majesty” to these subjects.
64
 In this petition 
(memorial), these citizens argued that the fall of Zaragoza to the Archduke Charles was not their 
fault and that members of all parts of society had served the king faithfully even though they 
were powerless to oppose his enemy’s occupation. This petition was their attempt to 
communicate that they were not rebels and to ask the king to return his royal favor to them 
because of their fidelity. This was presented to the king in the Council of the Cabinet on July 7, 
and three weeks later, he amended the initial decrees of the Nueva Planta.
65
 
On July 29, 1707, the king issued his second decree concerning the provincial fueros. In it, he 
noted that because many of the inhabitants of Valencia and Aragon: 
and of the cities, villages, places (lugares), and the rest of the communities and 
individuals (particulares), both ordinary and secular clergy (así eclesiásticos como 
seculares), and everywhere most of the Nobles (Nobles), Knights, Nobles (Infanzones), 
Hidalgos, and honored citizens have been very fine and loyal, suffering from the loss of 
their property (haciendas), and other persecutions and acts that have tested their 
perseverance and refined their fidelity (ha sufrido su constante y acrisolada fidelidad); 
and this being most notorious, in no case can it be understood with reason that my Royal 
intention noticed, nor punished as delinquents those that are known to be loyal.
66
 
 
Here the king qualifies his previous decree by explaining that those who are obviously loyal are 
not to suffer personally for the rebellion of their fellow subjects. Indeed, he indicated that the 
majority of his subjects never rebelled and that they became more loyal through the suffering 
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they endured during the Archduke’s rule. This is consistent with Philip’s willingness to appoint 
Valencians and Aragonese to their respective Audiencias, but is a significant departure from the 
previous decree which made no such distinctions—after all, the citizens of Zaragoza would not 
have petitioned the king to restore them to his favor if they had not apparently lost it. Still, the 
king’s rhetoric of clarifying his previously declared will enabled him to avoid acknowledging his 
failure to distinguish between his faithful subjects and those who rebelled. Philip was willing to 
reconfirm the “privileges, exemptions… and liberties conceded by the Lord Kings my 
predecessors, or acquired by another just title,” of those “places, houses, families, and persons, 
whose fidelity is well-known.”
67
 While these faithful subjects had their particular privileges 
reconfirmed, Philip emphasized that this was unrelated to the change in government: “The 
difference of government was not in large part occasioned by the past disturbances, but because 
in the form of government of the kingdoms and people there need not be difference in the laws 
and styles that are for... the conservation of peace and human society.”
68
 The justification for the 
change in the government changed from a desire to punish rebelling subjects to a desire for 
standardization in the administration of his kingdoms. The king further explained that “my royal 
intention is that all of the continent of Spain be governed by the same laws, in which the 
Aragonese and Valencians are very interested, for the communication that my mildness frees 
them, with the Castilians, in the positions, honors, and other conveniences that they have 
experienced in the kingdoms of Castile some of the Loyal vassals of Aragon and Valencia.”
69
 
Here he argued that the Aragonese and Valencians would have greater access to royal favors 
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because they could serve in Castilian offices and hold Castilian titles, affirming the most popular 
part of his previous decree and emphasizing its benefits for the Valencians and Aragonese. In 
this way Philip backed off from his prior position and instead tried to convince the Valencians 
and Aragonese that they would benefit from his reforms. Significantly, he did not imply the 
abolition of the nations of Aragon and Valencia, but only expressed a desire that the same laws 
apply across the geographic “continent of Spain”—there is no hint of a Spanish nation in these 
decrees. 
Meanwhile, the king abolished the Council of Aragon on July 15, 1707, giving its 
jurisdiction to a new office of the Council of Castile for the Iberian regions and to the Council of 
Italy for the Mediterranean islands. The king also reassigned the members of the council. Three 
went to the Council of Castile and another three to the Council of Italy, while four others were 
assigned to various other councils.
70
 Most significantly, however, the Protonotary of the Council 
of Aragon, Don Juan Milan de Aragón became a new secretary of the Chamber of Castile and of 
the Council of Castile with responsibility for “all of the papers of the business of the kingdoms 
of Aragon and of Valencia.” In addition to continuing to manage all of these papers, he was 
ordered to “indicate to the Chamber the number of officials which are necessary for his 
secretariat,” including those currently serving in the same capacity as protonotaries and 
secretaries. So not only did he continue in his job, he also brought his support staff from the 
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Council of Aragon with him.
71
 This guaranteed continuity in the practices governing 
communication between Iberian provinces of the Crown of Aragon and the royal council with 
jurisdiction over them and prevented the paperwork concerning Aragon from becoming mixed 
up with those concerning Castile.
72
 
It is also worth noting that Philip established an Audiencia in Aragon following the laws, 
practices, and uses of the Chancillerías of Valladolid and Granada just as he had in Valencia.
73
 
Actually, Philip seemed unsure what to call these new judicial tribunals—initially he created 
Audiencias with all of the authority and duties of Chancillerías, but later he ordered the Cámara 
of Castile to change the titles of Don Pedro Larreatigui y Colón and the Conde de Gerena, from 
Regents of the Audiencias, to Presidents of the Chancillerías of Valencia and Zaragoza.
74
 
Gradually the new governments of Aragon and Valencia were beginning to take shape and fulfill 
their duties by processing the immense paperwork of state.   
In response to the decree of July 29, 1707, the subjects of Aragon and Valencia wrote 
petitions (memoriales) to the king explaining their fidelity. The new decree initiated a flood of 
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petitions to the king for the confirmation of privileges by individuals and corporations in Aragon 
and Valencia. The volume of paperwork was tremendous—Philip V sent 93 petitions to the 
Council on one day alone.
75
 These requests were processed by the Council of Castile, which 
would request informes, or reports, from the President of the appropriate Chancillería.
76
 In these 
reports the President would comment on the veracity of the petition—sometimes he would need 
to contact others, such as generals or other officials, with more specific knowledge concerning 
the individual or corporation in question. The report would summarize this information and 
usually conclude with advice concerning how the king should respond to the requested 
confirmation of privileges. These recommendations might support full confirmation of their 
privileges, their partial confirmation, or their complete rejection. The Council would write up a 
consulta presenting this information to the king who would make the final decision in 
consultation with the council. The most important criteria for these decisions was whether or not 
the king’s subjects had proven their fidelity to the king.
77
 
While the decree authorizing the confirmation of these privileges stated that the king’s goal 
was to have one law for the continent of Spain, it actually worked to undercut standardization in 
some significant ways. By confirming particular privileges to various corporations and 
individuals, the king reinforced the centrality of privilege in his state and increased the 
idiosyncrasies that would be applied by his more standardized bureaucracy. This change served 
the royal goal of establishing a loyal base of support in Aragon and Valencia beholden to the 
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king. By initially abolishing the privileges of his subjects, Philip made those who ultimately 
regained them dependent on him personally for their way of life. In this way, the relationship 
between Philip and his subjects in the Crown of Aragon became increasingly personal and 
dependent on the king’s favor, rather than the beneficence of one of his long-dead predecessors. 
The rapid moderation of Philip’s initial decree of June 29 reflects his willingness to negotiate 
with his subjects in Valencia and Aragon. His aggressive assertion of royal prerogative gave him 
a strong position from which to revise his position as he had a lot of ground for concessions 
while protecting his authority to reform the royal administration of the Crown of Aragon.  
 
V. The blended government of Aragon (1710-1716) 
The next few years led to continued negotiation and the creation of a new model of 
government in the Kingdom of Aragon. Bourbon forces faced significant difficulties in the war. 
Considerable disagreement existed between Louis XIV and Philip V that further undermined the 
Bourbon position in Spain. Even more troubling, in 1710 the Archduke Charles’ forces 
conquered Zaragoza and subsequently entered Madrid, forcing Philip’s royal court to flee to 
Valladolid.
78
 Charles confirmed all of the traditional Aragonese fueros to solidify his hold on the 
region and emphasize the difference between him and Philip. When the tide of the war reversed 
and Philip reentered Zaragoza on January 4, 1711, he was once again forced to create a new 
government in the Kingdom of Aragon. This time the instability of Bourbon rule in Aragon led 
to a reconsideration of his prior policies.
79
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The rapid succession of changes had consequences for Bourbon authority in the region. 
Philip responded by reforming the Aragonese government once again. On April 3, 1711, he 
issued a royal decree because “among various things, I have found it convenient to resolve to 
establish a new government in Aragon,” euphemistically avoiding any mention of his difficulty 
controlling the region. There were three significant differences between this government and the 
previous one. First of all, Philip restored Aragonese civil law in all lawsuits except for those with 
the king as an involved party, in which case they would be tried by the laws of Castile. The 
Council of Castile was also ordered to judge civil cases based on Aragonese law in the third 
appeal, a new duty for the long-standing Castilian institution. Second, the king established a 
Committee of the Treasury (Junta de Erario) with authority over the distribution of all rents, 
tributes, and other impositions in the kingdom. Finally the king reduced the Chancillería to an 
Audiencia whose members he would appoint “without restriction of province, land, or 
nationality.”
80
 Significantly, this decree removed any quota related to the composition of the 
Audiencia, which nevertheless always retained a mix of Aragonese and Castilian members.  
While some historians have interpreted this as a trivial concession to buy peace in Aragon 
while the Bourbon’s began the conquest of Catalonia, the changes introduced at this point were 
quite significant.
81
 First of all, it indicates that Philip was more interested in maintaining his 
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authority in the region than in establishing a uniform legal system throughout his kingdoms. 
Instead of trying to maintain continuity, even among the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon, 
Philip quickly returned their civil law to the Aragonese. Second, this concession was far from 
trivial. Aragonese civil law differs significantly from Castilian law, otherwise it would be 
unnecessary to specific that royal contracts would continue to be judged according to Castilian 
law.
82
 Despite Philip’s prior claims that he desired to rule his kingdoms by the same law, he 
apparently did not regret his concessions to Aragon as neither he nor his successors restored 
Castilian civil law to Aragon following the war.
83
 Perhaps this reflects a sense that the change 
had not worked in Aragon prior to the Archduke’s invasion. After all, Aragonese notaries often 
followed Aragonese law instead of Castilian law from 1707-1711.
 84
 The significant problems 
flowing from the Nueva Planta led one of the most prominent Aragonese jurists, Don Diego 
Franco de Villalba, to publish a tract on the “legal crisis” plaguing the kingdom.
85
 Whatever 
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Philip’s motivations, the decree of April 3, 1711, marked the beginning of a new and more 
flexible royal approach toward governing the Crown of Aragon.  
To clarify the significance of the Chancillería’s reduction to an Audiencia, Philip issued two 
more royal decrees on September 14 and 15, 1711. The first of these identified the Audiencia of 
Seville as the new model for the Aragonese judicial tribunal, replacing the Chancillerías of 
Valladolid and Granada. The most significant of these changes was the creation of a second hall 
for hearing civil cases.
86
 The decree of the next day clarified various “doubts” related to this new 
Audiencia that usually were resolved by following the model of Seville. These included the end 
of appeals to the Council of Castile on civil cases. Further, if a judge had to recuse himself from 
a case, he could have recourse to members of the Council of Castile to fill his seat. The biggest 
exception to the Sevillan model was that while the Audiencia in Seville had the same authority 
over the political, economic, and governing parts of the government (político, económico y 
gubernativo), the king explicitly banned the Audiencia of Zaragoza from “meddling” in 
economic matters, except for serious cases when they seemed to merit reform to the Fiscal of the 
Audiencia.
87
 Through these changes the government of Aragon took on the form that it would 
maintain throughout the eighteenth century. 
As the war drew to a close, Philip began to take stock of his reforms and considered how he 
should approach the assimilation of the Principality of Catalonia. In January of 1713, Philip 
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asked Melchor de Macanaz
88
 to write a report on the old governments of Aragon, Valencia, and 
Catalonia, what had happened since the war, and what he recommended to bring them to 
“perfection.” The final report, presented on May 27, 1713, provides an interesting perspective on 
the changes that had taken place and insight into this minister’s understanding of Philip’s goals 
for the king in the Crown of Aragon. The introduction describes the power of the thirteenth 
century king, Peter III of Aragon (1276-1285), and blames the “fall of the government and 
(royal) authority” in the Crown of Aragon on Alfonso III (1285-1291). Macanaz believed the 
fueros granted by Alfonso had left the king with “nothing more than the name and honor of king; 
but without authority nor means.” Macanaz indicated that his proposed reforms would reverse 
Alfonso’s errors and restore the Crown of Aragon to its former glory.
89
  
 Macanaz was primarily concerned with increasing the king’s “means” by improving the 
efficiency of his administration and, above all, increasing his income. Macanaz noted that the 
royal income did not cover the expenses of the government in each of the kingdoms, which was a 
common complaint stretching back to the seventeenth century.
90
 To fix this problem, he 
recommended increasing the economic authority of the intendente, whose duties focused on 
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supplying the army at this time,
91
 and increasing the simplicity of the tax system as much as 
possible so that fewer officials could collect it.
92
 Similarly, much of the report discusses how to 
increase the king’s income from the salt tax in each kingdom.
93
 Macanaz also discussed the 
challenges of collecting income from noble estates, suggesting that the king should work on 
finding ways to seize as many of them as possible given the significant limitations that their tax 
exemption placed on royal revenue.
94
 In all of these efforts, Macanaz focused on identifying the 
most effective way to streamline the administration of these kingdoms—he was not interested in 
tradition nor in accomplishing any theoretical goals based on his conception of monarchy. 
Macanaz’s recommendations were thoroughly pragmatic. 
In line with these interests, Macanaz disparaged the many jurisdictional disputes that had 
taken place in Valencia since 1707. Every reference to the Chancillería is negative—he was 
particularly frustrated by its failure to compile a list of the useful fueros of Valencia. Instead, 
according to Macanaz, “they only met to devise ways to remove the authority of the generals and 
their troops, and to process the ancient sins of the natural citizens... every day their excesses 
grew greater.”
95
 They even ignored Marshal Berwick when he ordered them to stop interfering 
with the military and work on the compilation of the fueros. Macanaz recommended that the 
Chancilleria be reduced to an Audiencia on the model of Seville as the king had done to the 
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Chancillería of Aragon. Macanaz also indicated that it should be stripped of all power except the 
judicial authority to try cases and work on the compilation of the useful fueros, threatening that if 
its members meddled in other affairs they should be “sent to their houses.”
96
 While Macanaz did 
not write a history of the events in Aragon, for both the Aragonese and the Catalans, he 
suggested that the king follow the same model for streamlining the government and increasing its 
efficiency. By taming the Chancillerías, abolishing the old Catalan Corts, and reaffirming the 
fueros that increased Philip’s authority over the clergy and other officials, Macanaz attempted to 
restore “authority” to the king of the Crown of Aragon.  
The report from Macanaz reveals what he believed to be Philip’s primary concerns in the 
Crown of Aragon and the practical ways to attain them that he believed Philip would find 
compelling. What is conspicuously absent from Macanaz’s report is any reference to absolute 
principles or an idealized institutional form. While he certainly was interested in promoting legal 
and administrative uniformity based on other writings, he did not define his practical suggestions 
in this case.
97
 Instead, his recommendations for the kingdoms varied based on the resources and 
social composition of each kingdom. Macanaz’s report also indicates that Philip was interested in 
increasing royal revenue from the Crown of Aragon now that the fueros no longer interfered with 
the imposition of new taxes. 
Similar questions arose after the fall of Barcelona to Philip’s forces on September 11, 1714, 
ending the war of Spanish Succession. On June 13, 1715, the Council of Castile presented its 
recommendations to Philip concerning the form of the new government in Catalonia. They had 
solicited reports from one of the council’s ministers, Don Francisco Ameller, and from the 
Intendente of Catalonia, Don José Patiño. The most important issue addressed by both ministers 
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was the form of the judicial tribunal and its degree of autonomy from the Captain General. 
Ameller recommended that the king follow a middle path by creating an Audiencia with the 
Captain General as its head, but “with the limitation that all of the jurisdiction and power, which 
is ordinary and not delegated, be understood not as given to the Governor and Captain General as 
head of the Audiencia without all of the mystical body of it [the Audiencia].”
 98
 This would avoid 
the problem of the judicial tribunal being too distant from the military power necessary to 
enforce its decrees. It also would apparently create a check on the Captain General’s power—as 
Ameller noted when the Captain General left Barcelona, “the Audiencia could continue to 
exercise all of its jurisdiction and power.”
99
 Ameller also suggested that all royal decrees would 
need to go through the Audiencia for publication and that the Captain General would be limited 
in judicial matters, never having a vote in civil or criminal cases. This arrangement would create 
a clear separation between the judicial and political government of Catalonia. 
José Patiño encouraged the creation of a similarly modified Audiencia in Catalonia. He 
argued that in the course of economic and judicial matters, it was best for legal professionals to 
“discuss, resolve, and decide with total independence of the [military] boss, that by his 
profession of war is not obligated to judge [dar censura] in the business of justice.”
100
 
Nevertheless, given the “quality of the land, the character [genio] of the Catalans, and the actual 
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composition of things,” it seemed prudent to give the Captain General the first chair in the 
tribunal but to prevent him from making any judicial decisions.
101
 The king would thereby 
guarantee military support for the Audiencia’s decisions, as Ameller had advised. 
The council ultimately recommended this form of Audiencia to the king, emphasizing that it 
would be the best way “to avoid the jurisdictional disputes that the creation of Chancillerías 
incite each day between them and the military jurisdiction.”
102
 Following Ameller and Patiño, 
the council recommended that the king ban the Captain General from voting on judicial cases 
and that the Audiencia and Captain General jointly exercise political and governing jurisdiction 
in special meetings of the Real Acuerdo.
103
 In this recommendation, Ameller, Patiño, and the 
council encouraged the perpetuation of the kind of government recently put in place in Aragon 
and rejected the Valencian model.  
There was greater disagreement between Ameller, Patiño, and the members of the council 
concerning what laws should be enforced in Catalonia. Ameller suggested that Catalan civil law 
be restored while Castilian Criminal law remained in place.
104
 To facilitate the transition, he 
suggested that loyal Catalans be appointed to the Audiencia who understood the character, laws, 
and styles of Catalonia and could use these to instruct the Castilians unfamiliar with the 
region.
105
 Patiño went further, arguing that there were many problems from changing the law 
which would “cause confusion in the land” and impose “a great work on all of the lawyers, 
notaries, and secretaries of the land, who are many, all of whom would be obliged to begin a new 
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study, exposed to many errors, in prejudice to the parts” of the principality.
106
 His solution was 
to restore Catalan law across the board while also establishing a mechanism for processing 
changes to reduce the few abuses built into it. The Fiscal of the council agreed with Patiño’s 
plan, but the majority of the council advised the king of the need for “solid, clear, and rightly 
established” laws and practices for the subjugation of the “bellicose spirits of the Catalans.” To 
accomplish this, they recommended the continued application of Castilian law in civil and 
criminal matters, as any uncertainty now would threaten the stability of Catalonia.
107
 Several 
members of the council disagreed with this recommendation, instead suggesting that some of the 
Catalan laws benefited the king and were just.
108
 They agreed that there were problems with the 
Catalan laws, but encouraged the king “to order that the Audiencia observe in the practice of 
civil judgments all of the malicious evasions and impertinent articles that have been introduced 
under the shadow of their fueros.” To fix these problems, the Council proposed a system by 
which the Audiencia could revoke problematic Catalan practices when they encountered them. 
Despite the uncertainties and challenges of this system, the councilors believed that abolishing 
Catalan law punished all Catalans when only some of them had rebelled, so they advised the 
king against committing a crime against these innocent subjects. Additionally, they suggested 
that “some laws of Castile” are not proper for the “country and character of these natural 
citizens, for which reason the Lord Most Christian King has neglected their laws and customs in 
Roussillon.”
109
 Roussillon was a Catalan region that was formally ceded to France in the Treaty 
                                                 
106
 Sanpere y Miquel, 674.  
 
107
 Sanpere y Miquel, 679. 
 
108
 The dissenting councilors were the President of the Council, Don Pasqual de Villacampa, 
Don Francisco de Arana, Don Luis Curiel, Don Francisco de León y Luna, Don Pedro Lagraba, 
Don Francisco Molano, and Don Gerónimo Pardo, Sanpere y Miquel, 679. 
 
103 
 
of the Pyrenees in 1659, and the councilors suggested that Louis XIV’s experience with the 
region should caution Philip against replacing the Catalan laws that were particularly appropriate 
for the rule of the Catalans.  
Finally, the king’s advisors disagreed on how best to increase his revenue from the region. 
Patiño suggested that only the imposition of strict justice would establish “quietude” and serve as 
the foundation for good government, and he cautioned against creating new taxes that might lead 
to rebellion, which might make the Crown vulnerable to invasion once again.
110
 The council 
feared that the changes in forming a new government would be expensive and temporarily 
prevent the imposition of a new tax. The Councilor Don Lorenzo Matheu de Villamayor 
dissented from everyone else, suggesting that the expenses of the new government were too great 
to be justified and proposed an almost complete return to the old Catalan government. On the 
matter of changing the law, he pointed out that contracts and wills would continue to use the old 
language for some time, and that they would always remind the Catalans of their old legal 
tradition. Instead, by restoring their old system, the king could safely impose a new tax on them 
and increase his revenue while making his subjects happier.
111
 Yet another dissenting group of 
councilors proposed a third solution, advising the king to create a strong Chancillería to impose 
Castilian law little by little and in that way eventually attain reliable peace in Catalonia.
112
 They 
had great faith in the power of technically skilled Castilian ministers, and pointed to the 
Chancillerías of Valencia and Aragon as models of success. What is more, they argued that the 
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reform of the Aragonese government in 1710 had “spoiled” the successes in that kingdom, and 
that “with the novelty and mixture” of Aragonese and Castilian law, the royal ministers and the 
Aragonese lived “in a state of perpetual confusion.” As to the “presumed discord and 
controversies between the Chancillería and the Commandant (or Captain General),” these 
councilors suggested that they need only ask the king when jurisdictional questions arose, and 
his quick resolution of these matters would avoid any serious problems.
113
  
The disagreement among the king’s advisors reflects the tensions between the desire for a 
rational and uniform order across his kingdoms and the practical desire for stability. These 
desires led to different recommendations, because the many individuals, corporations, and towns 
under Philip’s rule each had their own goals that could not be reconciled through a universal 
policy. Without local support, however, it would be difficult to secure Philip’s rule against the 
threat of invasion by his enemies, who would benefit from local indifference to Philip’s 
government. The most fascinating result of the variety of positions presented to the king is that 
he had to choose from among these options. Had Philip desired to standardize his administration 
across Castile and the Crown of Aragon, he could have followed the advice of the dissenting 
councilors who recommended the expansion of the Valencian model of government. This would 
have required increased royal attention to resolve potential disputes between the Chancillería and 
the Captain General, but it would also have increased his involvement in the administration and 
would fit well with an effort to centralize the royal administration. Instead, Philip decided to 
follow a more moderate path similar to the model established in Aragon. On January 16, 1716, 
the king established the Nueva Planta of Catalonia for the “peace, quietude, and abundance” of 
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his subjects.
114
 He created an Audiencia “in which presides the Captain General... (who will) 
have a vote only in the things of the Government, and this when he is present (esto hallándose 
presente) in the Audiencia.” The regent was charged with giving notice to the Captain General 
before any discussion of “nominations of office and important matters” so that he could arrange 
to attend them.
115
 In this, Philip followed the advice of Ameller and Patiño and extended the 
system created in Aragon in 1710 to Catalonia. Similarly, the Catalans were granted their civil 
laws.
116
 Near the end of this decree, though, Philip made a particularly interesting observation, 
emphasizing that his subjects were united in their relationship with him and that this relationship 
trumped their national divisions: “They are to cease the prohibitions of foreigners, because my 
royal intention is that in my kingdoms the ranks and honors that I confer on them reciprocally to 
my vassals because of merit, and not because of birth in one or the other of my provinces.”
117
 
Philip’s subjects were thus rewarded for their service to him, and these rewards applied 
throughout his domain. He seems to have been primarily interested in securing his rule in 
Catalonia and strengthening the bonds between him and his subjects.
118
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Philip’s willingness to compromise on general principles for pragmatic purposes is nowhere 
more evident than in the appointment of officials in Catalonia. In violation of Castilian law, 
which provided the model for these offices, Philip appointed locals to fill the important yet 
relatively unprestigious and poorly paid mayorships (Alcaldes Mayores) across Catalonia. Even 
more telling, Philip was willing to appoint individuals who had actively supported Charles when 
there were no qualified alternatives.
119
 This suggests just how far his political actions varied 
from the principles outlined in the initial decree of the Nueva Planta. 
Philip V demonstrated his continued desire to follow this pragmatic course with his reform of 
the Valencian government in the summer of 1716. He reduced their Chancillería to an Audiencia 
“in the same form as that of Aragon,” clearly indicating his desire to perpetuate this new 
“mixed” form of government throughout the Crown of Aragon.
120
 The decree did not restore 
Valencia’s traditional civil laws, however, and during a royal visit to Valencia in 1719, the city 
council (ayuntamiento) asked Philip to restore their civil laws, and he promised to do so.
121
 In 
1721, they wrote the king and asked for written confirmation of this concession, and the king 
granted it to them again.
122
 Despite the royal willingness to restore their civil laws, the Audiencia 
of Valencia continued to enforce Castilian civil law, apparently because the Audiencia was 
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composed largely of Castilians who had no interest in learning a foreign legal system.
123
 In any 
case, twice Philip indicated his willingness to restore Valencian Civil Law, so it was not his 
desire to oppress the Valencians or impose Castilian law systematically across his kingdoms that 
prevented the change. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In light of Philip’s consistent flexibility in the creation of the new government of the Crown 
of Aragon, descriptions of his “ideological” desire for uniformity and administrative continuity 
between his kingdoms appear to be exaggerated. Instead, Philip’s initial assertion of his authority 
to abolish all of the fueros in the Crown of Aragon seems to have been a strategic rhetorical 
move that simultaneously appeared to resolve the many questions presented by the short-lived 
initial Valencian government and its blending of Castilian and Valencian traditions. Philip’s 
restoration of individual and corporate privileges for faithful subjects one month later and 
subsequent turn to yet another model of government less than four years later indicates that his 
flirtation with a uniform government was not the main priority directing his policies during this 
period. Instead, it appears to have been a provisional formulation of his royal will that quickly 
proved inadequate to the task of governing Valencia and Aragon. The pragmatic approach of 
Philip’s various ministers, his rejection of the Valencian model in Catalonia, and his subsequent 
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reforms in Valencia reflect the king’s desire to establish a stable government in the Crown of 
Aragon.  
Toward that end, Philip V willingly made concessions to his subjects that linked their 
interests with his own—after all, a privilege guaranteed by the king is only valuable while that 
king is in charge. By making the local and individual privileges dependent on his personal good 
will, rather than a legal tradition extending back to the thirteenth century, Philip encouraged 
various groups and individuals in the Crown of Aragon to support his rule. Building this base of 
support was more important to him than any desire for the simplicity and efficiency of a more 
uniform administration. Reinforcing the link between the privileged in these communities and 
the king who affirmed their particular interests inoculated the body politic from the “indifference 
to nation” which had plagued Philip’s rule in the Crown of Aragon during the War of Spanish 
Succession. 
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Chapter Four: The Reality of Bourbon Rule, 1717-1746 
 
 
By 1717 the form of the regional institutions through which Philip V governed the Crown of 
Aragon had been settled. The implementation of this new government had only begun, however, 
and this process would take decades. This chapter will examine some of the ways in which the 
Bourbon administration of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia functioned during this period by 
focusing on three contemporary issues that the king had to resolve through these new 
institutions: finance, justice, and the structure of the royal administration.  The first issue is the 
reduction of the maximum interest rate for the main fiscal tool in early modern Spain, the censo. 
The Nueva Planta inadvertently created significant confusion concerning the censo, which could 
not be easily resolved because of the variety and number of contracts that would be altered by 
any reform. The second issue, the preservation of Aragonese and Catalan Civil law, significantly 
undercut the legal uniformity of the Spanish monarchy and demonstrates Philip’s willingness to 
affirm regional variation. The third issue focuses on the ambiguity concerning the royal will that 
enabled jurisdictional disputes between the Captain General and the Audiencia in Catalonia. This 
competition reshaped the institutional structure of the new government in ways that differed 
significantly from the stipulations of the Nueva Planta. Considered together, the royal responses 
to these issues reveal that when the king’s authority was not directly challenged, he was willing 
to accommodate various interests in ways that appear unlikely based on the language of the 
Nueva Planta and the absolutist claims ascribed to Philip. While he appears to have been quite 
flexible on these three issues, he also insisted on his role as their final arbiter. Particularism 
offered a framework for the slow and tedious processing of these challenges that generated 
practical, if inelegant, solutions to the administrative problems of Philip’s government. These 
solutions continued to emphasize his supremacy while providing him with opportunities to 
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accommodate local and personal preference even when that required a reversal of the apparent 
meaning of the Nueva Planta. As each example demonstrates, when Philip encountered 
challenges in implementing his reforms he made pragmatic decisions that undercut uniformity 
and the goals stated in the Nueva Planta decrees.  
Phillip V’s willingness to accommodate his subjects even when that required fragmenting the 
legal and bureaucratic administration of his kingdoms demonstrates that his primary concerns 
were not, or at least did not remain, the creation of a centralized government that ruled all of his 
kingdoms “with the same law.”
1
 The continued advocacy of greater centralization and 
administrative homogeneity by some of his ministers, as shown in the preceding chapter, 
demonstrate that the shift in policy was an intentional choice to avoid what many theorists, 
including Charles Tilly and Max Weber, suggest Philip should have desired.
2
 Instead, Philip 
chose to accommodate the practical realities in the towns and kingdoms of Spain as long as these 
accommodations did not undercut his power nor challenge his personal right to decide issues. By 
granting privileges and exceptions to some subjects when they could make a compelling case 
that these were necessary and just, Philip built a network of support among the local and regional 
elite that enabled his regime to function. Such networks were integral for all early modern 
governments, and the tensions unleashed by the War of Spanish Succession had inflamed 
opposition to Philip, especially in the Crown of Aragon. Stripping those kingdoms of their 
privileges did little to restore support for him, but through particularism he was able both to 
reaffirm his own sovereignty and to gain the support of key segments of local and regional 
society so that he could govern effectively. 
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I. The censo  
The Nueva Planta created a new criteria for what laws were enforced in the Crown of 
Aragon that produced significant confusion surrounding the interest rate of the censo, which was 
the contract that governed most long-term debt in early modern Spain. These contracts covered 
many kinds of mortgages and leases and provided much of the income of the churches, 
monasteries, and municipal elite in early modern Spain. The Nueva Planta altered these 
relationships because it appeared to reduce the maximum interest rate on these contracts, and 
therefore these individual and corporate entities’ incomes, in the Crown of Aragon to the same 
rate as in Castile. Those paying the interest, which included much of the landed nobility and 
peasants, were thrilled at the prospect of a reduced interest rate on much of their debt, while 
those whose income was threatened with a significant drop argued that the reform would lead to 
their financial collapse and violate the king’s promise of ecclesiastical immunity from the Nueva 
Planta. After decades of consideration, the king eventually affirmed the old interest rate in the 
Crown of Aragon, institutionalizing divergent financial systems among his Iberian kingdoms.  
This resolution did not solve the problems of individuals and corporations who were unable 
to pay the high interest rates, however. The solution for them was to bring their cases to court 
and request a reduction in the interest on their debts as a part of their court-managed bankruptcy. 
The king preferred dealing with the specific instances where the old interest rate proved 
unworkable on a case-by-case basis rather than changing the interest rate throughout the entire 
Crown of Aragon. The result of particularism in the case of the censo was that Philip avoided the 
destabilizing consequences of major financial reform and ameliorated the worst consequences of 
the high interest rate through the intervention of his officials. This kept the king and his ministers 
at the center of his subjects’ appeals for financial relief but also increased the volume of cases 
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and paperwork that they had to process in addition to preserving a barrier to the economic 
integration of the kingdoms of Spain. 
Since the sixteenth century, the old nobility of rural Spain had struggled to manage their 
finances. Generally noble income was sufficient for the day-to-day needs of noble households, 
even with the extravagance decried by the reform-minded arbitristas attempting to reverse the 
apparent decline of Spain. Generally speaking, the financial difficulties of the high nobility in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries reflected their inability to pay the debt of their 
predecessors. The strength of the entail in Spain prevented these noble houses from losing 
possession of their land, but this also robbed them of the ability to sell their primary asset when 
in financial need. When a noble needed more money than he had at a given moment, such as 
when raising a dowry, which could require as much as 100,000 ducats per daughter, he had to 
borrow it. These debts were usually contracted through the cambios, or short-term letters of 
exchange, for which we have almost no records because these transactions took place at fairs, 
which produced few surviving records. When these debts became impossible to pay, the nobles 
paid them off with money from a bond, called the censo or censal, which was a lease or 
mortgage on land (or sometimes its income) that functioned as the primary form of raising large 
sums of credit in early modern Spain. This form of credit (borrowed from private individuals 
since no formal banking industry existed) served people when they were in financial distress. 
The form and regulation of these censos varied from kingdom to kingdom, but they were rarely 
redeemed and expanded throughout the seventeenth century so that by its end, the nobility was 
113 
 
often incapable of paying the interest on the bonds that the family had accumulated over 
centuries.
 3
 
When families became deeply indebted, the traditional solution was for a noble lord to cover 
the payments by forcing peasant communities to take out loans on their seigniorial lord’s behalf. 
The lord would, in turn, give his vassals a “letter of safeguard” which stated that the money was 
really for him and that he promised to pay the debt. This option was abolished in Castile in 1594 
where the monarchy increasingly bailed out the high nobility, but in Valencia it persisted into the 
seventeenth century—as late as the 1690s, the Duke of Gandía simply told his towns to borrow 
money for him when he needed it.
4
 In the seventeenth and eighteenth century this became less 
common, which left the nobles with few options. The king regulated the maximum (and default) 
interest rate of the censo, which was initially set at seven percent in 1534, before being reduced 
to six and two-thirds percent later in that century, and reduced yet again in the early seventeenth 
century down to five percent.
5
  
These general reductions in the interest rate could not be relied upon to save a troubled noble, 
however, and they often had to make other arrangements when it was impossible to pay their 
debts. The traditional system was called secuestro y alimentos under which nobles who could not 
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service their debts lost control of their estates to a receiver appointed by the Crown. The noble 
would receive an allowance and the rest would go toward endowments, the costs of 
administration, and the estate’s debts. This arrangement was quite common as about one-third of 
the nobles in Valencia were on an allowance during some portion of Philip IV’s reign (1621-
1665).
6
 These sequestrations usually ended when the noble and his creditors came to an 
agreement (concordia) by which the noble regained full financial control over his estate in 
exchange for guaranteeing an annual payment to his creditors.
7
 Because of the entail, which 
prevented alienation of noble land for any reason, and the inability of local courts to reach wealth 
in holdings outside their jurisdiction, the nobles never actually lost their land and maintained 
their lifestyle despite accruing increasing amounts of debt for centuries.
8
 
The necessity of debt relief for the nobility came up early in Philip V’s reign. In 1705, Philip 
published a royal decree (pragmática) reducing the maximum interest rate of newly contracted 
censos from five to three percent for the Crown of Castile and Leon.
9
 With the publication of the 
Nueva Planta in the summer of 1707, there was some confusion concerning the interest rate of 
the censo in Valencia and Aragon. Some officials believed that the rate of the censo had been 
reduced to three percent as in Castile, while others approved contracts at the old rate—even 
officials in Madrid were confused, as the Council of the Crusade indicated when it asked the 
king to take action to resolve the matter.
10
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Things become even more confusing because the king sent different responses to different 
officials who inquired about whether the reduction of the censo applied to Valencia. When the 
matter came before the king in 1708 and 1709, he followed the advice of Don Melchor de 
Macanaz and the Council of Castile to leave the censo “in the state that they found it prior to the 
disturbances [of the War of Succession] without innovation.”
11
 When the administrators of the 
Generalidad of Valencia asked the king about the censo on April 18, 1711, he replied assuring 
them that the rate had not changed. Meanwhile, on November 13, 1714, the Fiscal of the 
Chancilleria of Valencia petitioned the king for clarification as the Valencian courts were 
rejecting every contract of a censo if it had a rate higher than three percent.
12
 By 1714 the 
reduction was a well-established precedent supported by a royal order sent from the Marqués de 
Grimaldo to Don Juan Pérez de la Puente on August 24, 1709, that required the Generalidad of 
Valencia pay its censos at three percent. Similarly, Philip’s generals had forced the city of 
Orihuela to raise money through a censo at five percent to provide for the troops occupying the 
city following its capture. The king’s payments of the censo from 1709-1711 were at the rate of 
three percent, however, reinforcing the precedent establishing the reduction in Valencia.
13
 The 
king’s inconsistent orders and actions left his officials to guess what he intended concerning the 
rate of the censo in Valencia. 
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To resolve the confusion, the Fiscal of the Chancilleria of Valencia asked the king to reduce 
the censo to three percent for Valencia. The Fiscal even addressed the concerns about the 
reduction of income for merchants, pious works, and the clergy—all of whom were frequently 
the creditors of the censos. He reasoned that concern for these groups had not stopped the king 
from reducing the censo in Castile, so it must not be a serious problem. Further, as the new cap 
on interest applied to land in Castile that was more productive than that of Valencia, the 
productivity of land in Valencia could not serve as an objection to the censo’s reduction.
14
  
The church in Valencia took swift action to defend the higher rate of the censo when it 
learned of the petition to reduce it. Throughout Spain the ecclesiastical estate was one of the 
most important lenders to the nobility, so the church in Valencia stood to lose a tremendous 
amount should the reduction become law.
15
 In defense of its censos, the church emphasized that 
the Nueva Planta had explicitly exempted the church from the revocation of its privileges. 
Applying the royal decree of 1705, which was explicitly limited to Castile, to the church in the 
kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon on the basis of the Nueva Planta would thus violate the 
ecclesiastical immunity that the Philip had guaranteed. Further, the church argued that the 
reduction in the censo in Castile had only applied to the censos consignativos—loans secured by 
land, similar to a modern mortgage—and not to the censos enfitéuticos—leases authorizing 
someone to use one’s land, often with payment based on a percentage of the income produced by 
the lessee from the land.
16
 Since the majority of censos in Valencia were the latter, the church 
insisted that the royal decree would not have any major effect. Every peasant who worked 
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ecclesiastical land in Valencia would enjoy the equivalent of a rent reduction should the king 
reduce the censo, which was not the case in Castile. Additionally, while the cities of Castile had 
petitioned the king for the reduction, the cities of Valencia had not done the same, indicating that 
the reduction was not necessary.  To further motivate the king, the church’s petition emphasized 
that a reduction in the censo threatened to reduce royal revenue. As if all of this were not enough, 
the church in Valencia threatened to drive the convents and other pious hospitals into poverty as 
most of their income came through censos. This would harm both the living and the dead as the 
reduction in the ecclesiastical rents would lead to “the decline of the divine cult” and increase 
“the sufferings of the souls in purgatory” because there would be less money to fund masses for 
them.
17
 Others were concerned about the censo’s rate, such as the Creditors of the Aragonese 
town of Villa de Piña, which, along with the ecclesiastical estate of Valencia, requested a 
reduction in its seigniorial payments to the king to compensate for their loss of income because 
of the reduction of the censo.
18
 
The Guild of the Glovers of the city of Valencia, meanwhile, was among those paying the 
censos that were interested in seeing the rate drop. In their petition, the Guild explained that 
because of their large contributions to the raising of two tercios, or regiments, earlier that year, 
they were incapable of paying their censos at five percent. Their request was accompanied by a 
letter from the Captain General of Valencia, the Marqués de Villadarias, who described the 
“many outcries” of those who could no longer borrow at three percent in Valencia because 
judges had begun to approve contracts including censos at five percent.
19
 Meanwhile, the city of 
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Orihuela, which had been operating as if the reduction were in place, asked the king to allow it to 
continue to pay three percent interest on its debt because the city had made decisions based on 
the low rate. Retroactively raising the rate of the censo to five percent would “destroy the 
debtors” who were on the hook for the debt that the king’s generals had forced upon Orihuela.
20
  
The inconsistency of royal policy and action on the censo had generated considerable 
confusion. Whether the king reduced the censo to three percent or restored it to five percent 
throughout the Crown of Aragon, he would cause significant financial distress to many of his 
subjects. When the question of whether the censo should be reduced in Catalonia arose following 
its defeat in the War of Secession, the king had to decide how he would address the issue. The 
Council advised Philip to leave the censo as it stood since they did not know enough about these 
arrangements to offer meaningful advice. To correct this problem, they encouraged the king to 
“request clear, expressive, and comprehensive reports [informes] on the advantages and 
inconveniences” of the reduction from Chancillerías and Audiencias of each of the three 
kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. This would allow the king and his council to “listen to the 
subjects about what is most practical.” They even suggested that “those towns [pueblos] that are 
most interested” in the matter could submit individual reports “to facilitate the comprehension 
and understanding of the advantages and disadvantages [utilidades y perjuicios], the roots that 
produce each of these, and how they can be solved.”
21
 Philip V approved this plan and ordered 
“every city” to report on the consequences of changing the rate of the censo for its citizens so 
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that he could “act with proper reflection on the advantages and disadvantages that could result to 
the public [al comun]” before he set the rate of the censo for the Crown of Aragon.
22
  
Here Philip and his Council followed the model for negotiation without a Cortes which 
Charles II had employed in seventeenth-century Castile.
23
 While the Castilian Cortes could be 
called, Charles was not interested in doing so for various reasons, and so he bypassed it through 
requesting detailed responses from the towns of Castile. Here in the Crown of Aragon, Philip V 
went one step further by asking all of the towns to participate. While this kind of negotiation 
reflected the pre-eminence of the city in Castile, where the nobility and clergy never had any 
direct representation as they had in the Cortes of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, it also 
reflected Philip’s interest in acting based upon knowledge of his subjects’ advice on the matter. 
This request for reports is a clear example of Philip’s preference for particularistic negotiation 
after the Nueva Planta. 
Each of the kingdoms provided a distinct answer in these reports. The Audiencia of Zaragoza 
summarized the responses from the ecclesiastical councils of the canons (cabildos 
ecclesiasticales) and the city councils (cabildos seculares) of the Kingdom of Aragon. The 
councils of canons uniformly opposed the reduction of the censo, arguing that it would cause 
“notable harm to the pious works, hospitals, and other things like this” and that a reduction 
would violate their “ecclesiastical immunity.”
24
 At the same time, the canons acknowledged that 
the reduction of the censos for the universities in Aragon had worked out well and should be left 
in place because the reduced value of wool had made the universities unable to pay their debts at 
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the higher rate. Meanwhile, the city councils of the towns of Aragon took the opposite position, 
advocating the reduction as beneficial to the many towns that were unable to cover the interest 
on their censos, let alone redeem them. A few towns took different positions that the Audiencia 
noted. In Teruel, for example, the city council repeated the church’s arguments and opposed the 
reduction because of the “great piety of its citizens.”
25
 Borja, meanwhile, recognized the cost to 
the church, indicating that a reduction in the censo would hurt convents’ revenue, causing 
women to bring dowries if they were to become nuns. The City Council of Borja concluded that 
the reduction would be well worth this cost, however, as it would significantly help the 
deteriorated noble estates which had no alternative solutions because of “the complete absence of 
commerce” in the region.
26
 The Audiencia of Zaragoza, in light of all of these recommendations, 
suggested a model for change based on the universities of Aragon. They were unable to pay their 
creditors because of the reduced productivity of their land following the war, so their creditors 
had voluntarily accepted a reduction in the interest rate of the censo from five and six percent to 
two-and-a-half and three percent, respectively. The example of the universities suggested a 
patchwork approach to debt relieve that only reduced rates for those unable to pay their debts. 
The Audiencia advised letting the rates fall through the voluntary concordancias negotiated 
between creditors and debtors rather than extending a universal reduction which would reduce 
royal income unnecessarily. Meanwhile, the Audiencia encouraged the king to prosecute more 
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aggressively illicit contracts with rates higher than the legal maximum interest rate of the 
censo.
27
 
The Audiencia of Barcelona came to a similar conclusion in its report. After describing that 
the censos in Catalonia were more varied than those of Castile, the Audiencia argued for the five 
percent rate, noting that four different popes had approved this rate as it properly “regulated the 
profit” accrued by the rich when they “pass along their wealth to those who need it” in a way that 
was “convenient for the public cause.”
28
 This rate had worked well not only in Catalonia, but 
also in “all of Europe, which conforms to the common opinion of theologians and jurists.”
29
 The 
Audiencia insisted that the censo was essential to the Catalan economy and that experiments at 
changing it had reduced the wealthy Catalans’ investments because of the reduced rate of return 
on their investments to the detriment of everyone else. A lower rate would force people to sell 
their estates or seek illegal “usurious” contracts to cover their expenses, neither of which were 
desirable outcomes.  
The Audiencia of Barcelona presented fourteen reasons that the reduction of the censo was 
bad policy as it would run rough-shod over the many particular arrangements that balanced the 
interests of various segments of Catalan society. First, the interest on the censo at three percent 
did not provide enough income to pay the new tax of the Catastro at ten percent.
30
 Second, the 
debtor benefits, but only at the expense of the creditors who were “defrauded” a part of their 
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income by the retroactive reduction.
31
 Third, the Audiencia complained that “exempting the 
debtor of the payment which they offered would infringe on natural equality, without attending 
to the poverty of the creditor and the convenience of the debtor.”
32
 Fourth, the monasteries, 
which had not yet received their debtors’ arrears from delayed payments during the war, would 
suffer even more because of this. Fifth, the Audiencia repeated the warning that reducing the 
censo would reduce the number of masses for the dead and thereby harm the souls in purgatory 
and the divine cult. Sixth, it would increase the difficulties of fathers trying to raise a dowry for 
the marriage (“spiritual or temporal”) of their daughters.
33
 Seventh, as the clergy expected a large 
royal that was tied to the rate of the censo, the reduction would seriously reduce their income and 
delay the clergy’s ability to pay the new taxes.
34
 Eighth, the king would not be able to afford this 
subsidy to the church because treasury will have reduced income from the censo payments it 
receives in Catalonia.
35
 Ninth, the value of the produce of the land tied up in censos enfitéuticos 
had increased five-fold since the contracts began, so the reduction would decrease the interest on 
the mortgages even as the lands’ productivity increased. This point is particularly interesting, as 
the productivity of land in Aragon and Valencia was often reported as dropping precipitously, 
suggesting that there were some significant differences in the agricultural economies between 
these kingdoms at the beginning of the eighteenth century.
36
 Tenth, the concordancias for 
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debtors unable to pay their censos were based on a rate of five percent. For concordancias 
reducing this rate by half, the interest rate would become two-and-one-half percent. The 
Audiencia feared that a general reduction of the censo would further drop these renegotiated 
rates and thereby cause unjust and unreasonable harm to creditors.
37
 Eleventh, the reduction 
would destroy the balance between debtors and creditors. If it reversed the concordancias 
between debtors and their creditors, then it would destroy the debtors because it would not be 
tailored to the debtors’ ability to pay. If it would not replace the concordancias but simply 
further reduce the interest payments of the debtors, it would destroy the creditors who would no 
longer have adequate income for the money that they have loaned out. Either way, the reduction, 
when applied to concordancias, “is opposed to justice by commuting that which is not 
permitted… without being for the public benefit,” which was not the case in Audiencia’s 
assessment.
38
 Twelfth, the charitable giving of the rich to the poor would stop because the rich 
would no longer have the resources from which to give because they would need to sell off their 
estates.
39
 Thirteenth, in Cerdaña, half of which was in France where the rate of the censo is five 
percent, no one would give censo contracts to those on the Spanish side when they needed to 
raise capital so money would flow out of Spain and in to France.
40
 Fourteenth, many censo 
contracts include provisions requiring debtors to improve the land that they mortgaged. The 
penalty for not doing this was based on the payment of the censo, so the reduction would soften 
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this penalty and presumably lead many to ignore the requirement.
41
 Because all of these 
problems would be created by a reduction of the censo and there was no public demand for the 
reduction, the Audiencia of Barcelona discouraged extending to Catalonia the royal order 
reducing the censo to three percent. 
What is most striking about the Catalan case against the censo is how it indicates the need to 
preserve the particular arrangements between creditors and debtors in the wide variety of 
contracts considered censos in Catalonia. This was a much broader term there, and so what was a 
targeted financial reform in Castile risked destroying many specific arrangements in Catalonia. 
As many individuals and corporations were simultaneously creditors and debtors, a shift in favor 
of one or the other could cause dramatic imbalances and the inability of many to meet their 
obligations. This appreciation for the complexity of the situation led them to reject a universal, 
one-size-fits-all approach to reform, especially when there was no apparent need for such drastic 
measures, much as the Audiencia of Zaragoza had argued in their appeal for targeted debt relief 
through concordancias rather than a universal reduction of the censo. 
The Audiencia of Valencia’s report to the Council of Castile echoes themes from the 
Audiencias of Aragon and Catalonia. Again, the specific agricultural, economic, and legal 
contexts in Valencia were highlighted in the report, which presented material from several 
different cities within the kingdom. The city of Valencia emphasized that the “fertility of the 
lands of the kingdom were increasing every day.” Because of this agricultural improvement, the 
“proportion of its produce corresponds to the interest” of the censo, so there were few complaints 
or requests for the reduction. Even more significantly, the Audiencia explained that the “little 
interest” in the reduction reflected the experimentation with a rate of three percent in 1680 that 
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had failed. The Audiencia cautioned that a reduction “would cause serious harm to the nobles, 
ecclesiastical communities, and those who had taken religious orders [religions].”
42
 Meanwhile, 
the more southern city of Gerona (or Xijona) argued that the reduction would be beneficial 
because its surrounding land “was among the most sterile in the kingdom.” Gerona’s city council 
acknowledged the harm that the reduction of the censo would cause to the ecclesiastical 
communities, but maintained its defense of the reduction anyway.
43
  
The Intendente of Valencia, Don Luis Antonio Mergelina, also argued forcefully for the 
reduction of the censo. He explained that Córdoba, which was similar in size to Valencia, had no 
more than 40,000 pesos of debt and no pension obligations, and yet it enjoyed the reduced rate. 
Valencia, meanwhile, had 2,500,000 pesos of debt and 32 years of pension obligations, the 
Generalidad had 600,000 pesos of debt and 450,000 pesos of pensions, and the guilds had their 
own debt and pensions to pay. Together, these obligations seriously threatened the Valencian 
economy. As if this were not enough, the Mergelina noted that the large sums of the censos 
charged to the parishioners by their parishes that he calculated to be four million pesos of capital 
and that the interest on the debt that they already had was six million pesos. The cost of covering 
all of these censos and pensions in Valencia was larger than those of any of the twenty-one 
provinces of Castile, yet the Castilian cities had lower interest rates than the Valencians.
44
 In 
addition to these debts, the people of Valencia had been subjected to numerous and 
“considerable” charges on the king’s behalf and had suffered greatly because of them, leaving 
the kingdom with dramatically reduced financial resources.
45
 Mergelina insisted that these 
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problems should be considered in light of the limited productivity of Valencia, which was much 
less fertile than Múrcia, Granada, or Córdoba, all of which enjoyed the lower censo rate. Given 
this, it was clear that the censo at five percent did not reflect the relative fertility of Valencia. 
Meanwhile the Marqués de Mirasol, a native of Valencia, advocated a particularistic response to 
the censo much as the Audiencia of Zaragoza had, arguing that where it was impossible to pay 
the censo at five percent the rate should be reduced to three percent or less, and where it was 
possible to pay the current interest rate no change should be made. For its part, the Audiencia of 
Valencia noted some differences between the censos in Valencia and Castile and the inability of 
some towns to pay the interest on their censos because of the poor quality of recent harvests. 
They also remarked on the extensive, non-native financial interests in Valencia, where “the 
largest part” of the kingdom’s commerce “belongs to foreigners of other nations, and only in the 
fruit of the land is the commerce Valencian.”
46
 In the end, the Audiencia declined to make a final 
recommendation on the rate of the censo, suggesting that powerful segments of Valencian 
society were divided on the issue. 
While there are notable differences in the approaches taken by the subjects and Audiencias of 
these three kingdoms, each of these reports emphasized the distinctiveness of their kingdom’s 
use of censos and the importance of protecting the delicate balance between creditors and 
debtors. A universal reduction of the censo risked upsetting this balance, partly because so many 
conditions of the censo contracts and the various concordancias were tied to the interest rate of 
the censo, such as penalties for failing to fulfill the contract. The way that these documents were 
written increased the unintended consequences of sweeping royal action for everyone concerned. 
These reports do seem to emphasize the importance of protecting creditors wealth, especially that 
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of the church and the cities, yet they all do so by acknowledging the ways in which 
concordancias enabled debt-relief when debtors were incapable of meeting their obligations. 
Because the patchwork system of the censo throughout the Crown of Aragon was working well 
enough, these reports indicate a general tendency to leave well-enough alone.  
Despite this dominant voice, there was a clearly articulated opposition to a particularist 
approach to the censo, suggesting that many in these kingdoms would have benefited 
significantly from a general reduction. The city councils of many towns made this clear as did 
Mergelina, the Intendente of Valencia. The latter was particularly concerned that the high rate of 
the censo in Valencia was unjust in light of the lower rate in Castile—he could not understand 
why the rate would remain at five percent in Valencia while the less indebted and more 
prosperous cities in southern Castile enjoyed a lower interest rate. This juxtaposition, based upon 
a comparison with Castile that none of the Audiencias seemed to conduct on their own, 
highlighted the differences in the economies of the king’s various kingdoms and underscores the 
challenges of developing a single policy that could balance all of the competing interests 
represented by the individuals, towns, guilds, nobles, and ecclesiastical institutions throughout 
Iberia.  
The Council of Castile presented these reports from the three kingdoms of the Crown of 
Aragon to Philip V on October 28, 1718. The Council advised the king not to reduce the rate of 
the censo and to affirm that he did not intend to retroactively alter any concordancias that had 
led to lower rates in the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. The king resolved “for now not to 
make any changes to the censo.”
47
 Not content with this resolution, in 1720 Mergelina, wrote to 
the king with additional reasons to reduce the censo. He explained that the costs of the censos 
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and other debts (empeños) had become impossible for the communities of the kingdom to pay. 
Mergelina also explained that the only way for the king to address the usurious abuse of the 
towns in Valencia would be through the extension of the reduction of the censo that would make 
it possible for them to service their debt.
48
  
On August 31, 1720, while the Council was considering the material from Mergelina, the 
king ordered the Council to supervise the negotiation of a new concordancia between the city of 
Zaragoza and its creditors. Along with this request, the king added an additional order “to report 
generally on the state of the censos in the kingdoms of Spain and of the impossibility or 
difficulty that exists in paying them, and advise me if it is possible to address this general point 
through some provision.”
49
 There seems to have been some clerical error in complying with this 
request that led to the Fiscal of the Council of Castile only finding out about it on 12 February 
1732, nearly twelve years later.
50
 It was again linked to a pending concordancia, this time for 
Don Pedro Geronimo del Rio, a citizen of Zaragoza. The Council advised the king to dismiss 
Rio’s specific request and to settle the question of the general reduction once and for all 
instead.
51
  
The final report of the Fiscal Don Alonso Rico Villarroel concerning all of the issues 
surrounding the censo was presented to the king on December 24, 1733. Villarroel traced the 
history of royal actions on the censo since the Nueva Planta and came to the conclusion that the 
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king had consistently denied the extension of the reduction of the censo.
52
 In his reading of the 
reports from the Audiencias of Barcelona, Valencia, and Zaragoza, he believed that each 
affirmed “the naturalness of the censos of its district” at five percent.
53
 While the Council of 
Castile and the king had repeatedly attempted to resolve the matter of the censo in general, rather 
than in a piecemeal way as particular cases arose, was always unsuccessful because the problems 
were always specific to each case rather than generalizable to a kingdom:  
Everything that has been referred to that applied in general for Spain is most effective 
and powerful in the Kingdoms of Aragon, where with mature examination and full 
understanding [His Majesty] has ordered so many times not to innovate… not only from 
these considerations, but also because of the naturalness of the censos of each of these 
provinces: That being distinct from those [censos] of Castile, the rules of the reduction 
are not applicable as indicated in the long-delayed result of the reports of the three 
Audiencias…
54
 
 
Thus Don Alonso emphasized that the variety of uses of the censo in the Crown of Aragon made 
the implementation of any general rule to govern it ill-advised. Instead, he recommended 
working through specific concordancias when the censos became impossible to pay in any 
particular instance.
55
  
The gravity of the issue of the censo led the Council to petition a response from yet another 
Fiscal, Don Pedro Juan de Alfaro, which he presented to them on January 27, 1734. Alfaro’s 
response argued for the universal reduction of the censo and marked a turning point in the case in 
which most participants had opposed the reduction for the last fifteen years. While the king and 
his council had repeatedly opposed any innovation in the matter, Alfaro noted that innovation 
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could be excused “when it produces known benefits” as prior reductions in the censo 
demonstrated.
56
 Alfaro proceeded systematically to challenge the various arguments against the 
reduction of the censo. While the opposition to the reduction pointed to the absence of requests 
for the reduction from Valencia, Aragon, and Catalonia, Alfaro explained how reports from the 
principal cities and “republics” of both Valencia and Aragon, along with the testimony of their 
intendentes, and even the report from the Audiencia of Zaragoza, all indicated the benefits of a 
universal reduction.
57
 While the Audiencia of Valencia was non-committal and the Audiencia of 
Barcelona opposed the reduction, their recommendations did not outweigh the benefits of the 
reduction. Alfaro insisted that this “repugnant request of a province” could not prevent the king 
“as Universal Father of his subjects” from providing for the “relief of everyone.”
58
 This need had 
been demonstrated by the many debtors seeking concordancias in Aragon. While this was not as 
common in Valencia, even there the majority of the censos of the Generalidades, communities, 
and particularities were increasingly in arrears because of their inability to pay them. These 
difficulties were only growing because of the new contributions to the royal treasury levied on 
all three kingdoms.
59
  
These growing financial demands could not be met by increased effort on the part of the 
subjects of the Crown of Aragon, despite Villarroel’s insistence that the cause for any variation 
in the fertility of the land was due to the “laziness” of these subjects. Alfaro countered that while 
agricultural reforms could increase the land’s fertility, these changes would require “much cost 
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and work” and most of the land produced little fruit to justify such investment. He also argued 
that the possibility of improvement did not legitimize the higher interest rate because Múrcia, 
Granada, and Córdoba were more productive than any of the cities in the Crown of Aragon and 
yet they enjoyed the reduced interest rate because they were in Castile.
60
  
Alfaro also denied the ecclesiastical estates’ claim to immunity and was unimpressed by its 
arguments that the reduction of the censo would lead to increased suffering by souls in purgatory 
and the neglect of the divine cult. He noted that the church in Castile endured had a reduction in 
its income following the reduction of the censo and that this did not interfere with the law 
“because the motives for the law were deemed for the public convenience.” Further, the 
Valencian church, which had made this argument repeatedly, had also found it impossible to pay 
many of its own censos at five percent, so the reduction would lower its costs as well as its 
income. Finally, Alfaro defended the king’s authority to act despite the Valencian church’s 
invocation of ecclesiastical immunity:  
...in Castile [ecclesiastical immunity] was deemed compatible with the reduction, and no 
one can dispute the sovereign’s faculty to give prices to things, to prescribe rules for 
contracts without regard to the differences between the estates that are included [in those 
regulations]…
61
 
 
The king’s absolute authority over the economy trumped ecclesiastical immunity in all of his 
kingdoms according to Alfaro. Further, he emphasized that the needs of the ecclesiastical estate 
should be considered in light of the needs of the other estates and did not deserve preferential 
treatment. “The arguable harm to the church” must be weighed against its benefits for the 
nobility,  
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…as it is so very important to the kingdom that they conserve their splendor, that [the 
reduction] is more universally convenient, as follows for the Generalidades, 
communities, and the rest of the subjects that compose the general body of the republics, 
which contribute more to its conservation and the public necessities, and this must prevail 
over the least bit of one or the other member.
62
  
 
Not only was the king fully justified in ignoring any ecclesiastical immunity, but in fact he must 
do so to fulfill his duty to look out for the common good of his kingdoms. To ignore the 
overwhelming benefits to his other subjects in the interest of protecting ecclesiastical income 
would be fundamentally unjust according to Alfaro.  
Alfaro also addressed the opposition to the reduction based on the harm it would cause to 
creditors and the availability of credit. He noted that in Castile following the reduction “there 
was an abundance of money” among both ecclesiastical and secular landlords.
63
 While some 
objected that this would impede the flow of credit to Valencia and Catalonia because of the 
higher rate of return on the censos, Alfaro responded that those seeking censos in Castile had 
always been able to find a lender.
64
 He carefully responded to the objections that many kinds of 
contracts in Valencia and Catalonia were considered censos while the corresponding contracts in 
Castile, if they existed, were not. These concerns led him to recommend that the reduction 
become general only for the contracts where it made sense to extend it, specifically to those 
censos “which were paid at five percent in Aragon and Valencia, and those called muertos in 
Catalonia,” and with provisions that protected all concordancias from alteration because of the 
reduction.
65
 This was to avoid radically altering the censos that were called violarios and dos 
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vidas in Catalonia, which could have interest rates as high as fifteen percent and were 
fundamentally different kinds of contracts even though they were still considered censos. 
Alfaro’s argument was persuasive and the Council of Castile followed him in recommending 
the reduction.
66
 The ecclesiastical estate of Valencia responded immediately by sending a report 
to the king that repeated their arguments against the reduction.
67
 Despite these objections, the 
Council voted thirteen to two in favor of the reduction. The Council urged the king to avoid 
resolving any individual cases seeking a concordancia or other relief from censos in the Crown 
of Aragon and to resolve the universal issue once and for all through a general reduction. They 
warned that additional delays to consider new petitions would accomplish nothing and would 
only allow the known problems to persist.
68
 The Council failed to persuade the king, who 
“resolved” the matter by sending addition reports that he had received from the ecclesiastical 
estates of Aragon and Catalonia to the Council. Philip asked the Council to report what they 
thought of these new reports and whether they changed the Council’s recommendation.
69
 The 
Council complied and again the Fiscales were divided once again in their recommendations—
Don Francisco Portel recommended following Don Alonso Rico’s advice to reject the reduction, 
while Don Pedro Juan de Alfaro repeated his recommendation to make the reduction universal 
with a few minor qualifications. The Council again affirmed Alfaro’s advocacy for a general 
                                                 
66
 Ibid., 190f-191. 
 
67
 Ibid., 191f. The Council was clearly unimpressed, summarizing the memorial complains as 
the same harms and inconveniences that they have submitted since 1709 and “which have been 
examined with the greatest effectiveness and extensive understanding [eficaz y dilatado 
conocimiento], especially in the years 1716, 1717, and 1718….” 
 
68
 Ibid., 193-193f. 
 
69
 Ibid., 153.  
134 
 
reduction.
70
 Philip V never resolved this matter despite the Council reminding him of it in 
another Consulta in 1738.
71
 There is a note on the Consulta from 1735 indicating that the 
Council reminded the king of the matter on October 25, 1746, which was less than four months 
after Ferdinand VI ascended the throne.  
The debates over the reduction of the censo and the king’s hesitation to act on it reveal how 
difficult it was to come to any conclusion. There were many different individuals involved and 
ultimately a reduction of the censo would be a mixed blessing for the towns, guilds, nobles, and 
other subjects in the Crown of Aragon. In general, these groups seem to have preferred lower 
interest rates, but there were certainly many individuals and probably some secular corporations 
that stood to lose a fair amount of income from a reduction. That most of these real and legal 
persons were both creditors and debtors meant that any loss in income would be compensated by 
at least some reduction in their expenses. The ecclesiastical estates of the Crown of Aragon, on 
the other hand, aggressively defended the higher interest rate. This partially reflected the 
insistence on ecclesiastical immunity from the Nueva Planta reforms that were the initial basis 
for considering the exclusively Castilian reduction of the censo in the Crown of Aragon. The 
speed with which the clergy wrote to the king whenever he was advised to reduce the censo 
indicates that they feared significant financial harm should he rule against them, as all of their 
reports repeatedly insisted.  
What makes this case particularly interesting is that the king chose to do nothing despite the 
apparent extension of the reduction through the Nueva Planta and the advice of his Council in 
the 1730s to extend the reduction for practical reasons. To leave the rate of the censo at different 
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levels in his various kingdoms certainly undercut his efforts to govern his kingdoms under a 
uniform law. It also suggested that the abolition of the laws and privileges of the kingdoms of the 
Crown of Aragon had some very significant caveats. While Philip and many of his officials 
would probably have preferred to reduce the censo and have a more uniform law, the significant 
variations in the kinds of contracts that were called “censos” in the kingdoms of Spain made it 
nearly impossible to create a single law to make sense of them all. While these contracts were 
governed by the king, they often lasted for centuries and so they preserved the financial 
structures and the legal regulations governing them in each of the various kingdoms. In the end, 
the king did not even attempt to make all new contracts conform to a single standard, reflecting 
some level of acceptance of the survival of this aspect of the composite monarchy.  
The efforts of the Intendente of Valencia Don Luis Antonio Mergelina, the Fiscal of the 
Council of Castile Don Pedro Juan de Alfaro, and eventually the majority of the Council of 
Castile to persuade the king to make the reduction of the censo universal reflect another aspect of 
royal policy. Their contention was that this sweeping reform would reduce the number of 
specific concordancias that had to be negotiated and would be more just as they would treat all 
of the king’s subjects equally—after all, as they repeatedly noted, the reduction was beneficial in 
Castile even though the region of Andalucia was at least as productive as the most fertile lands in 
the Crown of Aragon. The counter to this position, consistently defended by the clergy and other 
Fiscales, was to emphasize the lack of a general outcry for the reduction. The preference to 
address the failings of the status quo through the piece-meal negotiation of specific exemptions 
characterizes Philip V’s preference for particularism.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that Philip requested reports from all of the towns and 
corporations of Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia while he was considering this issue. This 
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demonstrates that the absence of these kingdoms’ Cortes did not signal the end of the king’s 
interest in his subjects’ wishes. While the channels of this communication had changed, it still 
took place and was even initiated by the monarchy. In this regard, Philip V followed the example 
of Charles II when he sought input on the Junto de Alivios in 1669—in fact, Philip V’s request 
for reports was much more inclusive than those of Charles II.
72
 Here again we see Philip’s 
preference for particularism in his choice of how to negotiate with his subjects. 
 
II. The preservation of customary civil law  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the final decrees of the Nueva Planta reaffirmed the 
preservation of several civil law codes in the Crown of Aragon following their abolition by 
Philip a few years earlier. Several historians have argued that these concessions were 
insignificant, but a consideration of the fundamentally divergent nature of these legal systems 
suggests otherwise.
73
 In fact, the preservation of customary civil law in Aragon and Catalonia 
reflect yet another way in which basic institutional structures from the composite monarchy of 
the Habsburgs survived the Nueva Planta reforms and undermined the legal unification of the 
kingdoms of Spain.  
As with the censo, the king’s power to shape the legal system made him the arbiter in a 
complex debate where his subjects’ competing interests complicated royal officials’ ability to 
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act. As judges from Castile were brought in to Aragon and Catalonia to hear cases following 
Aragonese and Catalan laws, they were put in a difficult position attempting to learn a new legal 
system and implement it effectively. In this case, Philip’s willingness to accommodate the desire 
for traditional civil laws significantly increased the difficulties faced by his officials. In fact, the 
divergence between Aragonese and Castilian civil law reflected a deep difference in their 
assumptions about the nature of law. Philip and the other Bourbon’s tolerated the tensions that 
these differences created because civil law was important to the Aragonese and Catalan elite 
whose support he required to rule. While he certainly had the power to abolish these legal 
systems, the consequences of doing so would be so problematic that he decided to accept legal 
variation to facilitate the relatively smooth transition to his rule following the War of Succession. 
The problems with the abolition of Aragonese and Catalan civil law were not primarily overt 
opposition, although there most likely was some of that. Instead, they reflected the complexity of 
these legal systems and the degree to which they were bound up with the social lives of Philip’s 
subjects. Replacing one set of laws with another would entail an overhaul in the organization of 
families and the way in which people interacted with each other that would necessarily provoke 
dissension and conflict as people grappled with the new laws’ implications for their way of life. 
Analyzing the regional differences that survived the Nueva Planta reforms provides valuable 
insights into the transition between Habsburg and Bourbon Spain because it reveals the laws’ 
significance for the Aragonese and shows the difficulties of shifting between these legal systems. 
The preservation of Aragonese civil law is especially significant because of its relevance for the 
daily life of the people of Aragon and their understanding of the nature of law. In addition to the 
barriers created by the dominant narrative of state formation in early modern Spain, part of the 
reason for missing the significance of these laws may be that actual legal practice and the 
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acquisition of legal knowledge in Bourbon Spain has been largely ignored. Legal handbooks, or 
guides to legal practice for beginners and quick-reference books for judges such as Silvestre 
Martínez’s Libreria del Jueces, provide valuable insights into the way that law was practiced and 
legal knowledge was disseminated.  
The fundamental incompatibility of Castilian law with Aragonese expectations and habits 
grew out of long-standing differences in the understanding of law in Castile and Aragon. Since 
the thirteenth-century promulgation of the Siete Partidas by Alfonso X (1221-1284), Castilian 
courts functioned as if there were absolute principals of justice upon which the law depended for 
legitimacy. This deductive approach to the law followed Roman legal thought, which the 
Partidas acquired from the Code of Justinian. Alfonso intentionally crafted the Partidas into a 
unified and systematic code that was abstract and universal so that it could be used throughout 
the kingdoms he ruled as Holy Roman Emperor and King of Castile. Prior to this, however, 
Castilian law had followed a complex customary law based upon local practice rather than a 
theoretically consistent legal framework.
74
 By replacing this collection of customary practices 
with the principles of Roman law, Alfonso established a legal system that affirmed the 
legitimacy of a universal law. In contrast to Alfonso’s choice to follow the Roman model of 
jurisprudence, James I (1208-1276) of Aragon preserved the Aragonese understanding of law as 
the crystallization of long-established practice when he established the Fueros, the codification 
of Aragonese law. He did not replace the Visigothic customary law with Roman law, instead 
producing a unique legal code that reflected the practices of his subjects. Whatever his primary 
concerns in drafting these laws, James chose to preserve the legal practices of the Aragonese 
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rather than reground their law on abstract principles.
75
 In this sense, Aragonese civil law is 
inductive and emphasizes the particular, unlike the deductive and systematic Partidas in Castile.  
 In addition to the divergent understandings of law in Aragon and Castile, their legal systems 
differed in their prescriptions for how people should live their daily lives. Legal handbooks, or 
guides to legal practice for beginners and quick-reference books for judges provide valuable 
insights into the way that civil law was understood and applied by judges, lawyers, and notaries. 
The different legal foundations in Aragon and Castile resulted in significantly different legally-
defined social roles in each kingdom. In Aragon, fathers and mothers had more power with fewer 
legal limits on how they had to treat their children. Aragonese law also provided them more 
options in how they structured their families through greater freedom in adoption and the 
designation of tutors and heirs. 
The eighteenth century was a period of increased printing in many genres. This increase in 
printing led to a variety of coping mechanisms to handle the information overload, including the 
proliferation of handbooks and other shortcuts for study. These earned plenty of criticism, much 
as Cliff Notes and Spark Notes do today, yet they remained quite popular.
76
 Legal handbooks, 
which were part of this influx of publications, became increasingly popular as guides to legal 
practice, as opposed to legal theory. While some scholars denigrated the more practical legal 
books as the products of “hacks” and emphasized the importance of the great systematic legal 
scholars, it is important to remember that legal handbooks served a crucial role in transmitting 
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legal knowledge.
77
 They reflect actual legal practice and provide insights into the mindsets of 
early modern jurists that might otherwise have been lost. 
These guides to the law were all the more important given the poor legal education available 
at Spanish universities. Only in the mid-eighteenth century did universities begin to teach 
Spanish law despite graduates’ inability to handle practical legal matters for centuries, and even 
after these reforms, outside observers still tended to criticize the quality of Spanish legal 
education.
78
 Under the enlightened monarch Charles III, the Council of Castile undertook 
repeated efforts to reform the universities of Spain. Their efforts, however, seem to have focused 
on expanding the abstract discussion of the laws of nature and the laws of nations by including 
the works of John Locke, Samuel Puffendorf, and Hugo Grotius, among others, rather than 
adding material on the actual practice of law in Bourbon Spain to the curriculum.
79
  
The lack of practical legal training left a significant need that these handbooks attempted to 
fill. Joseph Berni y Catalá’s Instituta Civil y Real, which was first published in 1745, is an early 
example of this kind of book. It offered pragmatic advice to those beginning to practice law 
based on Berni y Catalá’s own experience. For example, he provided basic directions on how to 
use essential legal resources correctly while writing a legal brief. Berni y Catalá’s strategies 
included the order in which to consult these references and the proper use of the alphabetical 
index in the books that had them.
80
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While Berni y Catalá attempted to make Castilian law more approachable, other jurists began 
writing handbooks to aid those familiar with Roman or Castilian law in coming to terms with 
Aragonese civil law. Villalba, the author of Crisis Legal, began this effort with his legal tract 
explaining the similarities and differences between Aragonese civil and canon law and those of 
Castile, Fororum et observantiarum Regni Araonum Codex sive enodata methodica compilation 
iure civile et canonica fulcita, legibus Castellae conciliate, which was published in Zaragoza in 
1727. He later revised and expanded this work to two volumes, which he published in 1743.
81
 In 
these books, he provided a systematic explanation of the Fueros and their implementation in 
Aragon organized in a way that allowed Villalba to compare them with those of Roman and 
Castilian law. This was a significant project, as earlier compilations of the Fueros were 
unsystematic and thematically disorganized, making it difficult to compare them to legal codes 
based on Roman jurisprudence.
82
 With the publication of Villalba’s treatises on Aragonese law, 
lawyers and judges could read about Aragonese civil law in a way that would make sense to 
those who had a background in Roman and Castilian law. These handbooks made Aragonese 
civil law much more approachable to the “foreign” Castilian judges who now had to enforce it. 
Drawing on Villalba’s work, Manuel Silvestre Martínez published the Libreria de Jueces 
(1763) further improved the accessibility of Aragonese law by presenting it systematically in 
Castilian rather than Latin. The need to know Aragonese law created significant problems for a 
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newly appointed official trained in Castilian law, as Martínez knew from his own experience. His 
difficulties learning Aragonese civil law as the Mayor of Huesca inspired him to write the first 
volume of the work. In Huesca he had discovered that knowledge of Castilian law was 
insufficient to judge civil cases. This difficulty was compounded for judges with three-year 
appointments and limited means, who “invariably” took “the nature of necessity” and managed 
without the many books that an exhaustive study of the topic would require.
83
 The judges, 
therefore, faced the challenge of making sense of a foreign law with which they must quickly 
familiarize themselves because of the pressing duties of their new office. Understandably, these 
officials had little time for the rigorous study of a new legal system. Martínez hoped that his 
Libreria would allow them to quickly acquire the essential knowledge necessary to fulfill their 
official duties.  
Martínez’s Libreria attracted considerable interest as indicated by the number of editions that 
it went through, suggesting a ready market for his work. When first published in 1763, it was a 
one-volume book that only dealt with the similarities and differences between Castilian and 
Aragonese law. Martínez apparently achieved popular success, as Libreria went through six 
editions between its initial publication and 1774, when it went into its seventh edition with the 
addition of seven more volumes discussing a wide variety of legal issues less focused on 
Aragon.
84
 The eight-volume version of Libreria went through seven editions between 1774 and 
1791. By 1796 it had grown to twelve volumes plus a separate index, bringing the complete work 
to thirteen volumes. Although Martínez was not the only Spaniard writing legal guides, he seems 
to have had no difficulties selling Libreria. The success of his initial volume suggests interest in, 
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and perhaps even the need for, clarification of the differences between Castilian and Aragonese 
law.  
Martínez systematically explained the differences between the laws of Castile and those of 
Aragon as they appeared to contemporary legal professionals, revealing the significance of these 
differences as they were implemented. The differences in the regulation of paternal authority, 
marriage contracts, adoption, and inheritance resulted in distinct family and social structures in 
Aragon and Castile. Preserving the laws that governed these basic relationships enabled the 
Aragonese to maintain their social distinctiveness from Castile in a much more intimate way than 
the preservation of their representational assembly would have. The far-reaching implications of 
altering Aragonese civil law on these matters shows the far-reaching consequences of Philip V’s 
decision to maintain it.  
One surprisingly significant difference between the Castilian and Aragonese civil law 
practice concerned patria potestad, or paternal authority. Castilian regulations of paternal 
authority grew out of the Siete Partidas.
85
 They define paternal authority as “the authority which 
a father has over his children,” which includes “the bond of reverence, subjection, and 
castigation, which should connect father and son.”
86
 Martínez described this authority in Castile: 
“The fathers of families have authority over their children; this they acquire for the common 
good of the household and the benefit of those who depend on it, who have the obligation of 
obeying, respecting, and revering the fathers as such, doing what they order, as long as it is not 
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contrary to Divine or Human law; because of this, the father is obligated to correct and punish 
them.”
87
 The father ought to rule in the interests of those dependent on the household, who had 
the legal duty to obey his orders as long as they did not violate a higher law. The head of the 
household was obliged to correct and punish his dependents should they violate his commands, 
along with the corresponding responsibility to God for his failure to do this properly. 
The authority of the father over his children extended over all of his children’s wealth and 
earnings until they reached the age of fourteen, although the father was responsible to preserve 
the wealth for his children.
88
 Additionally, when both father and child were in danger of 
starvation, the father could sell his child and save their lives with the money he procures in this 
method. The law even permitted a father to eat his child if that was the only way for him to 
survive while his castle was under siege.
89
 Children had no legal identity independent of their 
father, and so could not bring their fathers to court. The only way for a child to seek legal redress 
was for her to ask a judge to bring the father into court on her behalf.
90
  
Moreover, Castilian paternal authority extended beyond children to others within the 
household—servants were “under the political-economic authority of their masters, to whom 
they owed respect as to a parent, and to fulfill the time they agreed to serve for their salary.”
91
 
This service included the legal duty to preserve the honor of their master by avoiding any words 
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or deeds that might bring dishonor to the household that they served.
92
 In this case, however, the 
law was clear that servants were not slaves. After all, they worked for a wage, to which they 
were legally entitled.
93
 Still, as long as a servant was being paid for her service, she was under 
the authority of her master.  
The organization of the household was very different in Aragon, where legal paternal 
authority did not exist at all. As Martínez explained, “in Aragon there is no paternal authority; 
and children are only obligated to show their parents that reverence that the Christian religion 
teaches.”
94
 Following the Fuero entitled Ne pater pro filio, the father had no legal authority over 
his children by virtue of being a father. The absence of paternal authority had significant and 
surprising practical consequences. For example, it appears that mothers had substantial authority 
over young children. If an infant or small child was taken away while under the age of five, they 
had to be returned to their mother. Additionally, if the mother and father were separated, the 
judge had the authority to give custody of the child to either parent or to a third party.
95
  
As one might suspect, at least some aspects of paternal authority ended up appearing in 
Aragonese practice despite its legal absence. First of all, children owed proper respect to their 
parents, which was a Christian duty. Following the law of nature and of nations, Martínez 
emphasized that fathers could also exercise “economic authority” over their children, giving 
fathers the authority and duty to “educate and nurture” them. Children could only be freed from 
this power when they reached fourteen years old—until then, they had no independent legal 
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standing.
96
 Finally, since the Aragonese did not have a notion of paternal authority, fathers had 
complete control over their children’s right of inheritance. Martínez explained the situation: “As 
there is no paternal authority, it appears idle to put the ways in which it is annulled, mainly there 
being no understanding of emancipation, nor un-affiliation, with the motive of having the 
increased ability of disinheriting the children, with or without cause….”
97
 Without the legal 
concept of paternal authority, there was also no corresponding legal concept of emancipation 
from this authority. This meant that children could be disinherited for whatever reason until they 
reached the age of fourteen. They then became legal persons and could pursue legal action to 
protect their inheritance, even though they were still considered minors until they turned twenty-
two. It is profoundly ironic that the absence of legal paternal authority gave fathers greater power 
over their children’s right of inheritance. 
One can sense Martínez’s frustration at the unsystematic laws of Aragon when he attempted 
to clarify father’s legal authority over their children: “There is no paternal authority in Aragon, 
and this is so; but despite this general rule, because of which one understands that the father has 
no power to subject his son with the severity that would be possible if he had it, look at the fuero 
único of the same Title, and you will find cases in which the father may in trial respond for the 
son....”
98
 So in some instances, fathers could act legally on behalf of his child even without 
paternal authority. This should come as little surprise, for it was undoubtedly a practical reality 
of family planning. The absence of paternal authority in Aragon left room for negotiation and the 
influence of custom in place of the codified legal structure that Castile had adapted from Roman 
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law. It also reflected the inconsistent habits and customs of the Aragonese, much to the 
annoyance of Martínez. 
Aragonese adoption laws also differed significantly from those in Castile. Although 
prohibited from adopting children in Castile, women were allowed to adopt in Aragon.
 
The Siete 
Partidas governing Castile prohibited women from adopting children except to replace sons lost 
in military service to the king, for “if women could do this themselves, it might happen that men 
would deceive them, or be deceived by them, so that great wrong would result.”
99
 Perhaps the 
fear expressed here reflects the tendency for fathers to adopt their illegitimate sons to perpetuate 
the family line—might Alfonso X have worried that women would be more likely to commit 
adultery if they could adopt their illegitimate children and guarantee their inheritance?
100
 In any 
case, the Aragonese had no such restrictions. Not only were women allowed to adopt, but men 
physically incapable of producing children could also adopt in Aragon despite the Partidas’ 
prohibition. In fact, only the castrated and children were prohibited from adopting according to 
Aragonese law. Martínez explained that because adoption in Aragon was not only “for the 
consolation of those that die without succession,” it was an option for many more people. 
Nevertheless, it seems likely that many adoptions were for the preservation of familial lines of 
succession. Because of the absence of paternal authority and the diminution of biological 
fatherhood, those who were adopted in Aragon even had the right to use the arms of their 
adopted parents, another privilege prohibited by Castilian law.
101
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The convoluted and ad-hoc nature of Aragonese civil law can also be seen when considering 
the appointment of legal guardians for orphans and the selection of heirs. In Castile, only a father 
could designate in his will the tutor for his children should he die, and if he did not do so, then 
the decision went to the children’s paternal relatives. If there were no living relatives, then the 
judge could appoint a tutor.
102
 The situation was quite different in Aragon, where mothers 
enjoyed much more authority over their children. If one or both parents of a child died without a 
will, the judge handling the matter had tremendous latitude in deciding whom he could appoint 
as the child’s guardian. While the judge could give the child to its surviving parent, he need not 
do so—in fact, the judge could give the child to anyone: “he can make guardian whichever legal 
adult he names,” as no one had “a right to the guardianship, neither as a relative, nor as a mother 
or father of the ward,” which allowed the judge to “give the child to a stranger” even if one of its 
parents lived.
103
 Parents who died and left a will designating a guardian for their children 
similarly had many options at their disposal. For example, if a mother died and named her spouse 
as the legal guardian of the child in her will, she could stipulate that the father would lose the 
guardianship of the child if he remarried.
104
 If she did not specify this, however, then the father 
would retain the guardianship of his child even if he remarried.  
Once appointed, guardians had the same nearly-unlimited authority over their wards as 
parents had over their children. While the authority of guardians over their charges was mostly 
the same as in Castile, in Aragon they could alienate all of their ward’s moveable property 
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without judicial approval if they chose.
105
 Similar actions would be considered an abuse of the 
guardian’s authority in Castile, where they had a greater duty to protect their ward’s property. 
Also, if a dispute between a ward and her guardian made it to court, the ward “could ask for 
nothing but food,” as this was the guardian’s only legal duty toward their charge.
106
 The duty to 
feed the legal minors under one’s charge appears to be one of the most deep-rooted legal duties 
in Aragon as it often appears as one of the few limits on parents and guardians’ authority over 
the children in their custody.
107
  
Despite the importance of parents’ duty to feed their children, this duty did not prevent 
parents in Aragon from disinheriting their children if they chose to do so. Castilian law required 
that children inherit from their parents their full share of the inheritance as stipulated by the law 
for those who died without a will. Parents could only disinherit their children if they could 
demonstrate just cause, such as if a son intended to murder his parents, had injured them with his 
own hands, or had betrayed the king. Daughters could only be disinherited for having been a 
whore without her parents forcing her to be one because they had refused to let her marry “in her 
time.”
108
 Parents in Aragon were much freer to disinherit their children and designate unrelated 
heirs, as Martínez explained: “In Aragon, there is no obligation of law, Fuero, nor observance to 
make one’s children one’s heirs, nor for children to do likewise for their parents; but having 
children from a legitimate marriage, while one need not designate them as heirs, one must leave 
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them because of their legitimacy, five sueldos, in place of the moveable goods that they could 
have inherited, and another five in place of the real estate [raices y sitios]….”
109
 In Aragon, then, 
there was no duty to designate one’s legitimate children as one’s heirs. For 10 sueldos, a parent 
could fully satisfy their legal duties to provide for their children and disinherit them, assuming 
that there was no entail on the estate. While there was an Aragonese judge who attempted to set 
the precedent that one could not disinherit one’s children with the words, “I disinherit my 
children, and desire that they be content with the 5 [sic] sueldos,” this precedent was not legally 
binding—only wills that managed to be made “contrary to observances, or fuero, or to contain 
requirements that are impossible to meet” were without legal force. Once basic legality was met, 
including providing one’s legitimate children with the requisite ten sueldos, the one making the 
will was free to “designate as heir anyone he [sic] chooses…. as if no legitimate child existed,” 
as long as they did not select a child “of sin, that is one of sacrilege, incest, and adultery, which 
also includes ‘natural’ children that are engendered in the time that their parents were capable of 
marrying….”
110
 If one wanted to leave their inheritance to such “illegal” offspring, one would 
need to adopt them. Otherwise, the Aragonese were entirely free to designate whomever they 
chose as their heir. Even foreigners could inherit, for “everyone is the same in this Kingdom of 
Aragon.”
111
 
The way in which the Aragonese could record their wills reflects a similarly more pragmatic 
and flexible approach to legal affairs than in Castile, where it was much more difficult to 
demonstrate the authenticity of a will. For example, when a Castilian wanted to certify a “sealed” 
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will that would remain secret until their death, it had to be signed by seven witnesses and a royal 
notary, while a sealed will in Aragon required the signatures of just two witnesses and a 
notary.
112
 Additionally, if an Aragonese testator chose, their secret will could be hidden in a 
place that only he or she knew as long as they provided a notary with directions to find the will 
following its author’s death. The Aragonese could also amend their wills with a hand-written 
note as long as two witnesses could attest to their writing it.
113
 If someone was dying and a 
parish priest was present, presumably to perform their last rites, the priest could serve in place of 
a notary and was bound to take the oral will and “write it down on the first paper that he 
encountered, whatever its quality [he must] accept it, and guard it until the testator is buried.”
114
 
In this case, unanticipated death, as long as it was not instantaneous, need not prevent one from 
leaving their will. Aragonese law provided for the changing of one’s will regardless of 
circumstances in addition to the considerable flexibility in what one could stipulate in that will.  
While the law did everything possible to enable the Aragonese to leave wills, inevitably 
some individuals died without recording one. When this occurred, the rules governing who had 
use of the property and who would inherit it also differed from those of Castile. In Aragon, one 
could claim the “Right of Widowhood” (Derecho de Viudedad) in one’s marriage contract, 
which would provide widows with the use of their deceased spouses’ goods “while one lived in 
widowhood,” regardless of who the heir was. In fact, this right could delay the implementation of 
the deceased’s will if they left one. There were several conditions to the Right of Widowhood, 
however. For example, it would be lost if the widow remarried, entered a religious order, or 
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fornicated.
 115
 While the law was unambiguous, loss of the Right of Widowhood for fornication 
was apparently inconsistently enforced. While loss of the Right of Widowhood because of 
fornication was not always specified by marriage contracts, the law trumped these contracts. 
When an official encountered a widow or widower “who has manifestly with him his fornicator” 
and yet retains the Right of Widowhood “even though he keeps his whore [puta] in his house,” 
the official should “warn” the couple and “correct… the Marriage, or Dowry, Contract [as] this 
man or woman must tie his or her finger while God gives them life.”
116
 Apparently some clever 
Aragonese widows and widowers had chosen to preserve this right by avoiding remarriage to 
their significant others (or, in some cases, their prostitutes) rather than marry and risk losing the 
use of their deceased spouse’s property. Even when this arrangement was not prohibited in the 
marriage contract it remained illegal, so Martínez encouraged his readers to change the contract 
retroactively to bring it into accordance with the law before forcing the couple out of the 
property and into married life. Martínez explained how such illegal contracts became notarized 
in a parenthetical aside about how there are “many mistakes, and errors, born of the inexperience 
of… royal notaries, who I have seen with sufficient pity [bastante lastima] guiding others with 
equal insufficiency.”
117
 Martínez’s pity for the poorly-advised couples who believed that they 
were following the law by avoiding legal marriage did not extend to toleration of their sexual 
activity, as indicated by his ominous encouragement that the couple marry “while God gives 
them life.”  
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When someone died without a will and their property was no longer exercised by a widow or 
widower, the property would be divided equally among the deceased’s sons and daughters. If 
they had no children, then it would be divided among their siblings, as parents never inherit from 
children in Aragon without a will in another break with Castilian law.
118
 If one of the deceased’s 
siblings had died before the deceased, but had left children, then the deceased sibling’s share of 
the inheritance would be divided equally among the nieces and nephews.
119
 Aragonese law on 
intestate inheritance differed from Castilian law in three additional ways. First, in the event that 
someone died without a will and without children, and the nearest relatives were split between 
the maternal line and the paternal line, rather than splitting the inheritance among all of the 
parties, it would go to the line from which the deceased had inherited the majority of her wealth 
originally. For example, if the majority of the inheritance had come to the deceased through her 
mother’s line, then it would remain in that line. Second, if in the scenario above, the deceased 
had earned the property that he left, then both lines would inherit it equally. Third, if the 
deceased in this same scenario had instead inherited the property from a distant ancestor, then it 
would be divided between the blood relations closest to both lines.
120
 All of these scenarios deny 
any automatic legal presumption in favor of the paternal line, and frequently divided the 
inheritance between several parties. Aragonese inheritance laws differed from Castilian laws in 
that they usually divided property among more relatives than Castilian law. 
While these differences between Aragonese and Castilian law are important, neither set of 
laws was static and sometimes legal precedent erased the distinctions between them. Martínez 
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continued to provide helpful guidance for his readers in these instances so that they could judge, 
plan, or act appropriately. For example, sons in both Castile and Aragon had to conform to their 
parents’ will concerning marriage or risk losing their inheritance. When it came to women in 
Aragon, however, the law was less explicit. Martínez explained that in regard to daughters, “no 
Fuero exists that exempts parents from the duty to provide for them... [however] it is best not to 
trust them, because the jurists of the kingdom have established as a principal that they do not 
have this obligation.”
121
 So while the written law in Aragon indicated that a daughter might 
continue to receive support from her parents if she married against their will, a judge would 
likely rule against her should the matter end up in court. 
Even with the qualification that Aragonese and Castilian law adapted to one another in some 
ways that could reduce their divergence, this discussion has demonstrated that the Fueros 
differed from Castilian law in numerous ways with significant consequences for social life in the 
Kingdom of Aragon. The laws governing paternal authority, marriage contracts, adoption, and 
inheritance, among others, shaped the most basic aspects of family construction and 
preservation. By leaving these in place, Philip V preserved the institutional structure that defined 
the parameters of long-term family planning among the Aragonese, which was especially 
important for the local elite.
122
 While the loss of the Cortes transformed the channels through 
which the Aragonese communicated their interests to the king and certainly upset their sense of 
shared governance with the king, it did not touch the lives of the Aragonese as intimately as the 
loss of their civil law would have.  
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Modern historians’ tendency to ignore the significance of Aragonese civil law impairs our 
ability to appreciate the persistent regional differences in Bourbon Spain that interested 
Martínez’s readership. While Philip’s restitution of Aragonese civil law certainly was a peace-
offering to the Aragonese, this should not lead historians to write it off as irrelevant to Bourbon 
efforts to centralize the institutions of state. The preservation of these local laws and customs 
enabled Philip V’s reforms by preserving the essential aspects of regional legal difference that 
touched daily life. Had Philip attempted to abolish these privileges, he would have had to deal 
with rampant non-compliance, as indeed was the case prior to the reinstitution of Aragonese civil 
law, for his subjects would not have tolerated his reforms. In this respect the preservation of this 
distinctive civil law reflects the ways in which the Bourbon government had to respect local and 
regional interests as the Habsburgs had learned. Philip V ultimately treated the Kingdom of 
Aragon with some respect for his subjects’ interests and institutions, more in line with the 
principle of aeque principaliter, or treating various kingdoms as inheritances rather than 
invoking the right of conquest over them. Despite the necessity of respecting local custom, the 
preservation of regional differences also created greater difficulties for Bourbon efforts to unify 
Spain. By maintaining the customary Aragonese civil code, Philip perpetuated a system that 
reified a legal code that was antithetical to the systematic Castilian law that he hoped to use 
throughout Spain and the colonies. These tensions reveal the significance of regional differences 
in understanding eighteenth century Spain and the importance of continuing to investigate the 
relationships between the peripheral regions in Spain and the central royal government. 
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III. Jurisdictional disputes within Catalonia 
Within the new government created by the Nueva Planta, the new officials had to establish a 
functioning government quickly that would be capable of maintaining royal rule. Officials in 
each kingdom faced a unique set of challenges based on the progress of the war, which version 
of the Nueva Planta was most recent, and how much adjustment these reforms required of the 
subjects under their authority. When these officials disagreed about how to implement the Nueva 
Planta they had to appeal to the king for resolution. In these situations, the debate often turned 
on the nature of the royal will—what exactly did the king want his officials to do and which 
officials had to change their actions to conform to his will? As with the censo and the civil law of 
Aragon, the king had the final say in the matter but his choice was constrained by the far-
reaching consequences of his choice. In the disagreement between the Captain General of 
Catalonia, who was the most important military official in each kingdom, and the Royal 
Audiencia of Barcelona, the kingdom’s highest court, Philip eventually decided to affirm a 
practical arrangement that violated the letter of the Nueva Planta yet allowed the Captain 
General to enforce strict military discipline. Phillip consistently opposed any “innovations,” and 
eventually decided that innovations in the practice of governing should be avoided even if this 
meant “innovating” in relation to the letter of the law. The final arrangement was much less 
efficient than the Nueva Planta’s model of official action and could delay the registration of 
royal edicts by months or more even as it improved the Captain General’s oversight of the 
military in Catalonia.  
These disputes led to a unique relationship between the Captain General, then the Marqués 
de Castelrodrigo, and the Audiencia in political matters. The Captain General, as President of the 
Audiencia, was able to participate in decisions related to the royal orders and decrees of the 
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various parts of Catalonia. These then would pass through the Royal Acuerdo, or the executive 
committee for the Principality of Catalonia. This was guaranteed by the royal order (Real 
Cedula) of January 16, 1716 that created the Audiencia of Catalonia.
123
 According to this law, 
the Audiencia had to notify the Captain General as to when it would meet and what items would 
be discussed, but if the Captain General did not come, then they could proceed without him. 
There were other matters, however, such as the implementation of royal orders pertaining to 
various local officials in the administrative units (partidas) of Catalonia, which the Captain 
General had always required the Audiencia to send to him for his signature before they were 
officially registered and promulgated.
124
 This naturally slowed the implementation of these 
orders and the practice apparently frustrated the subsequent Captain General, the Marqués de 
Risbourg, who ordered the Regent of the Audiencia to sign “all of the Letters, Orders, and 
Decrees that are directed to the Corregidores, city councils (ayuntamientos), Mayors (Alcaldes 
Mayores), Bayles, Aldermen (Regidores), and the rest of the persons of this Principality.”
125
 This 
order led the Audiencia to begin to act with greater autonomy from the Captain General when he 
did not show up to meetings of the Real Acuerdo and initiated a three-decade long conflict over 
the competing jurisdictions of the Captain General and the Audiencia in Catalonia.  
The next summer the Audiencia acted without consulting the Captain General concerning the 
collector of a particular tax (the rediezmo) in the town of Monblanch. He had not collected this 
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tax from various people because they claimed ecclesiastical immunity.
126
 When the Captain 
General learned that the Audiencia had acted on this matter without consulting him, he wrote to 
the Council of Castile to complain of the Audiencia’s “desire to strip his employment of various 
prerogatives.” While Risbourg did “not have decree nor order with which to consolidate the 
practice of the consultas,” this practice reflected the “quality of the land, the genius of its 
citizens, and the constitution of the things inferred from these... circumstances.” The government 
of Catalonia was ruled by an absolute “boss [un jefe],” which was important as the Catalans were 
“accustomed to obey this government better” than the alternative proscribed in the Nueva Planta. 
Risbourg explained that the Audiencia “did not have sufficient force of justice” without the 
Captain General’s involvement for “without this absolute head and the armed soldiers that it 
contains, the people will be insolent because of their natural aversion to the formalities of the 
tribunals, and others because of the defunding of the troops.” The Marqués de Risbourg thus 
justified the centralization of political authority in his office by appealing to the way in which his 
predecessors had exercised its power before him. The centralization of power in the Captain 
General’s hands reflected the need to maintain order and respect for the authority of the 
Audiencia by increasing its ability to enforce its decrees with military might. Despite the absence 
of royal authorization for this power grab, the preservation of order in Catalonia required it 
according to Risbourg.
127
 He also wrote to the Audiencia, complaining that their exclusion of 
him violated the “accustomed” form for handling these sorts of matters.
128
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The Council of Castile rejected Risbourg’s arguments and agreed with the Audiencia. The 
Nueva Planta decrees that created the Audiencia unambiguously supported the Audiencia’s 
position. The reason that the issue had not come up earlier was that the Audiencia did not want to 
stir up dissension in the government of Catalonia when it was initially created because they 
believed that such divisions would interfere with establishing a stable government. Now that the 
Catalan government was firmly established, however, they had chosen to push for stricter 
enforcement of the king’s orders. The Council noted three concerns with the Captain General’s 
usurpation of power.  
First, the centralization of power in the Captain General recreated the old office of Viceroy in 
all but name because the Captain General operated as the de facto “head” of the Catalan 
government. The council noted that the Captain General’s usurpation of political authority was 
“opposed to the actual government of this Principality and to the rest of the kingdoms and 
provinces of this crown.” Philip V had conceded the Alternos, the embodiment of his authority in 
Catalonia, to the Royal Acuerdo, but the Captain General had “now established this same 
superior direction of the Audiencia” and the government of the Principality. The Council charged 
Risbourg with “appearing to desire to form an image or resemblance of the ancient viceroy 
[lugarteniente].” This created problems because it reminded the Catalans of their fueros, as the 
Council explained:  
This is also seen by those citizens who have suffered the loss of their fueros and liberties, 
so that it seems just not to remind them [of this loss], this being the best way to make 
amends in this matter and honorable of Your Majesty’s consideration, that the motives 
which encourage moving away from the ancient government are those that the Captain 
General sets out for the use of the absolute management, ...reviving the ancient memories 
rather than establishing the new government with the gentleness and rules that enact 
prudence.... 
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The Council turned the Captain General’s argument on its head, suggesting that the Catalans 
would have less respect for the government because of the centralization of authority in his 
hands since it would remind them of what they had lost. The problems in Catalonia stemmed 
from Risbourg’s avoidance of the new government. If this government were ever established, the 
Council believed that it would increase the respect of justice and peace in the land in a way that 
the continual reliance on the military never could. As most of the King’s domain was 
successfully ruled by tribunals, such as the Audiencia and Real Acuerdo, the Council thought 
that the unruliness of Catalonia more likely reflected the weakness of the centralized Catalan 
state than its necessity. Instead of smoothly transitioning to the new government as the king had 
ordered, the Captain Generals of Catalonia had maintained the old model of concentrated 
government and encouraged the Catalans’ sense of “disunion” from the rest of the Philip’s 
kingdoms. All of this led the Council to suspect the Marqués de Risbourg’s fitness for royal 
office.
129
  
Second, the Council believed that the king’s rule was weakened by the variation between the 
Catalan government and those of the rest of the Crown of Aragon. They described the unique 
Catalan arrangement as “dissonant” with the other kingdoms and criticized the Risbourg for 
exercising prerogatives over the Audiencia “without jurisdiction, nor independent management,” 
in a way that “was very irregular, and dissonant,” to the way it was supposed to function. With 
only the title of President of the Audiencia, Risbourg exercised “more authority than the 
Presidents of the Councils, Chancillerías, and Audiencias of the Crown of Aragon.” By 
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unilaterally assuming this undelegated power, the Captain General was compromising the 
institutions that were the backbone of the new royal government in the Crown of Aragon.
130
 
Third and finally, the Council explained that Risbourg’s usurpation of power interfered with 
the efficient administration of justice. The Audiencia’s need to consult with the Captain General 
was prejudicial to those seeking justice, as “the decisions are not made with the brevity that they 
require” because the Audiencia “spends much time informing and consulting and sending these 
[reports] to the Captain General.” This whole process increased the work of the Audiencia and 
delayed its decisions to the detriment of everyone as the bottleneck in the resolution of the cases 
before the Audiencia significantly interfered with its ability to fulfill its function.
131
  
In light of these three reasons, the Council recommended that the king order the Captain 
General to observe “the expressed Royal Decree and managing the presidency of the Audiencia 
in the same form as is done by the rest of the Presidents of the Audiencias of these kingdoms” of 
the Crown of Aragon.
132
 After some delay, the Philip V followed the Council’s advice, sending 
letters to the Audiencia and the Captain General to this effect on 30 October 1733.
133
 This never 
went into effect, however, as the Marqués de Risbourg countermanded the king’s order in a letter 
to the Real Audiencia of Barcelona on 12 November. He explained that he had “the most grave 
motives for not executing the resolution... which he considered impracticable and very opposed 
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to the service of the king and the public good.”
134
 The Audiencia told the Council of Castile 
about this order on November 20,
135
 and Risbourg wrote to the Council on December 11 to 
justify his actions. His explanations found a cool reception in the Council of Castile. The 
Fiscales of the Council considered the Risbourg’s arguments redundant with nothing new to add 
to his letter of October 25, 1727, which the king had already seen. One of the Fiscales even 
commented that “it could not be otherwise,” implying that no other possible argument could be 
made for his indefensible actions. In the end, the Council could find no reason for Risbourg to 
countermand the king’s order and they encouraged Philip to resolve the matter quickly by 
reaffirming his desire to follow the Nueva Planta. They also suggested that the Marqués de 
Risbourg had demonstrated repeated insincerity in his letters and that he had repeatedly ignored 
the king’s orders. They hinted that he was trying to establish himself as an autonomous ruler of 
Catalonia and encouraged Philip to deal with this problem quickly before it grew out of hand.
136
  
While the Philip was deciding the matter, the Risbourg’s order stood and the Audiencia of 
Barcelona continued to consult the Captain General. This provisional solution was reaffirmed 
when the Conde de Glimes took over as interim Captain General just prior to Risbourg’s death in 
1735. José Patiño affirmed the provisional solution in a letter to the Regent of the Audiencia 
dated November 23, 1734, which was accompanied by a concurring royal order. Patiño 
explained that “His Majesty has resolved that for the present you not comply with the expressed 
provision [of October 30, 1733]... on this point it has appeared convenient to his royal service 
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that you not innovate the style practiced up to this point for now and in the interim while His 
Majesty resolves this matter....”
137
 So despite the death of the Marqués de Risbourg, the 
relationship between the Captain General of Catalonia and the Audiencia of Barcelona remained 
unchanged as both awaited the king’s decision. 
The tensions continued to run high and the Conde de Glimes wrote to the Council of Castile 
on July 27, 1735 to accuse the Audiencia of not following the royal order of December 3, 1716, 
which was the sole legal foundation of the Captain General’s claim to authority over the 
Audiencia. The Audiencia responded to these charges on August 3, 1735, explaining that they 
had complied with the king’s orders. The issue at hand was Audiencia’s response to a “a letter 
with orders directed to the Regent” of the Audiencia sent by the Cámara of Castile. The 
Audiencia had responded without consulting the Captain General. They explained that these 
kinds of orders had always been handled in this way and that the king’s order of November 23, 
1734 requiring them to treat the Conde de Glimes as they had Risbourg. To follow the request of 
the Conde de Glimes would require innovation, which they had been expressly banned from 
doing by the king while he deliberated. The Audiencia explained that “the root of these efforts, 
and consequent damages, believes the Audiencia, is that it has not been clearly established in this 
Principality what the authorities of the Captain General and of the Audiencia are, so their actions 
“suffer from such confusion.” These encouraged the king to resolve the issue once and for all, 
promising that “the Audiencia has no other pretensions nor other determination than to know the 
sovereign will so that it can gladly consecrate itself to obey it in everything.”
138
 After a rapid 
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exchange of letters between the Conde de Glimes and Bernardo Santos (then the Regent of the 
Audiencia), the Abad de Vivanco (Secretary of the Cámara of Castile), sent the king’s resolution, 
which directed the Audiencia to send all orders and reports (informes) that they received to the 
Conde de Glimes, “as you did with the Marqués de Risbourg.”
139
 To make sure that they 
understood the order, the Conde de Glimes wrote the Audiencia the next month to emphasize 
that it should practice its “inviolable observation” to share everything with him. He did this to 
make sure that the Audiencia understood that “it is not my intention (animo) to consent to the 
least novelty and if [there is one, I will] give account of it to the king.”
140
 The king’s resolution 
was definitive and supported the practical benefits of consolidating regional authority in the 
hands of the Captain General even though this directly contradicted the letter of the Nueva 
Planta and ignored the established practice of the corresponding officials in Aragon and 
Valencia. Apparently Philip was persuaded by Risbourg and Glimes’ insistence that ruling 
Catalonia required the union of military authority with that of registering royal edicts so that no 
one would mistake the force backing his decrees. 
The king’s decision did not end the struggle between the Captain General and the Audiencia, 
however. The Captain General ordered the Regent of the Audiencia, Bernardo Santos, to stop 
signing his name with “Señor,” or Lord, when writing to him, as the Conde was the head of the 
Audiencia and therefore the Lord of all of the Audiencia’s members.
141
 The Audiencia responded 
that while the Regent did not sign his name “Lord Regent [señor regente]” under the first 
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Captain General of Catalonia, the Marqués de Castelrodrigo, this form had been in use for many 
years, including the years that the Marqués de Risbourg was Captain General. Again the 
Audiencia deployed the order to follow the practices employed under Risbourg to challenge 
Glimes, explaining that “it appears that you will need to present this doubt to His Majesty, whose 
sovereignty alone” could change the customary salutation through a formal declaration.
142
 This 
exchange demonstrates that the Audiencia had not capitulated to the Captain General’s authority 
and that it would continue to assert its own prestige whenever and wherever it could.  
These tensions broke out again in the 1740s during the Conde de Glimes’ second period as 
Captain General of Catalonia. On May 30, 1741, the king made a number of orders related to the 
government of the Catalonia, two of which touched on the relationship between the Audiencia of 
Barcelona and the Captain General. Article 35 stated that “the Capitan General along with the 
Acuerdo, has a vote in the things of the government” and Article 155 added that the Regent of 
the Audiencia had to notify the Captain General of the royal decrees that were sent to the 
Acuerdo. If the Captain General did not ask about them, however, then the Audiencia did not 
need to consult with him prior to registering the royal decrees. These articles reestablished the 
relationship between the Captain General and the Audiencia that the Nueva Planta had originally 
outlined. The Audiencia believed that this authorized them register edicts without the Captain 
General if he did not attend the scheduled meetings of the Real Acuerdo. This upset Glimes, 
however, and he apparently petitioned the king to reconsider this novelty, which led to a new 
royal order on February 3, 1742, that was sent to the Conde de Glimes. Glimes sent a copy of the 
                                                 
142
 Consulta of the Audiencia of Barcelona to his Excellency the Conde de Glimes, 11 
November 1735, A.C.A., Real Audiencia, Leg. 173, No. 25. It includes a note on a loose piece of 
paper labelled “Notas de las Consultas en los quales se da tratamiento de Señor al Señor 
Regente,” which lists five examples from 1735 with it, and one where it was not used. 
Apparently someone looked into the history of this practice under the Conde de Glimes, but 
surprisingly no consulta is listed in either column from the Marques de Risbourg’s time in office. 
166 
 
letter to the Audiencia of Barcelona on February 12, 1742. The new order commanded the 
Audiencia to observe the same practices as you did with the Marqués de Risbourg, telling [the 
Captain General] about them in the same way, so that the Audiencia does not send reports 
[representaciónes]… without the signature of the Captain General: This is the order of His 
Majesty that for now the Audiencia make no innovation... in spite of the cited Articles 35 and 
155.” The Glimes was satisfied with this reversal of the royal position and told the Audiencia 
that it “must consult with me, as you have until the publication of the orders and that you 
practice as always, preventing the Audiencia from abstaining from executing [this order] for the 
period, and improper style, that without foundation has been invented in the last six consultas.” 
The Conde de Glimes further insisted that the Audiencia send everything it received from the 
Court to him “following the form and practice that it had previously followed.”
143
  
The Audiencia found the king’s sudden reversal suspicious, however, especially as the decree 
was not sent the order directly to them. In the Audiencia’s reponse to Glimes’ letter, its members 
expressed their skepticism in describing this “representation” that “pretends that His Majesty 
revoked the Articles 35 and 155 of his new orders; and second seems that the king has ordered 
that for now the Audiencia is to act without innovation in spite of the cited Articles….”
144
 They 
explained that they were wholly motivated by their desire to obey the king, so they would not 
obey the most recent order until they received confirmation that it really was the king’s will. The 
Audiencia clearly indicated their unwillingness to obey an order that would require them to 
“innovate [hará novedad]” by acting contrary to the most recent order that they had received 
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from the king on the matter. Among the causes of their suspicion was that this new order had not 
been sent by the king nor had the original been shown to them. The Audiencia elaborated on this 
point, explaining to the Conde de Glimes that he “could not complain” as they were only being 
prudent. The Audiencia insisted that it was following the most-recent declaration of the king’s 
will and avoiding innovation in their practice.  
The Conde de Glimes’ response was indignant, explaining that he had not invented the king’s 
order and that the Audiencia was willfully violating the king’s will. He expressed awe at their 
willingness to ignore the law and insisted that the Audiencia refused to do their duty by 
following the king’s decree. Glimes complained of “the lamentable state” of the Audiencia, 
which was “notoriously prejudicial to the public cause.”
145
 The impasse was finally resolved a 
few months later when the Audience received assurances that Glimes really had received an 
order from the king reversing Articles 35 and 155. On May 25, 1742, the Audiencia finally 
registered the king’s decree from February without any mention of the controversy that had 
preceded its acceptance.
146
 While the Audiencia’s renewed bid for greater independence from the 
Captain General had failed, their denial of the legitimacy of the royal order had bought them 
three months to operate without consulting the Captain General on every issue.  
Remarkably, the same issue arose once again following the ascension of Philip V’s successor 
and son, Ferdinand VI. What is striking about all of this is the significant confusion concerning 
the king’s will concerning the basic roles of the most prominent royal institutions in Catalonia. 
When disagreements came up, the king’s answer consistently appealed to the established practice 
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and opposed “innovation,” but questions continued because of uncertainty regarding which 
tradition mattered: the royal decrees, especially those of the Nueva Planta creating the new 
Catalan government, or the precedent established by the Audiencia and Captain Generals that 
had always been at variance with the written law. For brief periods in 1727 and 1742, the 
Audiencia followed the royal decrees but these were both quickly shut down by the aggressive 
action of the Captain Generals. The king repeatedly struggled to communicate his will in these 
matters, first delaying his decision for years before eventually affirming the precedent of the 
Audiencia and Captain General’s practice with an insistence on “not making any innovation” in 
1735. Despite this, he apparently forgot his decision when he issued royal orders in 1741 
affirming the Audiencia’s authority to act in some cases without consulting the Captain General, 
but once he learned of the contradiction he reverted to his position of opposing “innovation” in 
practice rather than insisting that practice follow his official decrees. 
Philip’s handling of these matters suggests two things about his government in Catalonia. 
First, the difficulty communicating his will seems to have grown out of his apparent ignorance of 
how the Captain General and the Audiencia worked together to administer the royal government 
of Catalonia. His consistent return to what had worked in the past by opposing all “innovations” 
(which were always the result of his own royal orders) suggests that Philip was primarily 
concerned with maintaining a functional government. By the time that these questions first arose, 
the new government had been in place for eleven years and its continued operation during the 
years of the king’s indecision confirmed that the centralization of authority in the Captain 
General was up to the task of governing, despite whatever delays and inconveniences it created.  
Second, it suggests that institutional practice and precedent continued to have considerable 
legal weight in Bourbon Spain despite the major changes imposed by the Nueva Planta early in 
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Philip’s reign. This is not to say that a practice’s age was the only thing that mattered, for this 
certainly was not the case. Instead, Philip acted as if established practice was more important 
than his own orders to his ministers. While Philip was clearly not afraid of reforming institutions, 
it would be a mistake to claim that he was only interested in the authority of his own words and 
the rational consistency of his bureaucratic institutions. At least in this case, he was willing to 
leave in place a system that worked despite the fact that it was operating in clear violation of the 
orders he had made when he created it. Yet he also insisted that it was his decision that 
established the proper operating procedure for these officials even as he consistently 
demonstrated gross ignorance about how they performed their duties. This did not matter, 
however, because both the Captain General and Audiencia always claimed to be following the 
king’s will, which was the only possible authority that could define the duties of royal officials. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
In each of these instances, Philip V demonstrated a pragmatic flexibility in the 
implementation of the Nueva Planta that led him to oppose homogenizing reforms and other 
“innovations” and instead to embrace particularism. In regard to the censo, he decided that the 
Nueva Planta had not extended the reduction in its rate to the Crown of Aragon and ultimately 
opposed his ministers’ articulate defense of the reduction. Through the preservation of 
Aragonese and Catalan civil law, Philip maintained a customary legal system that, by its very 
existence, practically and theoretically undercut the goal of legal uniformity throughout the 
kingdoms of Spain. Additionally, it structured social life in these kingdoms on a much more 
intimate level than criminal law did, suggesting that the practical consequences of its existence 
also undercut any effort to create a unified “Spain.” Finally, Philip’s support of the Catalan 
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Captain General’s usurpation of the Audiencia of Barcelona’s constitutional role again suggests 
that he was more interested in having a functional government than a centralized and uniform 
bureaucracy. Each of these case studies reveals a different way in which the old structure of the 
Habsburg composite monarchy survived the reforms of the early years of Philip’s reign.  
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Chapter Five: The Myth of Bourbon Absolutism 
 
 
When Philip V repealed the fueros and privileges of Aragon and Valencia on June 29, 1707, 
he claimed the authority to do so both as a just conqueror and as one of the powers that he held 
as king: “one of the principal attributes of sovereignty is the imposition and repeal of laws, those 
that with the variation of the times and mutation of customs I can alter, even without the serious 
and well-founded motives and circumstances” that led him to act in Aragon and Valencia. Philip 
went further, insisting that he acted because “I have judged it convenient (this because it is my 
desire...)” to create a uniform legal system, emphasizing his power to act as he willed and 
whenever he deemed it convenient.
1
 Philip’s insistence on his complete authority over the laws 
of his subjects at all times and in all circumstances reflects some contemporary views of the 
authority of rulers, such as those of French Bishop and political theorist, Jacques-Bénigne 
Bossuet.
2
 This view has been anachronistically identified as one of the central concepts of 
absolutism, a term that was only coined in the aftermath of the French Revolution, first 
appearing in Châteaubriand’s Essay on Revolutions in 1797.
3
 Without falling into the trap of 
ahistorical categories, how should one interpret Philip V’s understanding of royal authority over 
the law, especially in light of his political actions?  
The appearance of the term “absolutism” in the midst of the first French Republic accurately 
suggests that it is a category that is deeply shaped by the French Revolution. From the vantage of 
the present, it was clearly a system doomed to failure. The central role of the French monarchy 
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as the exemplar of absolutism has perpetuated these teleological assumptions, which have bled 
into the mainstream theories of state development that usually compare and contrast French 
centralization and absolutism with the (more) representative parliamentary monarchy of Great 
Britain. In broad brushstrokes, absolutism is usually characterized with a focus on the increasing 
centralization of the state and uniformity with which it related to its subjects. Philip V’s 
declaration in the Nueva Planta appears to affirm this understanding of absolutism as he 
emphasized his authority to legislate independently that he is exercising to “because of my desire 
to reduce all of my kingdoms of Spain to the uniformity of the same laws, uses, customs, and 
tribunals, governing all of them equally by the laws of Castile, which are praiseworthy and 
reasonable in all of the universe.”
4
 The first Bourbon king of Spain apparently brought the 
French form of absolutism across the Pyrenees.  
This mythic interpretation of absolutism must be squared with Philip’s actions, however, and 
these frequently undercut uniformity and demonstrate remarkable responsiveness to practical 
considerations that often led him to abandon the “absolutist” aspirations described in the initial 
decree of the Nueva Planta. While all of the Nueva Planta reforms together did increase the 
centralization of royal authority in the Crown of Aragon, decades of practical decisions 
following their implementation resulted in patch-work administration and legal framework. Even 
more shocking is the apparent success of this “poor” example of absolutism, for the Spanish 
Bourbons appear to have been at no risk of a revolution like that of 1789, and while the Spanish 
government has gone through many changes and been without a monarch at several points, a 
Bourbon sits on the throne of Spain today.  
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The surprising resilience of the Spanish monarchy in the eighteenth century challenges most 
interpretations of absolutism as it indicates that it was in some relevant ways more secure than 
that of France. What was the source of this strength? Philip V’s many reforms secured the 
Spanish monarchy by rearranging the institutions of Spain sufficiently that the king did not need 
to fight against old institutional barriers, but instead could do things like tax his subjects in the 
Crown of Aragon without their permission and use those funds in other parts of his vast domain. 
The institutions and laws of the Habsburg composite monarchy had prohibited this kind of 
action, but Philip’s decisive reforms removed these limitations on royal action. The strength of 
Philip’s rule following these reforms grew out of his freedom to respond to the situations that 
they encountered. Contrary to the traditional myth of Bourbon absolutism, this did not lead to a 
monarchy that ignored the desires of its subjects, but instead permitted the kings of Spain to 
respond to their subjects and make concessions. Without the institutional impediments to royal 
rule that Olivares, among others, had failed to remove in the seventeenth century, the Bourbons 
were able to act in a pragmatic way to address the specific needs and concerns of their subjects 
without seeking a universal solution negotiated corporately through the cortes. Instead, the king’s 
centralized authority enabled him to act in a particularist way that created a less uniform, but 
more stable, realm. 
As this chapter will demonstrate, Philip V acted in accord with Machiavelli’s advice in The 
Prince to implement his reforms swiftly and all at once, changing everything that one must at the 
beginning of one’s rule. While disorienting, the swiftness of the changes and violence mean that 
they come quickly come to an end, which allows everyone to begin to adjust to the new norm. 
By avoiding controversial reforms over the long-haul, this ultimately results in greater stability. 
The French Bourbons from Louis XIV to Louis XVI did not have an opportunity to reform the 
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entire system of government in France and had to continually reform their governing system 
throughout the eighteenth century. These reforms increased tensions between the monarchs and 
their subjects, a consequence that Machiavelli predicted and warned could lead to the downfall 
of unwise rulers.
5
  
To demonstrate the differences in the governing practices of eighteenth-century Bourbon 
Spain and France, this chapter will compare royal action in three different areas: the collection of 
taxes, the sale of offices, and the decline of representative assemblies. Royal policy in all three 
areas reveals the importance of privilege in both monarchies. It also demonstrates that the 
transformation of the relationship between king and privileged elite in Spain under Philip V freed 
him and his successors to protect privilege more effectively than their French analogues 
throughout most of the eighteenth century. The choices made by the monarchs in these three 
areas suggest that while the French monarchy found it necessary to challenge the privileges of 
the nobility and of venal office holders, the Spanish monarchy made fewer adjustments to both 
systems following the end of the War of Succession and the implementation of the Nueva Planta. 
The latter also negated the need for corporate negotiation in Spain, while in France the monarchs 
had to continue to circumvent the institutions that facilitated the corporate negotiation of subjects 
with their monarch as the regional estates continued to exist, even if they played a marginal role 
in the political life of the kingdom. 
While acknowledging these differences, one should not assume that they guaranteed the 
revolution in France and averted a parallel revolt in Spain. Both the Spanish and French 
monarchies increased centralization while respecting certain types of privilege to form a social 
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alliance in support of the monarchy.
6
 The asymmetry in these alliances and more aggressive 
efforts by the French bureaucracy to develop a direct system of taxation, while remaining 
dependent on the low interest rate that the privileged corps provided for them, reveals the variety 
of options open to early modern monarchs as they worked to increase their wealth, power, and 
prestige, while simultaneously seeking the support of the privileged elite within their realm.
7
 
Comparing the two monarchies also highlights the enduring Castilian and Aragonese influence 
on the structures and practices of Bourbon rule in Spain and cautions against the reading of 
Philip V’s rule that emphasizes the influence of Louis XIV to the exclusion of more Iberian 
models of royal rule.
8
 French influence ran deep in the court during the early years of Philip’s 
rule, but the governing practices employed south of the Pyrenees conformed to local traditions 
and expectations that generated a hybrid system unique to Iberia. 
 
I. Taxation and privilege 
In both France and Spain, the monarchies had to find ways to increase royal revenue while 
preserving the social alliance that linked the interests of the privileged elite with those of the 
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king.
9
 To satisfy the need for more funds, monarchs and reforms sought ways to tap the 
significant wealth that remained largely untaxed by traditional means. Reforms in Spain and 
France successfully increased royal revenue, and in both cases privilege remained central in 
defining the relationship between monarch and subject as neither the French nor the Spanish 
Bourbons sought the abolition of privilege. Instead, both had to renegotiate the relationship 
between privilege and taxation. In Spain this occurred quickly through the Nueva Planta reforms 
and focused on reducing the geographic privileges that limited the collection and use of tax 
revenue, while in France both geographic distinctions and the broad social exemptions from 
traditional forms of direct taxation, such as the taille, were gradually eroded to meet the demands 
of the royal treasury.  
The myth behind the tri-partite division of medieval French society explained the origin of 
the three estates based upon their contribution to society: the clergy ministered to the spiritual 
needs of the kingdom, the nobility fought on its behalf and upheld justice, and the third estate 
produced the material goods that satisfied the needs of daily life. The early modern monarchy 
ultimately took over the responsibilities of the nobility, adding a new essential task that was a 
prerequisite for the administration of justice and operation of the military—the collection of 
taxes. Exemptions to paying taxes, especially the taille, were increasingly granted to those who 
served the body politic in civil service based on the traditional divisions within French society. 
As the Parlement of Paris explained to Louis XVI in 1776:  
…every man in the kingdom is your subject, all are obliged to contribute to the needs of 
the State. But in this contribution one always finds order and harmony. The personal 
service of the clergy is to fulfill all the functions regarding instruction and religious 
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worship, and to contribute to the relief of the unfortunate by means of its alms. The noble 
devotes his blood for the defense of the State and assists the sovereign with its council. 
The last class of the nation, which is not able to render such distinguished services to the 
State, discharges its duty to it through tributes, industry, and physical work.
10
 
 
This division of services provided a justification for the division of French society into three 
orders and explained why the nobility and clergy were exempt from the primary direct tax in the 
seventeenth century, the taille. In fact, exemption from the taille came to be a socially significant 
demonstration that one was privileged, even for members of the Third Estate. Although it 
continued to be evoked, the myth of a tripartite society had less and less bearing on the actual 
composition of French society throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
11
  
The longevity of this myth reflects its usefulness in justifying privilege as a marker of 
legitimate differences between the members of society. This feudal heritage explained why the 
king protected the privileges of his subjects and why certain subjects deserved special treatment. 
The word privilege comes from the Latin for “private laws,” or a law that applies to one group or 
individual and not to the public at large.
12
 By the eighteenth century, the use of privilege had 
shifted away from anything resembling the ideal medieval society, but its feudal language 
continued to serve the king, who employed it to justify the privileges he bestowed on officials 
throughout the regions and municipalities of France.
13
 Louis XIV was particularly adept at using 
his own prestige to enhance the prestige of those connected to him as officials in his 
administration.
14
 This system collapsed the distinctions between the political and the social 
                                                 
10
 As quoted in Michael Kwass, Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century 
France: Liberté, Égalité, Fiscalité (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25. 
 
11
 Kwass, 25-29. 
 
12
 Bossenga, 5.  
 
13
 Beik, Absolutism and Society, 304. 
 
178 
 
through an emphasis on differences and privilege defined by service to the king. Exemption from 
the taille became an incredibly important mark of one’s status within this society of privilege, 
and therefore a powerful coin with which the king could attempt to purchase loyalty and support. 
Those who enjoyed privilege had an interest in protecting it, which required supporting the 
monarch who dispensed privileges and legitimized those who received them. In this way, the 
medieval myth became instrumental to the transformation of French society that took place in the 
early modern period. 
The eighteenth century was a period of significant innovation in this arrangement as the 
monarchy created new direct forms of taxation that threatened the exemption from the taille. The 
most important of these innovations were the capitation created to finance the War of the League 
of Augsburg (1688-1697), and the dixième, which financed the War of Spanish Succession 
(1701-1714). These new taxes were assessed on many of those who were exempt from the taille, 
including the nobility. Even those who remained exempt, such as the clergy, felt pressure to 
increase their voluntary donations to the royal finances with threats of becoming liable to the 
new taxes.
15
  
Questions concerning the implementation of the capitation and the dixième have long been 
an important field of historical research. This has become particularly true under the current 
“revisionist” interpretation of Bourbon France. Betty Behrens first raised the question of how 
taxation functioned within the ancien régime in 1963 when she asked, “Who did in fact escape 
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paying taxes? [And] in what ways and for what reasons did they manage to do so?”
16
 Her 
analysis, although limited by the scanty material available to her, demonstrated that at least some 
nobles paid direct taxes, such as the capitation and the dixième despite their exemption from the 
taille. Contrary to the then common tendency, especially among those interpreting the French 
Revolution as the result of marxist class warfare, to claim that the unprivileged were oppressed 
by the taxes that the privileged, including the nobility, avoided. Behrens convincingly argued 
that the nobles united with the Third Estate to resist the increased taxation, for both privileged 
and unprivileged who were heavily taxed.
17
 While her detractors, most notably Gerald 
Cavanaugh, noted that she had not proven that the nobility actually paid their taxes, subsequent 
studies have borne out her argument.
18
  
The work of Michael Kwass in particular has demonstrated that the French nobility did in 
fact pay taxes in the eighteenth century. For example, in the pays d’élection of Caen, the nobility 
paid the majority of the taxes assessed on them, effectively paying about 1.5 percent of their 
income in the direct tax of the capitation.
19
 Similarly, the dixième, which was created a few years 
after the capitation, laid a much heavier tax burden on all French subjects. It remained a larger 
tax throughout the eighteenth century despite theoretically being halved in 1749 when it was 
renamed the vingtième. The actual amount assessed did not drop with the new name, and since 
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the vingtième was doubled and tripled for much of the late-eighteenth century, the official rate 
was 11 or 16 percent, respectively. The dixième and the vingtième were collected with even 
greater efficiency than the capitation—in Caen, nearly all of the taxes assessed on the nobility 
were collected. While it is difficult to ascertain how much of their income nobles were paying in 
taxes, Kwass estimates that the actual rates that French nobles paid to the vingtième varied 
between 4.9-10.4 percent.
20
 It is worth noting that the unprivileged continued to pay even higher 
tax rates and that these taxes applied to privileged subjects, including the nobility, who now 
made considerable contributions to the crown’s finances. Those without the privilege of 
exemption from the taille continued to pay the highest tax rates, and yet the new taxes presented 
a significant challenge to the traditional link between privilege and exemption from direct 
taxation. These taxes also ignored the distinctions between the pays d’états, which officially 
made “free gifts” to the monarchy each year in lieu of taxes, and the pays d’élections, which did 
not have this privilege.
21
 The capitation, dixième, and vingtième levied taxes that applied 
uniformly across France for the first time and ignored the social and geographic boundaries that 
had traditionally organized and enshrined privilege in France. 
Probably because of their universal application, these new taxes were very effective at raising 
royal revenue. Contemporaries even attributed the Bourbon success in the War of Spanish 
Succession to the successful introduction of the dixième.
22
 Historians of France have emphasized 
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the long-term consequences of the new direct taxation, as it strained the French monarchy’s 
alliance with the privileged elite. These taxes antagonized the privileged classes that had come to 
look to the king as the source of their privilege in the preceding generation. Kwass has suggested 
that this could be one of the reasons that the nobility and clergy were supportive of the early 
French Revolution. If he is right, then the taxes that appear on one level as an indication of the 
tremendous power of the French monarchs eventually came to undercut royal power by 
antagonizing the privileged classes that the king had encouraged with his earlier particularistic 
policies.
23
 While Kwass and others make a compelling case, historians should avoid attributing 
the French Revolution to every policy of the French monarchy during the eighteenth century. 
While these taxes strained the relationship between the monarchy and the privileged elite that it 
depended upon, royal privileges and offices continued to be sought by those hoping to join this 
elite. The privileged only took “revolutionary” action when the monarchy became incapable of 
dispensing (or protecting) either because of its complete financial collapse.
24
 So while tax policy 
shaped and conditioned the alliance between the privileged and the monarchy in ways that 
mattered for the revolution, these changes were not an attempt to abolish privilege but rather a 
shift in the way that privilege defined how individuals contribute to the monarchy.  
There are many points of contact between the development of taxation in Bourbon France 
and Bourbon Spain, yet they diverge in two important respects. First of all, the Bourbons in 
Spain avoided any form of direct taxation that applied to the privileged elite. New revenue was 
raised primarily through increasing the taxation on the Crown of Aragon, which had traditionally 
paid much less to the royal treasury than the Crown of Castile. Second, the administration of 
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taxation within Bourbon Spain depended upon municipal officials more than in France. While 
the new royal officials, such as the intendente, had important roles in managing the finances of 
the regions, they were dependent on municipal officials to provide them with information and to 
collect revenue.
25
 This dependence on local officials reinforced the importance of pursuing a 
policy of particularism so that these officials were supportive of the monarch. Thus, while the 
Nueva Planta significantly changed the role of regional privileges in shaping taxation, it did not 
lead to an attack on privilege qua privilege, as the monarchy continued to depend upon a social 
alliance binding the privileged civil elite to the crown.  
The goal of financial reform was to distribute the burden of paying for the war and other 
expenses of state more evenly across the kingdoms of Spain, addressing the fiscal “imbalance” 
between the Crowns of Castile and Aragon identified by the Count-Duke Olivares and various 
arbitristas throughout the seventeenth century.
26
 Even more problematic than limitations in the 
monarchy’s ability to tax the Crown of Aragon was the requirement that money raised in it had 
to be spent there, and could not be put into the general treasury. With the Nueva Planta, these 
privileges no longer existed and tax reform could focus on reducing the consequences of 
privilege based on geography rather than individual or corporate status. While differences in the 
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relationship between the monarch and his various kingdoms persisted, as the following 
discussion makes clear, Bourbon tax policy worked to raise revenue from the kingdoms of the 
Crown of Aragon. The Nueva Planta reforms removed the traditional privileges and institutions 
which had prevented the imposition of new taxes in these kingdoms, and royal officials 
immediately began working to increase tax revenue to finance the war. While these efforts 
demonstrated the new relationship between the king and these kingdoms, they also reveal the 
continued process of particularist negotiation as those paying the taxes acted to adjust royal 
policy. With the initial Nueva Planta decree of June 1707, however, these institutional limits on 
reform were removed and the door was opened to new forms of taxation in the eastern kingdoms 
of Spain. 
Philip V first took a step toward centralizing the administration of his finances throughout his 
kingdoms by creating the new office of the intendente. Philip V’s first French minister, Jean 
Orry, initially proposed creating the office of intendente following the model of the Castilian 
corregidores in 1703, but nothing came of these suggestions. The idea was revived in 1711 by 
the Duke of Bergeyck, who created the first intendentes in Spain following a French, rather than 
a Castilian, model. Initially they were deployed throughout Castile and the Crown of Aragon, but 
the Castilian intendentes only duplicated pre-existing channels of administration and were soon 
dismissed. Their role in the eastern kingdoms remained important during the war, however, 
because of the need to provision the troops stationed there and to oversee the collection of 
taxes.
27
 In Catalonia, the intendente absorbed the functions of the Tribunal de Comptes and the 
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administration of the Real Hacienda that first assumed fiscal control over the kingdoms of the 
Crown of Aragon with the abolition of their fueros.
28
   
In 1718 the role of the intendentes was revised under the auspices of Philip’s first minister, 
Cardinal Alberoni, and they were reestablished in Castile, although the office was once again 
abolished in provinces without troops in 1721.
29
 Nevertheless, they remained in the Crown of 
Aragon without interruption through their final integration into the Bourbon administrative 
system in 1749 under Ferdinand VI.
30
 The duties of the intendentes were defined by Don José 
Patiño, who divided their responsibilities into four categories: finance, maintaining good order 
[policía], justice, and war. Their primary duty, however, was to oversee the troops and their 
financial provision. They also assumed the authority and duties of the Castilian corregidor, 
which mainly involved fiscal administration.
31
 Although the intendentes are often characterized 
as military officials, they primarily provided for the financial needs of the army, while the 
Captain Generals oversaw military operations. As contemporary French observers noted, even 
this more limited role was more than any one person could fulfill. The Council of Castile 
indicated similar concerns and forced the reduction of the office of the intendente to a purely 
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financial office in 1721.
32
 During these frequent changes and reversals of policy, the intendentes 
remained the most important financial officials in the kingdoms of Aragon.
33
  
These new intendentes served the royal government by implementing various tax reforms in 
the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. Unconstrained by the Cortes, the Bourbon monarchy 
could finally address the long-standing uneven tax burden of the Iberian kingdoms. To begin this 
process, Philip V reassigned the Secretary of the Council of Castile, Melchor de Macanaz, and 
sent him to Valencia in 1707 to report on the state of taxation in Valencia and suggest ways to 
improve it. Macanaz’s success in this effort led to his assignment to Aragon in a similar capacity 
in 1711. These positions gave Macanaz tremendous influence at a crucial moment in the creation 
of the new financial system in the Crown of Aragon.
34
 Macanaz advocated the introduction of 
some of the most important and effective taxes from Castile. Taxes in Castile were not actually 
systematic, but instead a complex collection of taxes developed over centuries of negotiation 
between the monarch and the cities of Castile. The most important taxes, accounting for more 
than ninety-percent of royal revenue, were divided into three categories: the “rentas 
provinciales,” the “rentas estancadas,” and the “aduanas.” The category of rentas provinciales 
included fifteen major taxes that were subdivided into forty-six distinct categories of taxation. 
The alcabala was the most important of these taxes, which was ostensibly a ten-percent tax on 
all commercial activity. In the seventeenth century, the Cortes of Castile added a four-percent 
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tax, called the cientos, to the alcabala, bringing the total tax rate on commercial activity to 
fourteen percent. The rentas provinciales also included the millones, a grant of several thousand 
ducats originally for the second Spanish armada sent to conquer England under Philip II that had 
subsequently become a regular tax. There were many other old feudal taxes included among the 
rentas provinciales as well. The rentas estancadas, meanwhile, were the royal monopolies which 
produced regular income from the sale of salt and tobacco, among others. Finally, the aduanas 
were import tariffs.
35
  
The most problematic aspect of the description of Castilian taxes, however, is that the rentas 
provinciales officially had almost nothing to do with actual tax collection in Castile. The 
monarchy was entirely unequipped to collect such complicated taxes, so beginning in the 
sixteenth century, the royal treasury operated through a process called the encabezamiento that 
involved assessing towns their share of the tax based on their population. Town councils would 
then decide how to collect the amount for the king. In general, these municipal officials avoided 
property taxes and taxed the sale of key consumer goods, such as wine, meat, and oil, which 
meant that the poor paid a large portion of the cities taxes.
36
 This system proved very reliable for 
the monarchy, as it provided a high degree of predictability and reliability for tax collection.
37
 
The Spanish crown’s dependence on the towns of Castile for royal revenue increased in the late 
seventeenth century as the monarchy began to bypass the Cortes and negotiate tax assessments 
directly. This coincided with these towns’ growing role in provisioning troops stationed near 
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them directly through payments in kind, all of which reflect the monarchy’s adoption of 
particularism and devolution under Charles II.
38
 
The complexity of Castilian taxes, and the disconnect between what they were supposed to 
be and how they were actually collected, led to considerable confusion when they were first 
implemented in the Crown of Aragon. The first attempt to raise taxes there began with the 
imposition of the alcabala in Valencia and Aragon. The alcabala was assessed at a rate of 14% 
on all commercial transactions and was charged on every item brought into the city of Valencia 
in 1707.
39
 This led to a dramatic overnight rise in prices in the city of Valencia. Everyone who 
brought goods through the gates of the city had to pay the tax before they could enter that led 
food sellers to stop bringing their goods into the city. This understandably led to “innumerable 
complaints and great disorder.”
40
 The historian Francisco Cánovas Sánchez attributes this 
consequence to the inflexibility of Juan Pérez de la Puente, the superintendant of finance in 
Valencia and the official responsible for the administration of the alcabala.
41
 These results were 
unacceptable and, following this disastrous first year, the encabezamientos were never reissued, 
effectively ending all efforts to collect the alcabala. Cities throughout the kingdom of Valencia 
struggled to pay the tax in addition to meeting the demands of the occupying military forces that 
naturally appeared more pressing to the local officials and military officers. In Aragon, the 
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alcabala was even less successful. The Crown dropped the nominal almost immediately from 
14% to 5%, but this large concession proved insufficient. Continued petitions from Zaragoza to 
suspend the tax met royal refusal. Efforts to impose the alcabala in Aragon between 1708-1711 
were foolhardy at best, since Bourbon forces had only tentative control of the kingdom during 
this period. Ultimately, the alcabala brought in a disappointing amount of income. Although 
Henry Kamen’s calculations indicate that this tax increased royal revenue despite these 
problems, the alacabala was officially abandoned in the Crown of Aragon by 1714.
42
 The 
assessment of unpopular new taxes that had no basis in local practice in the midst of war proved 
unenforceable and ineffective. As Melchor de Macanaz noted when he reviewed the failure of 
the alcabala in the Crown of Aragon, “the people do not understand this mode of taxation.”
43
 
The failure of the attempt to impose Castilian taxes in the Crown of Aragon led to further 
innovation. The ever-resourceful Macanaz presented a new plan to Philip V in 1713, suggesting 
the creation of a new supplementary tax that would be equivalent to the many Castilian taxes not 
in force in Aragon and Valencia. This “equivalent” tax would avoid the confusion of the 
Castilian system and be much less expensive to enforce.
44
 This reform also benefited from secure 
Bourbon rule following the Peace of Utrecht and the improvement of the Valencian economy.
45
 
Each kingdom had a different name for this “equivalent” tax, but in each case it was almost 
identical in practice. 
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The Valencian equivalent tax, known as the equivelente, was first assessed in 1715 at 
800,000 Castilian Pesos.
46
 This proved too high for the Valencians, however, so they petitioned 
the intendente twice before asking Philip V to lower the tax assessment on February 2, 1717. 
They requested its suspension for a year and the remission of their unpaid taxes from 1716. 
These requests were denied, but the equivalent tax assessment was reduced to 518,186 Pesos in 
1718. This value was more realistic and the equivelente became the principal source of royal 
income from Valencia during the eighteenth century.
47
 The supplementary equivalent tax was 
successful in the other kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon as well. In the Kingdom of Aragon, it 
was known as the única contribución. Initially it was assessed at 533,000 Pesos,
48
 before being 
quickly reduced to 333,000 pesos,
49
 where it remained for the duration of Philip V’s reign.
50
 
Philip V imposed an equivalent tax on Catalonia in 1715, where it was known as the catastro. 
The catastro was initially assessed at one-and-a-half million Castilian Pesos, but this was based 
on the Catalan economy as it was before the war. As in Valencia and Aragon, the initial 
assessment was unrealistic and it dropped to 900,000 Pesos by 1718.
51
  
Even though Macanaz tried to create a more efficient and rational tax system, this was not a 
“modern” direct tax that ignored privilege. Instead, the equivalent taxes were based on 
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longstanding models and had more in common with the old French taille than with the dixième. 
By respecting the many individual and corporate privileges that the king had granted, the 
equivalent taxes affirmed the role of privilege in linking the social elite’s interest with those of 
the king.  
While the implementation of these equivalent taxes was much more successful than the brief 
attempt at raising the alcabala in the Crown of Aragon, royal officials encountered several 
challenges while enforcing the new equivalent taxes. At times, the king’s subjects remained 
unable to pay. For example, the Intendente of Valencia, Don Luis Antonio Mergalina, wrote to 
Don Joseph Rodrigo on August 27, 1720 explaining that many Valencians could not afford to 
pay the equivalent tax because of the high interest rate on their debt in censos. The Intendente 
encouraged the king to reduce the rate in Valencia to three percent—the same rate as in Castile—
so that the kingdom would have sufficient resources to pay its taxes. While the matter was not 
resolved by Philip, the intendente properly identified the tensions between various royal policies 
and how they could complicate the enforcement of each other.
52
 Many Valencians also received 
these censo payments, complicating the king’s desire to increase the taxable income of his 
subjects. In this case, Philip V’s indecision reflects caution in regard to the interests of the 
privileged elite, many of whom depended upon income from the censo.  
Tax evasion also became a serious problem with the equivalent taxes in the Crown of 
Aragon. Molas Ribalta’s study of the Catalan town of Mataró in the eighteenth-century revealed 
years of systematic falsification and fraud committed by the city council in the payment of the 
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catastro.
53
 There were also other cases of tax evasion. In September 17, 1720, the Captain 
General of Catalonia, Don Francisco Caetano de Aragon, wrote to the Don Joseph Rodrigo to 
explain that the bailes and justicias of Catalonia were not enforcing with sufficient “rigor” the 
decree which required robbers and those convicted of “insults” (insultos) pay the catastro.
54
 
Apparently many municipal officials were not collecting taxes from these criminals, which led to 
noticeable shortfall in tax receipts. Local officials in Catalonia demonstrated their ability to 
interfere with tax collection. 
City Councils were not the only source of problems. The Archbishop of Tarragona also 
interfered with the collection of the catastro. The Primate of Catalonia, the Archbishop of 
Tarragona, claimed that all of the sharecroppers (colonos) who worked land owned by his 
archdiocese were immune from the catastro in late 1724. On January 6, 1725, the Intendente of 
Catalonia, Don Andréz Perez Braseho brought this to the attention of the king and the Council of 
Castile, explaining that this extension of privileges would cause many problems—he feared its 
extension to the (lay) seasonal workers who helped to collect straw and wool on clerical lands, in 
addition to the sharecroppers who regularly worked them. He cautioned that the redistribution of 
the catastro among the reduced number of people subject to it would lead to “a most 
considerable reduction in the value of the catastro.” The alternative suggested by the Intendente 
was to let the royal treasury (real fisco) cover the cost for the sharecroppers and respect the 
exception that appeared to be legitimate to many, including the juez de competencias. The 
Council advised the king to resolve the matter himself by writing the Archbishop of Tarragona 
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directly (through the via reservada) and declare his solution as quickly as possible. While Philip 
does not appear to have responded with the urgency that his council advised (no resolution is 
recorded), the Archbishop’s willingness to challenge the crown and extend his tax privileges to 
those who worked his land suggest tense relations between the Archbishop and the Crown and 
yet another source of opposition to the king’s efforts to increase the royal revenue.
 55
  
These attempts at tax evasion by municipal and ecclesiastical officials indicate the limits of 
Philip’s tax reforms. While there were many difficulties collecting these equivalent taxes, the 
reforms dramatically increased royal income from the Crown of Aragon. In part, this reflects the 
limits on royal taxation and the use of money collected in the Crown of Aragon prior to the 
Nueva Planta reforms. The stability of these new taxes for nearly thirty years under Philip V and 
Luis I provided much-needed predictability for the reconstruction of the Valencian, Catalan, and 
Aragonese economies. Even if their tax burdens were higher than they had previously been, they 
were consistent and predictable.
56
 In fact, the equivalent taxes in the Crown of Aragon remained 
fixed at the same value for most of the eighteenth century. As prices rose steadily throughout this 
period, the tax burden because less onerous throughout the century.
57
 
These fiscal reforms, along with the rest of the Nueva Planta, increased tensions between the 
Bourbon monarchy and the Valencians, Aragonese, and Catalans. Naturally, the loss of their 
traditional privileges, which for centuries had prevented increased royal taxation despite the 
Habsburgs’ efforts, was a source of frustration. The early appeals for suspension of the new 
taxes, although effective at reducing the tax assessments, reflect the unpopularity of the reforms. 
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Some in the royal government were aware of these tensions, as the creation of the Junta del Real 
Erario in Aragon reveals. This Junta, composed of eight Aragonese officials, shared jurisdiction 
over the financial administration of Aragon with the intendente beginning in 1711. The new 
Intendente, Melchor de Macanaz, had just left Valencia to assume this post and refused to share 
this power. Macanaz eventually convinced Philip V to disband the Junta rather than lose his 
services.
58
 This clearly reveals the tensions between some of Philip’s ministers and his subjects 
in the Crown of Aragon. The end of the Junta de Erario undoubtedly frustrated those who had 
served on it, as well as others who may have hoped for more lax tax enforcement from the Junta.  
This account shows that Philip V could and did act in accord with traditional descriptions of 
absolutist monarchs. Nevertheless, the taxation regime in Bourbon Spain continued to respect 
local and regional customs and preferences, not because of royal weakness but rather because 
Philip had no interest in abolishing a society based on privilege. While the new equivalent taxes 
were much simpler than the Castilian tax system, taxes continued to vary in administration and 
amount between the kingdoms of the Spanish Bourbons. Numerous individuals and corporations 
remained exempt from taxation. Even though geography mattered less under the Bourbons than 
under the Habsburgs, it still shaped taxation in meaningful ways as the Spanish monarchs 
continued to respect privilege on its new standing after the Nueva Planta reforms. 
Royal policy was also shaped by the local officials who ultimately collected the taxes for the 
king. These officials were, in turn, limited by the amount that royal subjects would pay. This is 
clear from the revolt of the Valencian town of Peñiscola. Valencian concerns about their inability 
to pay the equivalent tax had led the town’s governor, Don Sancho de Echevarría, to reduce the 
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tax rate on the grain harvest. This was not enough for the citizens of Peñiscola, however, as 
Henry Kamen explains: 
...the day after Echevarría’s measure a man got up publicly to say that the people would 
pay only at gun-point. When the governor ordered his arrest, a riot broke out in the city. 
The populace proceeded to take over the whole of Peñiscola, threatening death to all the 
town councillors and the army officers. At least one councillor was killed in the 
disturbances. In a successful attempt to pacify the rioters, the governor went out to them 
and promised, in the king’s name, pardon for their actions and freedom from current 
taxes. This seems to have brought the disturbances to an end. Fearful of the possibility 
that other similar events might recur in a realm so recently pacified by royal troops, the 
government took a soft line. The king decided to keep the promises made in his name, 
until such time as the ringleaders in Peñiscola could be singled out and punished. The 
crisis passed, and Valenica remained quiescent.
59
 
 
Clearly the residents of Peñiscola found an effective way to communicate their concerns about 
the equivalente. What is most telling, however, is that Philip V chose to back Echevarría’s 
promises, indicating his recognition of the need to adjust his tax policy in light of his subjects’ 
inability to pay. It is also worth noting the importance of reliable ministers under the new system, 
since Echevarría’s promises ended the revolt. This helped to maintain Philip’s control by 
properly balancing local concerns and the king’s financial needs.  
One might suspect that tax evasion, negotiation, and concessions to privilege and violence 
would lead to insufficient royal revenue in Spain. Surprisingly, the financial position of the 
Spanish monarchy was dramatically better than that of the French throughout most of the 
eighteenth century. The Spanish crown’s revenue grew twice as quickly in real terms from the 
1720s to the 1780s as that of France.
60
 While the crown’s “credit rating” was worse than that of 
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many of its regions, leading it to pay a relatively high interest rate on its debt, the Spanish 
monarchy avoided accruing debt much more effectively than did the British or French. On 
average, only seven percent of the Spanish treasury’s income was spent servicing debt from the 
end of the War of Succession until the 1780s. During the same period, the British and French 
governments spent between one-third and one-half of their budgets servicing debt. Even after the 
Spanish crown had significantly increased its debt preparing for war in 1793, its “national” debt 
per capita was only five percent of the British that year.
61
 The difference appears to be that the 
Spanish government was more cautious in borrowing money despite the willingness of lenders to 
lend and the continual military engagement during this period.
62
 While the reason that the 
Spanish crown borrowed so much less has not been settled—Regina Grafe has suggested that it 
had to do with the fragmentation of authority that remained in Bourbon Spain—it is clear that the 
Bourbons in Spain had sufficient revenue despite their avoidance of direct taxes like the 
capitation and dixième.
63
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Finally, it should be noted that the Bourbons in Spain did attempt to impose a direct tax on 
all economic activity and wealth in the mid-eighteenth century under Ferdinand VI. It was called 
the catastro and applied throughout Castile. Ferdinand even obtained authorization from the 
Pope in 1757 to collect the tax from the clergy. It was abandoned shortly thereafter, however, 
because of the united opposition of the clergy and nobility to the loss of their fiscal privileges. 
The project was attempted again in 1770 under Charles III, and failed a few years later because 
of the opposition.
64
 These attempts at direct taxation demonstrate that the Spanish Bourbons 
were willing to attempt reform, but they ultimately proved more responsive to the opposition of 
their privileged elite than the French. The failure of these reform efforts and continued financial 
success of the Spanish monarchy for decades following the reform efforts demonstrate that the 
indirect tax systems of the ancien régime could serve royal interests effectively.   
The different approaches to raising royal revenue employed in Bourbon Spain and Bourbon 
France are significant. While Louis XIV had used particularism to solidify his reign and 
discourage a repeat of the Fronde, in the final wars of his reign he undercut this system by 
imposing the capitation and the dixième which threatened the privileges of elite. The Spanish 
Bourbons demonstrate the alternative fiscal possibilities as Philip V’s new taxes in the Crown of 
Aragon continued along particularist lines by respecting the privileges that he gave to his 
subjects. The abolition of the fueros and Cortes in the Crown of Aragon freed Philip to more 
consistently affirm individual and corporate privileges because he had demonstrated that 
privilege came from the king and had also increased royal revenue through the equivalent taxes. 
This may have worked to the advantage of his successors as the taxes in the Crown of Aragon 
                                                                                                                                                             
Spain remained heterongenous in some important ways, but it is unclear why Grafe believes that 
this point has been long established.   
 
64
 Gelabert, 230-231. 
197 
 
did not alienate the privileged members of society. In both cases, the Bourbon’s raised royal 
revenue through challenging traditional sources of privilege. The central difference is that the 
Spanish Bourbons only raised taxes on the regions that had ostensibly forfeited their privileges in 
the War of Succession, while the French Bourbons threatened the privileged elite who had 
remained demonstrably loyal to the monarchy.  
 
II. The sale of offices and privilege 
The sale of offices, both in the eighteenth century and now, has a bad reputation as an 
inherently corrupt system—after all, it suggests that possessing the money that enables one to 
buy an office is the only necessary qualification for dispensing justice or whatever other official 
duties the position might entail. Even worse, in modern political discussions, whenever money is 
discussed in relation to politics, the implication is that money is buying some sort of “public 
action.” This was not the case with venality, however, as those purchasing offices were acquiring 
the privilege and duties of exercising royal authority of rather than any particular policy change 
or political favor. The office certainly might confer certain privileges upon the office holder, 
such as ennoblement, yet it did not guarantee the venal officeholder a particular political 
policy.
65
 Rather than the sale of political action, venality was a system for transmitting public 
responsibilities to those who invested in the success of the monarchy.
66
  
The system of venality supported the Spanish monarchy in different ways than in France. 
First, it was a source of revenue in each. This played out differently between them, however, as 
the kind of property that one acquired when purchasing an office was fundamentally different 
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between Spain and France—in the former, it was simply access to an office, while in the latter 
one owned the office as a heritable good which could serve as collateral for a loan and yielded 
consistent income. Second, the sale of offices gave officeholders an interest in supporting the 
king as they were now members of his administration. This linked their prestige and power to 
that of the monarch—the more glorious the king, the greater the honor of serving him. Because 
of this connection, venal offices functioned as an important mechanism for social mobility.  
Nevertheless, the systems of venality in Spain and France differed significantly in their 
configuration despite these broad similarities in purpose and function. The systems were 
asymmetrical as municipal and local offices could be purchased in Spain, while key positions in 
the king’s household and in the parlements could be purchased in France despite attempts to end 
the sale of local offices. These differences reflected different understandings of justice and their 
concomitant legal traditions. The result was that venality in France functioned as a state system 
of finance increased royal dependence on its privileged creditors and generated an increasingly 
independent judicial system, while in Spain it was an ad hoc source of royal revenue that 
facilitated the formation of a municipal elite. As with the variation between tax reform in Spain 
and France, these two systems of venality show how traditional practice and local expectations 
could shape the decisions of absolute monarchs in early modern Europe. 
Venality was always contentious in France with various arguments made both in support of 
and against the practice of selling offices stretching back to the fifteenth century.
67
 Critics 
charged that the sale of offices gave too much autonomy to the office owners. Their 
independence and prestige grew through the annexation of royal authority, which worried 
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proponents of centralized monarchical rule. Efforts to reform the system of venality always faced 
an up-hill battle as venality was an essential part of the Bourbon government in France. The 
monarchy was in a very real way dependent on this system and could not afford to fundamentally 
alter it. This system was based on the monarch’s need for financial capital and competent 
bureaucrats and administrators, both of which were met by selling offices to the increasingly 
wealthy bourgeois gentlemen studying law at the university system. In return for their wealth and 
expertise, they received property in the administration of the state—possession of an office 
conferred the right and duty of exercising royal sovereignty within its jurisdiction to the office 
owner. This property provided a reasonable monetary return for the investment in the gages, or 
wages paid by the king, the prestige associated with holding the office, and the power of the 
exercise of the office.
68
 The strength of the French state made these investments worthwhile. It 
could protect monopolies granted by offices and was capable of collecting taxes from those 
subject to the taille, which made the exemption from the taille granted by many offices an 
appealing privilege. With the persistence of family control over these offices beginning in 1604, 
family strategies among the elite in France were shaped around the purchase and preservation of 
offices. The relationship between officeholders and the king was one of the central pillars 
supporting the Bourbon monarchy in France.
69
  
Just as importantly, venality functioned as a system of state credit. Venal offices in France 
were property providing regular income that could be sold by the office’s owner and inherited by 
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an heir. As property, offices were very similar to property in land. Offices could be used as 
collateral for a loan in much the same way. Individuals could borrow money at lower interest 
rates than the monarchy, and so the creation and sale of offices became a way to persuade 
individuals to borrow on the behalf of the monarchy at these lower rates.
70
 Sometimes it was 
difficult to find new buyers for offices, so the king would increase the wages of an office, known 
as the augmentations de gages, and demanded an additional lump-sum of capital from the office 
holder to pay for the increased value of the office.
71
 The officers owning this property were very 
often organized into corporate bodies, or corps. These corps, such as guilds, became increasingly 
important in the eighteenth century as it was more efficient for the king to negotiate 
augmentations de gages with these corps than with separate individuals. Even more importantly, 
the corps would often collectively borrow and send the new capital to the king on the behalf of 
its members at low interest rates because these corps could enforce the payment of its debt by its 
members. The corps functioned within the French system of venality as a way to efficiently 
borrow at low interest rates for the monarchy in exchange for the privileges, wages, and power of 
holding an office.
72
 This system was yet another dimension of the alliance between the monarchy 
and the privileged elite in France.  
The expansion and contraction of this system was primarily driven by the fiscal needs of the 
monarchy, and this was largely determined by the costs of frequent war. The Dutch War, the 
Nine Years’ War, the War of Spanish Succession, the War of Polish Succession, the Seven 
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Years’ War, and the American War each led to an expansion in the venal system.
73
 A 
tremendous amount of capital was tied up in these offices—by 1722, property in royal offices 
totaled approximately 750 million Livres and it continued to grow throughout the eighteenth 
century.
74
 This wealth had become essential to the French crown’s finances and the property of 
office-holders was much too large for the king to buy them all out had he desired to do so, but by 
the 1720s there was increasing recognition that the system of venality was in dire need of reform.  
Reform was attempted at various points, usually in times of peace when royal finances were 
in better condition. Each of the major ministers from Louis XIV’s reign through 1789 attempted 
to reform the system in some way. Colbert, Desmaretz, John Law, Maupeou, Terray, 
Lamoignon, and Necker each attempted reform in various ways with varying degrees of success. 
In almost every case, these efforts pursued the twin goals of reducing the number of offices and 
increasing the amount of royal revenue extracted from office holders. Reducing the quantity of 
venal offices required compensating those losing their offices, usually through paying the last 
office holder the wages for ten to twelve years following the abolition of the office. At no point 
did a king of France ever contemplate abolishing an office without some form of compensation 
for the loss in property.
75
 This meant that only in times of relative peace and prosperity could the 
king attempt a reduction in the number of offices. These efforts, even when successful, were 
usually reversed with the creation of new offices to meet the financial demands of a subsequent 
war.  
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In part, this reflected the fact that the creation of new offices was one of the most effective 
ways for the monarchy to quickly raise a significant amount of revenue. An easy way to do this, 
and to guarantee that the offices would be purchased, was to create an office with the monopoly 
on a previously free trade, such as wig-making.
76
 By 1690, it became increasingly difficult to 
find opportunities like this, however, and many offices were created whose service was either 
unnecessary or undesirable.
77
 The difficulty in creating new offices that had willing buyers led to 
more creative means of extracting revenue from office holders. Since the 1520s, office owners 
were at risk of losing their office even after they had passed it on to a designated successor if 
they died within forty days of the new officer taking possession. This forty-day rule was a blatant 
effort by the king to bet on the deaths of his subjects, and it became such a concern that by the 
reign of Henry III it was possible to buy an exception to this rule for one-third of the original 
price of the office.
78
 This was much too costly for many officeholders, however, and Henry IV 
introduced the more affordable option of paying the paulette, or more commonly, the annuel, 
with which an officeholder could purchase a one-year exemption from the forty-day rule for only 
one-sixtieth the price of the office. This turned the sale of exceptions to the forty-day rule into a 
source of regular income for the crown, and it was continually tinkered with—the re-assessment 
of office values and the granting of several-years’ exemption for a lump sum worth several 
annuel’s were both common practice during periods of war.
79
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The greatest changes came in the late-eigtheenth century. Under Maupeou, the offices were 
revalued based on their market values rather than their original sale price and assessed a one-
percent tax, called the “hundredth penny,” on this new value. It was a much more effective way 
to raise regular revenue from officeholders than any prior reform, although it naturally inspired 
many complaints from those subject to the new tax. This new income was then used to buy-out 
office holders and reduce the number of venal offices in the kingdom.
80
 While the surprising 
death of Louis XV led to Maupeou’s replacement and the reversal of many of these reforms, the 
hundredth penny remained a fixture of royal finance.  
Maupeou’s short-lived reforms, along with the subsequent reform efforts of Lamoignon and 
Necker, demonstrated that the system of venality could be reformed in radical ways and 
increased the defensiveness of officeholders.
81
 This threat to the system created a backlash 
against these reforms, as venal officeholders began to view themselves as a group with united 
interests opposed to the goals of the king. Surprisingly, they began to defend the sale of offices 
as a check on tyranny as officeholders held their authority independently from the goodwill of 
the monarch. In this reading, venality was an institution that defended the liberty of the king’s 
subjects.
82
 The increasing tensions between the venal officeholders and the king challenged the 
alliance between the monarch and the privileged elite, as officeholders were less willing to 
negotiate individually with the king and increasingly interested in uniting to bargain with him in 
defense of their common interests.
83
 Just as the capitation, dixième, and the vingtième united the 
French against their monarch by undercutting the privileges that had been the foundation of the 
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king’s support among the nobles, the attacks on venality strained the alliance between the king 
and his subjects and reinforced their sense of unity in opposition to him to protect their 
privileges. In both cases, fiscal necessity had led to royal policies that drove a wedge between the 
king and his privileged subjects, threatening the social order of the ancien regime. This was 
ultimately the result of fiscal necessity and the weakness of the French monarchy to protect these 
privileges and meet its financial obligations. 
In early modern Spain, the system of venality was broader and more flexible than in 
France—in fact, it is difficult to describe as an enduring “system” in any real sense. Venality was 
not limited to offices in Spain, but included privileges that were entirely unrelated to serving in 
the royal bureaucracy. For example, it was possible to purchase certification of limpieza de 
sangre, or the “purity of blood” designating a person as an “old Christian” free from the 
suspicion associated with moriscos or conversos. As Jean Pierre Dedieu has noted, our categories 
for making sense of an institution like this are challenged when offices and one’s heritage are for 
sale through similar channels.
84
 While this study will focus on the sale of offices, it is important 
to keep in mind that this practice operated within the larger system where more was available for 
sale than in France. 
As in France, the sale of offices served a key role in selecting individuals to serve in the royal 
bureaucracy, although with perpetual charges of corruption. The system was not a zero-sum 
game in which the king always gained or lost through each sale. The absence of venality does not 
necessarily indicate greater royal authority and its presence does not necessarily confer improved 
capacity for royal action.
85
 As in France, it was a trade-off between the twin needs to find 
someone to fulfill a task and to raise funds for the royal treasury, and the dual costs of alienating 
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the king’s authority and incurring the long-term costs of paying the officer’s salary. Venality was 
deeply entrenched in Habsburg Spain and the most important positions in the monarchy were for 
sale. For example, in 1699 the offices of both the Mayordomo Mayor in the king’s household 
and the Presidency of the Council of Castile were purchased. All of this changed with Philip V, 
who issued a royal order less than six months after his ascension in 1700 suspending the sale of 
offices and canceling the titles of those involved with the administration of justice, including the 
governors and corregidores in the colonies, at the cost of returning the money that these officials 
had paid for them.
86
  
This last point indicates another significant difference in how venality functioned in Spain 
and France—the bureaucratic level of the offices for sale. In Spain, positions in the audiencias 
and chancillerías, which were the most important royal courts in each region, were never for 
sale.
87
 Even in the Indies where these offices might be for sale, their owners were never 
permitted to choose their successor. This state of affairs contrasts starkly with the sale of offices 
in the parlementes throughout France that came to provide them with a degree of autonomy from 
the king as they demonstrated in the latter half of the eighteenth century. At the same time, the 
Spanish monarchy sold the key offices on the local level while the French monarchy took steps 
to reclaim control of municipal offices. These differences created a sort of inverse distribution of 
offices between the two states, which Dedieu suspects accounted for many of the differences in 
their political systems in the eighteenth century. He has recently noted that there has been no 
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adequate comparative study of venality between Spain and France to explore these 
connections.
88
 While this study cannot fulfill that role, it will begin to unpack these differences 
and consider their relevance for a more general understanding of the divergence between Spain 
and France in the eighteenth century.
89
  
The lack of venality in Spanish judicial appointments reflects long-standing legal limits on 
the expansion of venality. Officially purchasing an office only granted the position to the 
individual who bought it and offered little beyond this. It was illegal to purchase offices as 
hereditary property was outlawed. This prohibition was circumvented by the purchase of the 
privilege of resignation in favorem, or resigning in favor of another person. Still, the legal 
prohibition on permanently annexing royal authority through the purchase of an office prevented 
the creation of a system of credit through venality as existed in France.
90
  
In general, royal appointment was limited by several factors. The individual appointed had to 
be technically competent. He also had to be socially acceptable to the political elite who held 
similar offices since the new official would need to be able to interact with them to fulfill the 
duties of his office.  Finally, the candidate had to respect the authority of the king who had given 
him the office. There were a number of offices that officially could not be sold. Participation in 
the Cortes, as its members were technically representatives of the cities and not of the king, 
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could not be sold. Neither could judicial appoints because justice, while dispensed by the king, 
belonged to the community. This collective possession of justice meant that the king could not 
sell corregimientos, positions in the audiencias, or seats in the councils. These officials were 
chosen based solely on their competence and money was not permitted to enter into the king’s 
choice.
91
 The differences between Spain and France on this matter reflected deeply divergent 
understandings of the nature of communal justice.  
In Spain, venal officeholders on the municipal level held considerable ability to influence 
local affairs. While these officeholders generally worked with the king who sold them their 
offices, they would sometimes oppose his actions when they appeared to threaten their 
privileges. They both could and did act to protect their interests when they believed the king’s 
actions opposed them. For example, in 1739 Philip V sold twelve new offices of regidores in 
Valencia to some of the newly rich families from the area, but the city council of Valencia 
refused to recognize several of them and the king had to exercise “all of his authority” to impose 
the candidates.
92
 The king’s sale of an office did not guarantee a social rise all by itself—
ultimately society had to decide that. All that the king could do was to provide an office as a sign 
indicating the social significance of the new office holder who must convince his community’s 
elite that he deserved their favor and respect. While the king could insist on recognition of his 
officers, this was sufficiently costly and troublesome that he eventually gave up doing so in 
Valencia. In 1765, he officially granted the city council the right to examine the suitability 
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(idoneidad) of candidates to fill its vacancies.
93
 This reflects the king’s respect for these local 
institutions even when he had the power to dictate terms. In Spain, the Bourbons were more 
interested in cultivating local favor with the ruling elite than in taming them through political or 
military force.  
The sale of offices was one of the most effective mechanisms that the king had to develop 
these urban oligarchies as a check on the noble seigniorial lords who had traditionally been the 
most powerful figures in rural Spain.
94
 It provided a way for new families to join the hidalguía 
and the municipal elite that was a crucial channel for social mobility. Even though most offices 
available for sale in the eighteenth century were municipal, families would purchase offices in 
various cities within a region to acquire increased influence and prestige.
95
 This enabled families 
to elevate their standing within the region even though they were generally prohibited from 
purchasing regional offices such as a position in the audiencia. In this way enterprising families 
could still use venality as a vehicle for social mobility. 
While the asymmetry between the offices for sale in Bourbon Spain and Bourbon France was 
generally in force, the historian Francisco Andújar Castillo has examined in detail the exception 
that proves the rule, which must be kept in mind. From 1704-1711, Philip V engaged in the 
unofficial sale of offices on a tremendous scale to fund the war and find officials who were 
invested in his success in the War of Succession despite officially banning the practice on 6 
March 1701.
96
 The sale of offices was conducted secretly and through private channels, managed 
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by the financier Bartolomé Flon under the watchful eye of the French ambassador. These sales 
have long gone unnoticed as the titles of those purchasing these offices do not mention the price 
paid because they were technically free gifts that went into the general treasury.
97
  This sale of 
offices was distinctly different from the French system of public finance through the sale of 
offices regulated by the corps as secrecy limited the purchase to a one-time appointment to the 
office.
98
 This ad-hoc system of selling offices to finance the War of Succession ended abruptly in 
1711—a year with several important Bourbon victories including the reconquest of the kingdom 
of Aragon.
99
 These secret sales briefly defied the standards of the system of venality in Spain 
under the Bourbons, but were immediately dropped when the income that they generated was no 
long essential to the war effort. While these sales demonstrate that Philip could act contrary to 
the law that he himself had promulgated, Andújar Castillo considers these sales ultimately as an 
indication that the monarchy was in a “position of clear fragility.”
100
 In a sense this is true, as it 
demonstrated the monarchy’s profound and immediate need for money. At the same time, these 
offices were only valuable if Philip was successful in the war—holding a position in the losing 
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monarch’s administration was usually a mark against an official, as the Archduke Charles’ 
appointees discovered after the war. Philip’s ability to sell these offices suggests that his 
government retained credibility as a meaningful institution even during its most desperate 
moments in the war.
101
 The end of the sale of these offices also coincided with the recovery of 
royal revenue from taxes and other sources that in 1713 was nearly double that of 1703.
102
 
The stark differences between the French and Spanish systems of venality reveal how long-
standing legal traditions and expectations could shape institutions despite the absolute power of 
these monarchs. While Philip’s use of the sale of offices to finance the War of Succession 
demonstrates that these could be violated when necessary, it created significant problems and 
was conducted secretly, indicating that these traditions continued to shape the behavior of the 
king and those purchasing the offices.
103
 Similarly, while there were ways to get around the 
general prohibition of purchasing heritable property in an office, the necessity of creative legal 
instruments prevented the development of a system for the annexation of royal sovereignty 
through the sale of offices. The legal variations concerning the sale of offices in France and 
Spain shaped the kinds of credit available to the monarchies. They also defined very different 
opportunities for social mobility through the purchase of offices although both systems provided 
a way for ambitious families to increase the prestige, power, and income. These differences 
suggest two key ideas which must remain in tension. First, early modern rulers could make 
meaningful choices in how they employed the sale of offices as there was more than one way to 
exercise royal authority to finance wars, cultivate the support of local elite, and reinforce the 
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prestige of the crown. Second, although there were many ways to pursue these ends in the 
abstract, in practice the institutions and expectations of a monarch’s kingdom and subjects 
shaped the viability of these possibilities, pushing their rulers toward particular methods for 
selling offices and away from others.  
Additionally, it is worth considering the contemporary belief that venal office holders were 
more independent because their position did not depend on the good will of the king to the same 
extent as traditional appointees who lacked property in their position. While Spanish venal office 
holders had fewer legal protections, municipal officials consistently demonstrated their 
importance to the royal administration and their ability to influence royal policy. The king 
ultimately could force his will upon them, but this required a significant investment of time and 
expense and likely reduced his ability to make requests from the city governed by those officials. 
As revenue and soldier quotas were often requested from municipalities who were left to raise 
the funds and men however they chose, the king needed a good relationship with the urban 
oligarchs throughout his realm. The sale of municipal offices allowed these oligarchies to 
maintain long-term control over their cities, increasing the king’s need to cultivate their good 
will. Similarly, the parlements autonomy in France permitted them to function as centers of 
authority that could challenge royal action in their jurisdiction. While the French monarch had 
considerable clout, venality did provide adequate security for some officials to complicate the 
operation of the royal bureaucracy. The asymmetrical concentration of venal officeholders on the 
regional level in France and on the municipal level in Spain could be one reason that the Spanish 
Bourbons pursued particularist policies more consistently than their relatives across the Pyrenees 
during the eighteenth century.  
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III. The decline of “representational” assemblies 
The authority to legislate is central to the early modern understanding of an absolute 
monarch. As the historian of political thought, J.H. Burns, argued, an absolute ruler rules 
independently, rather than arbitrarily. Jacque Bénigne Bossuet’s definition also recognized the 
limits on this power, describing it as “subject to reason,” even while affirming the monarch’s 
power to “to disregard law, custom, privilege and established rights in the interest of the 
common good of his subjects.”
104
 Similarly, Bodin’s apparently unlimited understanding of 
sovereignty was in fact limited to the power to command what is in conformity with divine and 
natural law, much as Thomas Aquinas had argued.
105
  
Despite such far-reaching theoretical power, there were institutional limitations on royal 
power, especially that of taxation. In the French pais d’états and the kingdoms of Spain, the 
various Estates and Cortes, respectively, had to approve new taxes. The regional estates 
primarily functioned as institutions that forced negotiation between the king and the local elite 
concerning the amount of taxes that the region would pay. This actually worked out well for both 
sides, since the resulting assessment was a balance between local ability to pay and the King’s 
needs—William Beik has even suggested that the French kings may have been better off had all 
of their regions had Estates because these negotiations were effective at avoiding tax revolts and 
providing consistent funds to the crown.
106
 Perhaps, however, the Estates of Languedoc, which 
Beik studied, survived the mid-seventeenth century because they were so effective, unlike the 
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Estates of Normandy and Dauphine that were suppressed under the Cardinals Richelieu and 
Mazarin.
107
 Even when successfully negotiating the amount of taxation, the Estates found 
themselves in an increasingly weak position relative to the crown as the eighteenth century 
proceeded. While they continued to negotiate the amount the pais d’états paid, rather than 
maintaining the fiction that this was a “free gift” as the dons gratuits given for the taille did, the 
capitation and dixiéme were paid in the form of abonnements, or lump sums of money paid by 
the province in lieu of the direct taxes. Even though this was still a meaningful privilege not held 
by the pays d’élection, it was decidedly not a gift. Additionally, the crown proved itself willing 
to revoke this privilege and assess the vingtiéme directly, as it did from 1750-1755 under the 
controller-generalship of Machault d’Arnouville.
108
 While the actual negotiation taking place in 
the provincial estates may have been effective, the history of the French Estates from the 
fifteenth through the eighteenth century is one of declining relevance and influence. The absence 
of a meeting of the General Estates for nearly two hundred years only underscores this fact.
109
 
The story of declining relevance is even more noticeable for the Spanish Cortes. In the late 
seventeenth century, the Cortes of Castile was called less frequently and the negotiation of taxes 
for Castile increasingly took place directly between the Castilian towns and the king.
 110
  This 
shift towards particularism in Castile served as a model for the new government in the Crown of 
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Aragon under Philip V. With the abolition of the Corts and Cortes in Aragon, Catalonia, 
Valencia, and Mallorca, he officially gave these kingdoms representation in the Cortes of Castile, 
making it more similar to the Estates General of France. This did not ultimately lead Philip or his 
successors to call the Cortes into session. It only met three times following the end of the War of 
Spanish Succession: in 1724, to hear Ferdinand VI’s oaths and confirm him as Philip’s heir; in 
1760 to swear in Charles III’s son, Carlos Antonio, as the prince and heir to the throne; and in 
1789 to confirm Ferdinand as the heir and to repeal the Salic laws banning women from 
inheriting the throne.
111
 These sessions accomplished nothing of substance beyond clarifying the 
succession, and the Bourbon monarchs had no interest in letting them do more—the Cortes of 
1760 lasted only five days, reflecting its singular purpose. The Cortes had even less of a role to 
play in eighteenth-century Spain than did the Estates in France.  
Under the Bourbons in both Spain and France, the Estates and Cortes were institutions that 
theoretically facilitated the communication between the monarchs and their subjects, but in 
practice this negotiation was limited to the quantity of the tax assessment in the French pais 
d’états. In this regard, the Spanish Bourbons had fewer institutional limits than their French 
counterparts as the regional Cortes were nearly all abolished by Philip V during the War of 
Succession.
112
 This increased the importance of local municipal officials who became the key 
figures in negotiations with the king as the intermediate institutions no longer existed. In both 
Spain and France, kings preferred to deal with their subjects more directly through particularistic 
negotiation rather than through the traditional “representational” assemblies that had governed 
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negotiations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This marks an important shift toward 
more direct—and possibly more personal—rule by the Bourbon kings. By reducing the Estates 
and the Cortes to irrelevance, subjects had to turn to other channels to communicate their 
concerns to the king. Direct appeals to the king and his ministers became increasingly important 
because there were fewer alternatives. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
The similarities and differences between Spain and France do not map neatly on to a one-
dimensional continuum of “more centralized” versus “less centralized.” Instead, they suggest the 
significant degree to which early modern monarchs had to balance competing concerns even 
while they enjoyed significant legal freedom. Negotiation between monarchs and subjects should 
not be viewed as a zero-sum game. Subjects were invested in the success of their ruler for the 
maintenance of order and peace and monarchs depended upon the support of their subjects. The 
Bourbon kings in Spain and France attempted to protect their interests and to preserve the 
alliance that linked the privileged elite to the monarchy. How this looked and functioned differed 
significantly between the monarchies and continued to change during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. The changes were not identical, however, as both monarchies were limited 
by the traditions and institutional expectations of their subjects. Thus Philip V could secretly sell 
offices to pay for the War of Succession while his grandfather employed new forms of direct 
taxation to accomplish the same goal at the same time. In neither case should one assume that 
these systems guaranteed or averted the French Revolution. Instead, they reveal how rulers and 
subjects in different places had varying preferences and expectations for how such increasingly 
costly conflicts would be financed. In both cases, the Bourbon kings ruled through creative 
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engagement with the institutions and customs that legitimized their rule to persuade their elite 
subjects to finance the growing expenses of government.  
This comparison also highlights the centrality of privilege to the rule of the Bourbons in 
Spain and France. The desire to reform the systems of taxation and venality were driven by fiscal 
concerns, but they could not be extracted from the complex network of privileges that bound 
subject to monarch. Reform of either system required adjustments in the meaning of various 
privileges and their exercise. In the Spanish case, Philip V’s reforms in the Crown of Aragon 
freed the Spanish Bourbon’s from many of the institutional limits on royal action and provided 
them with the ability to protect privileges as they had already implemented a functional fiscal 
system that endured for a century. While the attempt to impose a direct tax system in the mid-
eighteenth century in Spain ultimately failed, this did not cause serious financial problems for the 
Crown. Meanwhile, in France there were more tax reforms and adjustments to the system of 
venality throughout the eighteenth century. In both cases the French monarchs demonstrated a 
willingness to redefine the role of privilege, but this long-term challenge to how the privileged 
elite believed they should be treated by the Crown strained the social alliance that had linked 
their interests to those of the monarchy. While this was not the immediate cause of the French 
Revolution, which came about because of the financial collapse of the monarchy, the leading role 
of nobles and clergy in the subsequent Estates-General and National Assembly suggests that the 
traditional role of privilege in French society had shifted in dramatic ways.
113
  This was not a 
necessary development of absolutism, however, as the Spanish Bourbon’s demonstrate. Early 
modern rulers had a variety of paths of reform available that they followed with surprisingly 
varied results.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 
The legacy of Philip V’s reforms and governing practices remained important topics in the 
political discussions taking place in eighteenth-century Spain. When Charles III of Spain called 
the Cortes of Castile into session in 1760 to confirm his son, Charles Anthony, as the heir to the 
throne, the delegates of the four capitals of the Crown of Aragon used this meeting to suggest an 
alternative to the structure of the political union in the Memorial de Greuges, or the Petition of 
Grievances.
1
 This document reveals the terms in which contemporary critics of the Nueva Planta 
expressed their opposition and their suggestions for an improved royal government. On both 
accounts, the Petition reveals continued regional variation and the preference for particularism in 
Bourbon Spain.  
The delegates who presented the Petition explained that Philip V had a noble goal when he 
attempted to create “equality and uniformity between the parts which would result in the great 
benefit of the body of the monarchy.”
2
 The Nueva Planta fell short of this goal, however, as the 
officials who oversaw the creation of the new government “did not have enough time, nor did 
they have the experimental understanding that was required to judge which innovations were 
useful and which had to be abandoned as dangerous to the public and to royal authority.”
3
 
Without sufficient time or a working knowledge of the government that they were reforming, 
these ministers were unable to implement a smooth transition to the new government. Hasty 
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action and ignorance of local expectations increased the difficulty of implementing these 
reforms. 
The Nueva Planta’s failure to promote equality could be seen in the evident inequality in the 
distribution of royal and ecclesiastic offices. On the local level, the selection of municipal 
officials by lot from among the citizens had been replaced by royal appointment.
4
 The presence 
of many foreigners from Castile in the administration of the Crown of Aragon was damaging 
because they did not understand the laws and customs of those they governed. Philip V opened 
all offices to all of his subjects to create “a perfect equality in the distribution of the charges and 
awards” among his subjects without regard to nationality.
5
 In addition to the many positions in 
the Crown of Aragon held by Castilians, most positions at the court, in Castile, and throughout 
the New World also remained in Castilian hands.
6
 The residents of the Crown of Aragon’s 
inability to acquire offices was a mark of disgrace which cut them off from social and political 
advancement. Instead of increasing equality among his subjects, the Nueva Planta had led to 
greater inequality through the near exclusion of the Aragonese, Catalans, Mallorcans, and 
Valencians from royal office.  
The delegates of the Crown of Aragon did not attribute this failure to a deficiency in 
Castilian law. Instead, they emphasized that the laws of Castile “are very just and very useful for 
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the kingdoms in its Crown.”
7
 These virtues were not transferable to other kingdoms according to 
the Petition, and the laws of Castile were demonstrably ill-suited to the needs of the Aragonese, 
Catalans, Valencians, and Mallorcans:  
…just as the human body is not one and perfect but its parts, while distinct and 
dissimilar, obey the head or the soul that resides in it, so also is the unity and perfection 
of the body of the monarchy but its parts or provinces, while they have different civic 
laws, obey and are subjects of Your Majesty. Your royal will, Lord, is a supreme 
universal law that unites all and obligates them to sacrifice their properties and lives in 
the defense of Your Majesty and of the common good. The difference of the government 
and of the civil laws of the kingdoms of Spain are not opposed in the apex to the 
sovereignty of Your Majesty, nor to the union of your vassals, nor to the true policy… 
prudence and the same natural reason dictate that as the provinces have different climates 
and different types of people, their laws must be different so that all can be well ordered 
and the body of this monarchy happy.
8
 
 
The differing character of the people and environment of the kingdoms of Spain required laws 
tailored to their peculiar needs. Any attempt to impose a single legal code, no matter how good it 
was, would cause problems. The delegates from the Crown of Aragon used the traditional image 
of the body politic to explain these differences and justify the need for several legal codes all 
under the single absolute authority of the king. Rather than presenting a challenge to his 
authority, they framed the multiplicity of Spanish legal systems as a strength that emphasized the 
preeminence of the king’s will as the only supreme law that could unite his kingdoms.  
The delegates defended this vision of a political body composed of different kingdoms by 
noting how commonplace this arrangement was: “Perhaps the monarchies of France, Austria, 
and others are left alone as perfect because the provinces that compose them have different 
laws?” Within Spain the value of legal variation had been demonstrated as well. The delegates 
noted “the prudent diversity” in civic laws and in the many legal differences that continued to 
distinguish the four kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon. They invoked the precedent of James I of 
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Aragon, who, after conquering Valencia and Mallorca, “did not give them the laws of Aragon, 
nor of Catalonia, but instead gave them other special laws that were well-suited to make them 
happy.”
9
 James also prevented Catalans from holding offices in Valencia, reserving those 
positions for local subjects.
10
 Because of James’ “generosity” toward those he conquered, his 
son, Peter III, was able to conquer Sicily and Naples due to the “prodigious generosity with 
which his faithful vassals spilled their blood.” Similarly, when the Crowns of Castile and Aragon 
were united in the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabel, they “did not think of altering the ancient 
laws with which they had governed and maintained their flourishing kingdoms in the Crown of 
Aragon.”
11
 The genius of this system, according to the delegates, was that it recognized that each 
province was uniquely different and convinced that its institutions were better than those of 
everyone else. Each kingdom would accept its own laws, while rejecting the laws that were best 
suited to its neighbor. This system also avoided the inequality between the kingdoms as each had 
access to enough offices for the kingdom. The success of the Spanish composite monarchy was 
unsurprising, as “those great kings and their wise advisors, knowing that following natural law, 
fathers with families must govern their own houses and citizens [must govern] their cities, they 
understood as a consequence of this [natural] law that it was very just and very beneficial that 
each kingdom govern its own citizens, subordinate to the supreme will of their sovereigns.”
12
 
According to the delegates, the distinctive natures of these kingdoms had to be respected for the 
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good of the kingdoms and of the king.
13
 When Philip V implemented his reforms, he did so with 
the laudable aim of improving the equality of his kingdoms. His reforms’ failure had now shown 
that legal uniformity among the kingdoms of Spain promoted Castilian dominance in all of his 
kingdoms and threatened the happiness of both subjects and monarch. 
The delegates from the Crown of Aragon did not expect a revocation of the Nueva Planta 
despite their rosy reading of the history of the Spanish composite monarchy and condemnation of 
the failure of Philip’s reforms. Instead, the delegates addressed specific problems with practical 
solutions. Rather than calling for the reinstatement of the Council of the Crown of Aragon, they 
asked that the kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon receive equivalent representation in the Council 
of Castile—specifically, they requested six seats for the Aragonese kingdoms, which 
corresponded to the number of seats reserved for the other kingdoms in Castile. This would be 
more consistent with Castilian practices. The delegates also asked that Corregidores and 
municipal officials be chosen from among the local population.
14
 The delegates also encouraged 
the king to appoint local bishops. They noted that this was important for the spiritual good of his 
subjects and that it would be more consistent with established practice in Castile and throughout 
Christendom following the Council of Trent. Appointing bishops who could speak Catalan in 
Catalonia, Valencia, and Mallorca was important as “laborers” in these kingdoms did not 
understand Castilian. For practical reasons the appointment of bishops who spoke the vernacular 
was common in the New World, and the delegates believed that the same principles applied to 
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the Crown of Aragon.
15
  Finally, they asked that the king appoint local judges as they would 
understand local legal practice and customs better than foreign appointees. This was especially 
important because of the preservation of Aragonese, Catalan, and Mallorcan civil laws.
16
  
All of these requests shared the goal of facilitating each kingdom’s ability to have a greater 
role in its government so that they could be better subjects. This would be more just and would 
restore the subjects of the Crown of Aragon to the king’s good grace—the delegates repeatedly 
mentioned that they felt like foreigners cut off from the king’s favor and the honor that they 
deserved. Their exclusion from royal favor reduced their support for the king—from whom they 
felt estranged. The delegates recognized that these reforms might appear to limit the king’s 
authority, but they countered with the unlikely image of a locked room:  “One does not lose the 
liberty of entering and exiting a room... if one retains the key to open it whenever and however 
one chooses. The sovereign just will of Your Majesty is the only key that opens the door to 
award those who are worthy and closes it to those who are not. It is the law that admits those and 
excludes the others.”
17
 The king alone could give privilege to the worthy, and the delegates 
urged him to recognize the worthiness of the residents of the Crown of Aragon by appointing 
them to royal offices. Rather than challenging royal authority, they implored the king to use his 
authority to strengthen the bonds between subject and monarchy in their kingdoms. Philip V, 
Charles’ father, had begun the new government in the Crown of Aragon and now Charles had the 
divinely appointed destiny “to perfect it” and restore equality to all of his subjects.
18
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The most striking aspect of the Petition of Grievances is how it linked the diversity of the 
king’s subjects and kingdoms with the sovereignty of the king’s will. By respecting the variety of 
laws and customs that his subjects had developed through their distinctive histories and in 
response to their unique circumstances, he could promote their well-being and protect his own 
authority from encroachment from his citizens. The creation of a barrier preventing the citizens 
of one region from governing those of another meant that the only force that united the kingdoms 
of Spain was the monarch. While many historians and political theorists, including Tilly and 
Weber, have considered this the mark of a weak political union or an undeveloped state, the 
delegates from the Crown of Aragon believed it heightened the king’s authority by elevating him 
above all of his subjects in a unique and compelling way. A composite monarchy was stronger 
than a unified one, and centralization could actually prove to be a weakness. While the reforms 
proposed by these delegates were largely ignored, they demonstrate an important line of political 
thought in eighteenth century Spain that made sense of Spanish political developments through 
the language of bodies and assumptions of the distinctiveness nature of each of the several 
kingdoms of Spain. The Petition’s discussion did not include language of centralization or 
devolution, but instead focused on practical suggestions to improve both the equality of the 
kingdoms of Spain and their subjects and the supreme authority of the king.  
The Petition of Grievances also reflects the continued divisions between the kingdoms of 
Spain following the Nueva Planta reforms. As this dissertation has argued, the lack of legal 
uniformity in Bourbon Spain did not diminish royal authority, but could promote it by allowing 
the king to find a practical balance between the needs of the monarchy and those of his subjects. 
By pursuing particularist policies throughout the Crown of Aragon, the king could address local 
concerns without implementing wide-reaching reform that would inevitably create as many 
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difficulties as it solved. This dramatically non-ideological approach to governing conforms to 
Philip V’s lack of interest in political theory. Instead, he focused on finding practical ways to 
achieve the common good rather than implementing some ideal form of absolutism. His tutelage 
under the anti-absolutist archbishop of Cambrai, Fénelon, may have cultivated this outlook, 
although more research should be done on this topic.
19
 Given his relative silence on the theory of 
governing, Philip’s political actions remain our best source for understanding his view of royal 
authority. These indicate a strong preference for legal variation and privilege over any 
aspirations for a centralized and uniform state.  
To understand the significance of Philip’s reforms and his other political actions requires an 
understanding of the Habsburg practices of governing the composite monarchy of Spain in the 
late seventeenth century. The institutional arrangement of the Habsburg composite monarchy 
enabled the king’s subjects to play competing authorities against one another to accomplish their 
goals. While it had traditionally depended upon the representative assemblies of the Cortes, 
under Charles II these were avoided in favor of direct particularist negotiation. This new 
arrangement should not be read as a clear sign of royal incompetence, however, as it proved very 
effective at mobilizing men and resources during Charles frequent wars. In moments when the 
Habsburgs could ignore the traditional limits on their authority, such as following the revolts of 
Catalonia and Messina and their subsequent reconquest, Philip VI and Charles II demonstrated 
their willingness to assert royal supremacy while also preserving many of their subjects’ 
privileges. In the case of Catalonia, the composite monarchy survived intact following the revolt, 
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which suggests a conviction that the Catalan privileges ultimately served the interests of both 
monarch and subjects. 
Philip V adopted a different course of action when he reconquered the Crown Aragon 
following its support of the Archduke Charles in the War of Spanish Succession. While many of 
the king’s advisors suggested preserving the privileges of these kingdoms as Philip IV had in the 
1650s, Philip’s initial decree of the Nueva Planta proclaimed a radical new relationship between 
the king and his subjects, who would all be ruled by “the same law.” One month later, however, 
he began to retract this vision of a united Spain under a universal law by restoring many of the 
privileges of those who had remained loyal to Philip during the War of Succession. As the war 
progressed and new questions about the government of the Crown of Aragon arose, Philip chose 
to preserve a growing number of these kingdoms’ privileges as well, including their civil laws. 
The resulting institutional arrangement of Spain preserved the outline of the Habsburg composite 
monarchy with many privileges dependent upon membership in kingdoms, towns, guilds, 
families, and the like. Nevertheless, the Crown of Aragon’s privileges were no longer grounded 
in medieval precedent, but instead on fidelity to the living Bourbon monarch who restored them 
to his faithful subjects. This shift more closely linked the exercise of privilege with obedience to, 
and the good will of, the king. 
Philip and his ministers strayed further from uniformity and centralization in the years 
following the War of Succession. In his surprising break from the Nueva Planta, Philip 
continued to prefer specific practical solutions to sweeping reform, even when this led to legal 
and administrative inconsistency throughout his kingdoms. When faced with questions 
concerning the creation of a universal interest rate on censo debt throughout his kingdoms, he 
left rates higher in the Crown of Aragon than in Castile. He apparently made this choice because 
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the change would cause too many problems because of the different set of contracts that would 
be changed there, where many more contracts fell under the broad category of censo, 
complicating any attempt at broad reform. Similarly, when the Captain General of Catalonia 
usurped power assigned to the Real Acuerdo by the Nueva Planta, Philip affirmed the change 
and opposed “innovation” in administrative practice, which required innovation in the official 
legal authority of these officials. Custom trumped law in Philip’s decision as he cared more 
about what worked than what was technically correct according to his own proclamations. 
Finally, the preservation of Aragonese, Catalan, and Mallorcan civil law resulted in these 
kingdoms having a deductive criminal law based absolute rules that it attempted to apply to 
particular circumstances, while at the same time having an inductive civil law based on 
contradictory customs and practices. These two fundamentally opposed legal traditions now 
existed within the same jurisdiction, creating a less coherent legal arrangement than the 
composite monarchy in which they existed next to each other in distinct kingdoms. In each of 
these cases, Philip V chose to affirm the practical solutions of his ministers and the entrenched 
interests of the local elite. Particularism, not a grand vision of universal monarchy, defined 
Philip’s approach to settling disputes concerning the implementation of his early reforms.  
If Philip rejected the Habsburg precedent of the composite monarchy and only inconsistently 
followed Castilian models, perhaps he instead followed the example of his relatives in France. 
While many historians have argued that he did precisely that, this thesis is ultimately 
unconvincing because of the significant differences in the Bourbon monarchies’ governing 
practices that persisted during the eighteenth century. While rulers on both sides of the Pyrenees 
depended upon the support of their privileged subjects and faced significant fiscal needs, the War 
of Spanish Succession provided Philip V with an opportunity to redefine his relationship with his 
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subjects all at once—an opportunity that did not come to the French monarchs. This change 
allowed the Bourbons in Spain to affirm privileges throughout the eighteenth century as they had 
found a sufficient balance between royal needs and the willingness of Spaniards to support the 
monarchy through taxation and the purchase of offices. In France, the Bourbons continually 
adjusted the privileges of their subjects—and the costs of enjoying these privileges—which 
eventually undercut the privileged elite’s support for a monarchy that appeared to threaten their 
status rather than defend it. While both dynasties avoided traditional representational assemblies, 
the Spanish Bourbons proved more responsive to the interests of their privileged elite. The 
French king’s ability to impose direct taxation on the nobility and to demand new funds from 
venal office holders reflects the power of the monarchy, but the need for these measures reflected 
its inability to find alternative sources of income and ultimately weakened the social foundation 
of the monarchy. The Spanish Bourbon’s ability to avoid this trajectory proved to be a source of 
strength and stability as it successfully maintained its role as the defender of the society based on 
privilege in Spain. The tremendous innovations of the initial Nueva Planta decree gave Philip V 
and his successors considerable flexibility to restore or promote privileges, even if this came at 
the expense of uniformity and centralization. Avoiding the creation of the “state-like” institutions 
necessary for the assessment and collection of direct taxes on all royal subjects proved to be a 
source of stability that helped the Spanish monarchy to avoid an event like the French 
Revolution.  
Naturally, it would be ridiculous to assume that Philip V acted to avoid the French 
Revolution. What can be concluded from his governing practices, however, is the open and 
contingent nature of institutional development and the Spanish Bourbon’s flexibility in 
responding to challenges as they arose. Philip certainly would not have chosen the War of 
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Spanish Succession if he had the ability to choose a secure and uncontested ascension instead, 
but it provided the context in which he was able to alter the relationship between the Crown of 
Castile and the Crown of Aragon in a significant way with long-reaching consequences that 
provided certain advantages to him and his successors. When he did this, he was not pursuing a 
more “absolutist” monarchy or a more centralized and uniform state, but instead sought practical 
solutions to the problems at hand. This involved creative engagement with the traditional 
institutions of the monarchy and the customs of his subjects that yielded surprising and 
unpredictable results.  
These conclusions demonstrate the danger of attempting to create totalizing theories to make 
sense of the past; all too often these theories take the present as the “natural” goal of the past. As 
the present is a moving target continually in flux, such theories require frequent reinterpretation 
to identify the new agents of “progress” who attempted to create the present world. Rather than 
teaching us about the past and tempering our judgment of the present, such theories only reveal 
to future generations our own inability to understand any alternative to our own lived 
experience.
20
 The example of Bourbon Spain demonstrates that early modern monarchies could 
relate to their subjects in a number of ways that do not easily fit into categories such as 
“centralized” or “decentralized.” Instead, the Bourbon monarchy created a new configuration of 
privilege that strengthened the local elite, the monarchy, and the role of privilege in defining 
Spanish society. This set of governing practices followed a distinctly different path of 
development than that pursued by the Bourbons in France and demonstrates that while the 
eighteenth century was a period of significant institutional innovation throughout Europe, there 
was no single obvious model for an early modern monarch to follow. Each ruler had to choose 
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how to respond to her circumstances without a clear path of development and her choices created 
a variety of distinctive institutions mediating the ever-changing relationship between ruler and 
ruled. With sensitivity to these variations, it is possible to see alternatives to the unnecessary 
dichotomy between centralization and devolution that is transcended by particularism as it was 
practiced by the Bourbons in eighteenth century Spain.  
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